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WHEN ENTREPRENEURS OF COMMERCIAL
NONPROFITS DIVORCE: IS IT ANYBODY'S
BUSINESS? A PERSPECTIVE ON
INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
NONPROFITS
EVELYN ALICIA LEWISt
In this Article, Professor Lewis explores numerous issues
raised by a relatively recent phenomenon: the blurring of
traditional distinctions between the nonprofit and for-profit sectors
of our economy due to increased commercial activity by nonprofit
organizations. Specifically, Professor Lewis examines a divorce
law question that, because of sector-blurring, is of growing
potential relevance: Should a nonprofit entity's value be included
for purposes of property-division allocations upon divorce when
a divorcing spouse is a controlling manager of a small commercial
nonprofit (a "closely held commercial nonprofit")? In answering
this question affirmatively, Professor Lewis compares the interests
of a manager/controller of a closely held commercial nonprofit to
the ownership rights of a shareholder of a for-profit close
corporation and finds no principled distinction between the two
situations.
More expansively, Professor Lewis uses the divorce law
question as a window for examining the control power of
managers of closely held commercial nonprofits and various
matters of more general applicability, resounding in close
corporation, property, nonprofit, and divorce law. These matters
include sector-blurring's power as an intersector of not only
divorce and nonprofit law, but also other legal arenas that
formerly seemed unrelated; the forces which entice
entrepreneurially oriented individuals to select a nonprofit, rather
than a for-profit, form as a medium for creating new value; the
operations of closely held commercial nonprofits (and,
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inferentially, of a number of other types of small nonprofits), with
particular focus on the implications of the nondistribution
constraint imposed on nonprofits; the necessity for legal rules that
recognize size and substance differences between nonprofits; and
the importance of context to the discernment of the meaning of
"property."
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I. INTRODUCTON
Once upon a time the God of Charity ruled the world of
altruism; his children were called the "Nonprofits" and they
facilitated the provision of sustenance, health, education,
religion, culture, and the like to their mortal descendants.
Charity shared the universe with the Goddess of Commerce,
who ruled the world of capitalism and business. Her children
were known as the "For-Profits"; they facilitated their mortal
descendants in profit-seeking endeavors. Occasionally, the
Nonprofits and the For-Profits joined forces for a common
purpose, but their spheres of operation generally remained
separate. Government, the Ruler of the Universe, could easily
tell them apart for purposes of regulating their rights and ac-
tions; it generally treated each group differently, with distinct
rules for each. But then some of the children of Charity and
Commerce began marrying each other, spawning progeny
with mixed attributes. These progeny became known as the
"Commercial Nonprofits." This Article is about the most self-
contained and self-controlled of this new group: the closely
held, commercial nonprofits. It examines whether the mortals
who control and operate these nonprofits should be con-
sidered "owners" of the business interests held in the
nonprofit form for the purposes of property-division al-
locations upon divorce of these operators. But this is not a
bedtime story or a Greek myth.
Last year "Big Bird" and his Sesame Street neighbors grossed $31
million for their creators. "Barney," the purple dinosaur of Barney
1. Ellen Edwards, PBS Missing Out on "Barney" Bucks: Tie-Ins Reap Millions for
Creators, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1993, at Al, A8; see also Paul B. Brown & Maria Fisher,
Big Bird Cashes In, FORBES, Nov. 5, 1984, at 176 (arguing that Sesame Street has become
commercial despite its educational purpose); Carl T. Hall, The Marketing of Nonprofit
'Sesame Street': Licensing Contracts Bring in Millions, S.F. CHRONICLE, Dec. 30,1991, at
B1 (noting that Sesame Street generates approximately $50 million annual revenues for for-
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& Friends, reportedly made as much as $50 million.' Both programs
have a primarily educational purpose, an admirable aim which
qualifies, along with a number of other purposes,3 as a "charitable"
endeavor, deserving of preferences under tax and other laws.4 Both
programs serve the same basic group of patrons and customers. Both
are produced by companies that received initial start-up funding in the
form of sizeable gifts donated by grantors5 principally interested in
"purpose accountability" rather than "profit accountability."6 Both
generate most of their profit from ancillary, commercial activities-the
licensing and sale of commercial products bearing the likeness of the
television characters featured in the programs aired on public
television stations.' Finally, despite their monetary success, both
programs continue to attract grant monies to subsidize their high
production costs.'
Despite these similarities, there is a fundamental difference
between the two programs. The producer of Sesame Street, the
Children's Television Workshop (CTW), is organized as a "not-for-
profit" or "nonprofit" corporation,9 and is thus prohibited from
directly or indirectly distributing profits (generally referred to as the
"non-distribution constraint")." In contrast, the producer of Barney
& Friends, the Lyons Group, is organized as a "for-profit" corporation
that not only is free to distribute profits but is expected to do so."
The contrasting organizational statuses are offered here as an example
of a fast-growing but relatively recent phenomenon: the blurring of
profit corporations associated with the show).
2. Edwards, supra note 1, at Al; see also PBS and CPB Plan "Harder Look" at
Funded Shows' Ancillary Potential, PUB. BROADCASTING REP., Sept. 24, 1993, available
in WESTLAW at 1993 WL 287165 [hereinafter Harder Look] (reporting that PBS is
concerned with receiving a fair return on investment in children's educational shows in
light of merchandising profits generated by the shows).
3. See discussion infra parts II.A., II.B.I., and II.C.l.c.
4. See discussion infra parts II.A., II.B.1., and II.C.l.c.
5. The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), an educational television network, and its
parent, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), each contributed $1.125 million
to fund almost one-half of the $4.5 million cost of the first 30 Barney installments.
Edwards, supra note 1, at A8; Harder Look, supra note 2, at 1.
6. In contrast, for-profit ventures are funded by capital "investors" who, unlike
grantors, purchase ownership interests in the ventures and generally seek profit
accountability.
7. Edwards, supra note 1, at Al; Hall, supra note 1, at B1.
8. Elizabeth Jensen, Survival in the Cable Age, SEATrME TIMES, Mar. 13,1994, at Fl.
9. See Edwards, supra note 1, at Al.
10. See discussion infra part II.A.
11. See Edwards, supra note 1, at Al.
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our nation's economic sectors1 2 caused by the substantial increase in
business activities by nonprofit entities. 3 This development, in turn,
has precipitated reassessment of, and consequent changes in, the laws
applicable to nonprofits.
This Article examines the implications of sector-blurring as a
potential force for change in a legal arena that seems far removed
from the world of nonprofits-the divorce law arena. In divorce law,
it is well settled that business interests acquired or developed during
marriage generally are divisible property upon divorce of the married
business owners. If business interests now are being developed using
the not-for-profit form, should these interests also be considered in
property-division allocations upon divorce? This Article answers the
question affirmatively, positing that when key managers of certain
types of nonprofits divorce, they should be treated as de facto owners
of the nonprofit businesses they control for purposes of property
divisions. In reaching this conclusion, this Article examines numerous
matters which resonate in legal contexts beyond those of nonprofit
and divorce law, confirming the broad implications of the circumstan-
ces warranting the inquiry, i.e., the realities of sector-blurring.
A. The Sector-Blurring Phenomenon
Economists generally describe our market economy as composed
of three sectors of activity, 4 two of which-the government sector
12. See generally David Billis, Sector Blurring and Nonprofit Centers: The Case of the
United Kingdom, 22 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 241 (1993) (summarizing the
research and scholarly commentary on the blurring of the sectors in the United Kingdom);
J.M. Ferris & E. Graddy, Fading Distinctions Among the Nonprofit, Government, and For-
Profit Sectors, in THE FUTURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR ch. 8 (Virginia A. Hodgkinson
& Richard W. Lyman eds., 1989) (discussing the reduced distinctions between sectors);
Reynold Levy, Foreword to NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET ECONOMY:
UNDERSTANDING NEW ROLES, ISSUES, AND TRENDS xiii, xiii (David C. Hammack &
Dennis R. Young eds., 1993) [hereinafter NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET
ECONOMY] (commenting on the vanishing territorial boundaries between the different
economic sectors).
13. Although the business activities of nonprofits are the chief reason for sector-
blurring, increased intrusion of for-profits into traditional nonprofit spheres also
contributes to sector-blurring. See discussion infra part III.C.1.
14. See generally BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
3-4 (6th ed. 1992) (making the point that "in the largest sense, there are three [sectors]");
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE MIXED ECONOMY (Avner Ben-Ner & Benedetto Gui
eds., 1993) (analyzing the nonprofit sector relative to the other two sectors); LESTER M.
SALAMON, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SECTOR, A PRIMER xvi (1992) (noting that nonprofits,
government, and private business "are all integral parts of the 'mixed economy' "); Levy,
supra note 12, at xiv ("[C]onsumers can now choose between for-profit, governmental and
nonprofit providers.").
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and the private, for-profit sector-are the most familiar.'5 In recent
years, however, the third "invisible sector," as it sometimes has been
called, 6 is finally receiving the scrutiny it warrants. Scholars,
primarily economists and social scientists, are focusing increased
attention 7 on what they call "the third sector," the "independent
sector," or "the nonprofit sector."' 8 AU these terms refer to the
15. MICHAEL O'NEILL, THE THIRD AMERICA: THE EMERGENCE OF THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1989) (noting that references to the "public" and
"private" sectors often mean government and business, as if there were only two sectors).
16. Id.
17. See, eg., COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS (Carl Milofsky ed., 1988); PAUL J.
DIMAGGIO, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISE IN THE ARTS (1986); THE ECONOMICS OF
NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986); PETER D. HALL, INVENTING
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (1992); HOPKINS, supra note 14; ESTELLE JAMES & SUSAN
ROSE-ACKERMAN, THE NONPROFIT ENTERPRISE IN MARKET ECONOMICS (J.M. Montias
& J. Kornai eds., 1986); NONPROFIT BOARDS OF DIRECTORS (Robert D. Herman & Jon
Van Til eds., 1989); NONPROFIT FIRMS IN A THREE SECTOR ECONOMY (Michelle J. White
ed., 1981); NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 12; THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) [hereinafter
NONPROFIT HANDBOOK]; THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE MIXED ECONOMY, supra note
14; HOWARD L. OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND AS-
SOCIATIONS (5th ed. 1988); O'NEILL, supra note 15; PUBLIC-PRIvATE PARTNERSHIP
(Harvey Brooks et al. eds., 1984); SALAMON, supra note 14; RICHARD F. WACHT,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1991); DENNIS R.
YOUNG, IF NOT FOR PROFIT, FOR WHAT? (1983); DENNIS R. YOUNG ET AL., GOvER-
NING, LEADING, AND MANAGING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (1993) [hereinafter
YOUNG, GOVERNING; Avner Ben-Ner, Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector?
Reforming Law and Public Policy Towards Nonprofit Organizations, 104 YALE L.J. 731
(1994) [hereinafter Ben-Ner, Who Benefits]; Avner Ben-Ner & Theresa Van Hoomissen,
The Governance of Nonprofit Organizations: Law and Public Policy, 4 NONPROFIT MGMT.
& LEADERSHIP 393 (1993) [hereinafter Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, Governance]; Lee
Clarke & Carroll L. Estes, Sociological and Economic Theories of Markets and Nonprofits:
Evidence from Home Health Organizations, 97 AM. J. SOC. 945 (1992); Eugene F. Fama
& Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 319-21
(1983); James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda
for Reform, 34 EMORY L.. 617 (1985); Henry B. Hansmann, The Evolving Law of
Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current Trends Make Good Policy?, 39 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 807 (1988) [hereinafter Hansmann, Evolving Law]; Henry B. Hansmann, The Effect
of Tax Exemption and Other Factors on the Market Share of Nonprofit Versus For-Profit
Firms, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 71 (1987) [hereinafter Hansmann, Market Share]; Henry B.
Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981)
[hereinafter Hansmann, Reforming]; Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit
Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980) [hereinafter Hansmann, The Role]; Howard L. Oleck,
Proprietary Mentality and the New Non-profit Corporation Laws, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 145
(1971) [hereinafter Oleck, Proprietary Mentality]; Richard Steinberg & Bradford H. Gray,
"The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise" in 1993: Hansmann Revisited, 22 NONPROFIT &
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 297 (1993).
18. See SALAMON, supra note 14, at 4-5 (noting that the terms "voluntary sector,"
"charitable sector," and "tax-exempt sector" also are used and that each term emphasizes
different aspects of this diverse sector); see also HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 3-4 (listing the
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private, nonprofit activities in this country that primarily involve the
advancement of health, education, scientific progress, social welfare,
culture, or other "charitable" purposes.' 9
Some blurring between the economic sectors has always existed,
particularly between the governmental sector and the other two
sectors. Government, using fee-for-services contracting, has long
enlisted the services of the for-profit sector to carry out its functions.
Similarly, government has long subsidized the activities of nonprofits
through tax subsidies and grants, because these activities often
privately advance the public good.' But the phenomenon capturing
scholarly attention in recent years is the blurring of the line between
the operations of the for-profit and nonprofit sectors.21  Two
powerful facts explain this phenomenon. First, the nonprofit sector
has been the fastest growing sector of the economy in recent years.
22
Second, the nonprofit sector's character has fundamentally
changed.'
The nonprofit sector is "huge, complex, important, and barely
recognized .... 'It is perhaps the biggest unknown success story in
American history.' ,24 But the secret is getting out; its growth and
maturation in the last twenty years command reassessment of our
numerous terms used); O'NEILL, supra note 15, at 1-9 (emphasizing the term "third
sector").
19. SALAMON, supra note 14, at 5.
20. See O'NEILL, supra note 15, at 2.
21. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 12, at xiii. Levy notes that "the borders that once tidily
separated governmental, for-profit, and nonprofit institutions are quickly vanishing. The
cartographers who map these territories also confront a major challenge. Their
representation of the third sector and its relationship to government and especially to
business must keep pace with swiftly changing realities." Id.
22. As explained by Professor Peter Dobkin Hall:
Nonprofit organizations only became a significant and ubiquitous part of the
American organizational universe in the very recent past: in 1940, there were
only 12,500 secular charitable tax-exempt organizations .... Most of [the]
growth took place after 1960-and did not become significant enough to merit
the compilation of regular annual statistical reports until late in the decade. The
effort to treat nonprofits as an institutional sector in the National Income Ac-
counts dates only from 1980.
HALL, supra note 17, at 13 (1992); see also Hansmann, Evolving Law, supra note 17, at
812-13 (describing the difference in nonprofits pre- and post-1950); Daniel F. Skelley, Tax-
Based Research and Data on Nonprofit Organizations, 1975-1990,14 STAT. INCOME (SOI)
BULL. 81, 81-83 (Sept. 1993) (citing statistics documenting the growth of the nonprofit
sector relative to the economy as a whole).
23. See HALL, supra note 17, at 13,259; Edward Skloot, Enterprise and Commerce in
Nonprofit Organizations, in NONPROFIT HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 380 (indicating that
most of this change has occurred since 1980).
24. O'NEILL, supra note 15, at 1.
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basic views about this sector. Available data reveals that "[f]rom 1977
to 1982 ... [t]otal national income originating in the independent
sector increased 85 percent in current dollars .... In comparison,
total national income originating from business increased 55 percent
and that from government, 58 percent."'  By 1990 (the base year for
current, comprehensive data on the subject),26 1.4 million nonprofit
organizations existed in the nation,27 generating 6.2% ($289 billion)
of the $4.6 trillion total national income.' As one reviewer of this
data noted, "This compares to 15% generated by government and
78.2% generated by the for-profit sector, and reflects a rate of
increase for non-profits... substantially greater than increases in the
other two sectors."29  Not only has the number of nonprofits
increased, but nonprofits also have expanded the scope and size of
their commercial activities, particularly since 1980. This increased
"marketization 30  or commercialization of nonprofits is the
predominant force blurring the distinction between the nonprofit and
for-profit sectors. Thus, it is central to the issues examined in this
Article.
Although nonprofits have carried on commercial activities for
years, these activities formerly were confined to small pockets.3 '
However, financial pressures on nonprofits in the 1970s and 1980s
forced adoption of new survival strategies. These pressures included
the rising costs produced by the double-digit inflation of the late
1970s, the Reagan administration's reduction in funding in areas
25. VIRGINIA A. HODGKINSON ET AL., NONPROFIT ALMANAC 1992-93: DIMENSIONS
OF THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR 17 (1992) [hereinafter HODGKINSON, ALMANAC].
26. See generally HODGKINSON, ALMANAC, supra note 25, at 13-178 (detailing findings
on size, scope, and dimensions of diverse nonprofit sector and its various subsectors). For
a statistical profile based on earlier data, see HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 21-27.
27. HODGKINSON, ALMANAC, supra note 25, at 16.
28. Id. at 17; see also Robert F. Carbone, Marketplace Practices and Fundraising
Ethics, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 294-
95 (citing the same figures presented by Hodgkinson); Howard P. Tuckman, How and Why
Nonprofit Organizations Obtain Capital, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET
ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 203,205-06 (noting the growth of nonprofits from 1977-1987).
29. Carbone, supra note 28, at 295; see also Skelley, supra note 22, at 81-83 (citing
statistics documenting the growth of the nonprofit sector relative to the economy as a
whole); OLECK, supra note 17, at 3-5 (discussing the "numbers and wealth of nonprofits"
in a section so entitled).
30. See SALAMON, supra note 14, at 86. See generally Skloot, supra note 23
(describing the kinds of entrepreneurial activities favored by nonprofits and the impact of
these activities).
31. See Skloot, supra note 23, at 380 (noting that the Metropolitan Museum of Art has
been selling photos of its collections for more than 80 years and that several university
presses were established before World War I).
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where nonprofits were traditionally active, the Reagan ad-
ministration's call for increased self-reliance by nonprofits, and the
resulting increased competition among nonprofits for corporate and
foundation giving? 2 In essence, "[a]s nonprofits cast about for new
revenue opportunities, income-generating projects-once dismissed as
illegal, irrelevant, or inconsequential-took on a particularly attractive
cast .... Thus, in the past few years, some nonprofits have es-
tablished... a wide variety of earned income ventures."33
Nonprofits expanded their revenue-generating activities so much that
by 1989 only 27.2% of the nonprofit sector's annual revenues came
from private gifts; the government provided slightly less than 26%."4
The sizeable balance of 37.9% came from dues, fees, and charges paid
for products and services offered by the non-profit sector3 As one
commentator observed, "[I]t can be said that a substantial portion of
the business of nonprofits is business., 36
The success of nonprofits is so significant that for-profit business-
es are crying foul, complaining that tax exemptions give nonprofits
unfair advantages in the marketplace. These complaints even have
prompted congressional hearings on the subject.37  There are
32. Id. at 380-81.
33. Id. at 381.
34. HODGKINSON, ALMANAC, supra note 25, at 9, 147; see also SALAMON, supra note
14, at 25-26 (giving overview and subsector breakdown of sources of funds). Budget-
tightening efforts currently being undertaken by government portend even less
governmental support of nonprofits in the future. See, eg., Ellen Edwards & Jacqueline
Trescott, Budget Ax Falls On Arts, Public TV-CPB Still Alive After Initial Cuts-More
Pending?, WASH. POST, Feb. 23,1995, at C1. These efforts are reminiscent of some of the
same financial pressures that arose during the Reagan administration, which helped to
precipitate the present level of sector-blurring activity. If history is a predictor, a new wave
of increased sector-blurring activity may be on the horizon, heightening the need for more
intense study of the legal implications of sector-blurring.
35. HODGKINSON, ALMANAC, supra note 25, at 9; see also SALAMON, supra note 14,
at 26 (indicating that the percentage of income from dues, fees, and charges is as high as
51%).
36. Carbone, supra note 28, at 295.
37. See Non-Profit Competition: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Small Business,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1988); see also HALL, supra note 17, at 269-70 n.3 ("[T]here is
no industry in which ... proprietary ... and nonprofit firms do not compete-which is
why the 'unfair-competition' issue has loomed so large with regard to nonprofits over the
past two decades."); HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 830 (discussing the unfair competition
claims as responsible in part for the emerging "commerciality doctrine" being applied by
the courts); O'NEILL, supra note 15, at 13 (observing that the report of the U.S. Small
Business Administration was highly critical of the competitive advantage flowing from
special nonprofit privileges, spawning proposed legislation to curb business activities);
Skloot, supra note 23, at 9 (discussing the 1987 hearings of the Oversight Subcommittee
of the House Ways and Means Committee); Cindy Skrzycki, Why Nonprofit Businesses are
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numerous examples of the shift from the "bake sale"-type activities
associated with our notions of traditional charities to the mass-
marketed, high-end products and services offered by today's
nonprofits: the popularity of Sierra Club calendars," the meteoric
success of the Bank Street Writer educational software in the
1980s,"9 and the "can't-keep-enough-in-stock" popularity of New
Press's May It Please The Court, the controversial, unauthorized
compendium of actual tapes and transcripts of leading United States
Supreme Court cases. 4° The selling of services by nonprofits is also
big business. For example, renovated, sometimes even posh, exercise
facilities in YMCAs across the country now compete directly with
private health clubs.41
Despite the proliferation of revenue-generating activities by
nonprofits, the public perception of nonprofits is still dominated by
images of break-even balance sheets and under-paid, altruistic staff
assisted by martyr-like volunteers. Although these images are still
accurate for many nonprofits,42 news reports of excessive or
unethical behavior in the nonprofit sector provide inklings of the
substantial room for profit-making, and even profiteering, by
nonprofit managers. Recall, for instance, recent television coverage
Booming, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 16, 1984, at 65 (commenting on unfair
competition claims); Richard Steinberg, Nonprofit Organizations and the Market, in
NONPROFIT HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 118 (discussing competition and market
structure).
38. See Skloot, supra note 23, at 381.
39. Id. at 385. According to Skloot,
[t]he Bank Street Writer reached the marketplace in January 1983, only nine
months after conception of the idea. By summer, the Bank Street Writer, with
a dozen rave reviews behind it, had become the second largest selling word
processing software in the United States, with expectations of becoming the
leader in sales by 1984.
Id
40. See Paul D. Colford, "May It Please the Court" Doesn't" "Secret" Audiotapes Bring
History to Life, NEWSDAY, Sept. 9,1993, at 67 (commenting that the "boxed set, published
by The New Press, a nonprofit house in New York, has become as hot as Madonna's 'Sex'
book was [the previous] fall").
41. See Marcia Berss, Taxation by Other Means, FORBES, April 11, 1994, at 64, 64;
see also Skloot, supra note 23, at 383-87 (discussing other nonprofit service providers).
42. See Avner Ben-Ner & Theresa Van Hoomissen, A Portrait of the Nonprofit Sector
in the Mixed Economy, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE MIXED ECONOMY, supra note
14, at 243,263-64 (reporting data drawn from a study of 8010 nonprofits in New York state
in 1985 and concluding that "most nonprofit organizations approximately break even:
most nonprofit organizations' revenues exceed expenditures, but only by a minute
margin"); see also Sharon McDonnell, Many Nonprofit Leaders Don't Profit, CRAIN's N.Y.
Bus., May 9, 1994, at 29 (reporting that leaders of low budget nonprofits receive low
salaries).
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of the allegedly excessive percentage of profits from annual Girl Scout
cookie sales used to support an inflated staff and swank administrative
headquarters in New York City.43 Recall also news accounts of the
excessive $390,000 salary of William Aromony during his tenure as
President of the United Way' and the fraudulent activities of Jim
Bakker at PTL (Praise the Lord).45
Such publicity has the positive effect of heightening awareness of
sector-blurring activities. Yet, it generally focuses attention on the
sensational and aberrant rather than the normative conduct.46 The
increased marketization of nonprofits does not signify abandonment
by nonprofits of their altruistic goals. Just the opposite is true: The
impetus for the expansion of commercial activities is survival. The
revenues generated from commercial activities create a mechanism of
internal "cross-subsidization" for nonprofits, to use the terminology
of economists.47 In other words, these revenues subsidize the often
costly, service intense, public-benefit activities undertaken by
nonprofits.
There are abuses, of course, but this Article restricts its attention
to the legitimate and well-intentioned affairs of nonprofits.48 The
43. "Rolling in Dough," Eye to Eye with Connie Chung (CBS television broadcast,
Mar. 6,1994); see also Ellen Graham, Thin Rewards: Sprawling Bureaucracy Eats Up Most
Profits of Girl Scout Cookies, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1993, at Al (commenting on angry
backlash by Girl Scout troops from report); Paul Vitello, Forget Cookies, Go For Dough,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 27,1994, at A6 (citing Girl Scouts' inability to copy corporate support and
fundraising dinners used by Boy Scout Council to raise funds).
44. See Roger Kahn, How Much is Too Much in Nonprofit Compensation?
NONPROFIT TIMES, Apr. 1992, at 18; see also Amy Saltzman, You Don't Have to be Poor
to do Good, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 25, 1988, at 64 (commenting on the
increasing salaries in the nonprofit work sector).
45. See Bakker Reportedly Denied Early Release, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1993, at A19.
For additional examples of abusive conduct, see OLECK, supra note 17, at 10-11; Ira M.
Ellman, Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations, 80 U. MICH. L. REV. 999 passim
(1982); Hansmann, The Role, supra note 17, at 874-75.
46. See, e.g., Hansmann, The Role, supra note 17, at 875 ("[A]buses appear to be the
exception rather than the rule; ... nonprofit [institutions] in most industries ... are
operated on a fairly circumspect basis."); see also OLECK, supra note 17, at 11-12 (same).
47. The term "cross-subsidization" is repeatedly found in the literature on nonprofits.
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in NONPROFIT
HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 27,39 [hereinafter Hansmann, Economic Theories]; Richard
Steinberg, How Should Antitrust Laws Apply to Nonprofit Organizations?, in YOUNG,
GOVERNING, supra note 17, at 279. 294-98.
48. I believe adequate formal and informal procedures and structures already exist
to temper and penalize most types of excessive behavior, most notably fiduciary standards
imposed on officers and directors and the extensive budget oversight procedures imposed
by many institutional grantors. However, for the proposition that changed governance
structures are needed to curb the potential for abuse, see Ben-Ner, Who Benefits, supra
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legal ramifications of sanctioned and encouraged commercial activities
are sufficiently broad to provide ample areas for examination. One
such area is the specific focus of this Article.
B. Focus of this Article
The reality of sector-blurring between for-profits and nonprofits
is continuing to change the legal rules that apply to nonprofits. As
nonprofits have become more business-like in character, many laws
once considered inapposite have become relevant.49 The specific
objective of this Article is to examine whether a change in the divorce
law treatment of nonprofits is also warranted."0
The relevance of divorce law to nonprofits may not be immedi-
ately evident. But this reflects one of the problems addressed by this
Article: The subtleties of sector-blurring are masked by organization-
al forms that once accurately reflected organizational substance, but
that now have lost their accuracy. The traditional for-purpose/for-
profit dichotomy between nonprofits and businesses is no longer
sufficiently substantial to justify equating organizational form with
substance. Today, many nonprofits serve both for-purpose and for-
profit goals due to a new "no market, no mission"'" reality that
controls their existence. Therefore, many of the legal changes now
applicable to nonprofits reflect logical extensions of settled law to the
altered reality of nonprofits.5 Such extensions are based on a
fundamental jurisprudential tenet: Similar factual situations dictate
similar legal treatment. Building on this theme of applying settled law
to changed circumstances, this Article shows that when the reality of
sector-blurring is unmasked, so too is the potential applicability of
divorce law.
1. The Basic Question
If business interests developed during marriage are generally
considered divisible property upon dissolution of the marriage of the
note 17, at 756-57; Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, Governance, supra note 17, at 408-12;
Fishman, supra note 17, § III; Kevin P. Kearns, The Strategic Management of Accoun-
tability in Nonprofit Organizations: An Analytical Framework, PUB. ADMIN. REV., Mar.-
Apr. 1994, at 185; Oleck, Proprietary Mentality, supra note 17, at 145-52.
49. See discussion infra part III.A.2.
50. This examination, in turn, is intended to serve the broader objectives of this
Article. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 67.
51. See David Starkweather, Profit Making by Nonprofit Hospitals, in NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 105, 106.
52. See discussion infra part III.A.3.
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business owner,53 should business interests developed in a nonprofit
form receive similar treatment? For those familiar with nonprofits,
it may be tempting to quickly answer "no," because nonprofits have
no "owners" in the traditional meaning of that term. But this
rejoinder assumes too much; it equates form with substance in all
nonprofit situations. Thoughtful reflection on the issue requires
examination of both the meaning of "ownership" and the operative
divorce law parameters.
"Ownership" is a concept embracing a spectrum of powers and
fights. Some incidents of ownership may still be found even when
other significant fights in the traditional "bundle of fights" are not
present. This Article posits that key managers of certain types of
nonprofits enjoy de facto ownership of the nonprofit businesses
worthy of consideration for divorce law purposes.
2. The Nonprofit Entrepreneur
Specifically, this Article focuses on the divorce law treatment of
divorcing managers who could be considered "nonprofit
entrepreneurs." As noted by Edward Skloot,s4 "Until recently, the
term nonprofit entrepreneur was an oxymoron.... Nonprofits were
charitable organizations that worked without profit motive....
Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, were businessmen for whom profit
was both the cardinal reason for existence and the sole definition of
success.""5 Webster's Dictionary supports the inconsistency, defining
"entrepreneur" as "one who organizes, manages, and assumes the
risks of a business or enterprise. 5 6 Today, however, nonprofit
entrepreneurs are found in all reaches of the nonprofit sector. Many
large nonprofits have marketing divisions run by professional business
managers, and many small nonprofits are started and operated by
individuals who clearly fit both the connotative and denotative
meaning of the term "entrepreneur." These entrepreneurs have
discovered that "commerce and charity can safely coexist.""7 In
particular, the nonprofit entrepreneurs examined in this Article are
53. See discussion infra part IV.B.
54. THE NONPROFIT ENTREPRENEUR-CREATING VENTURES TO EARN INCOME
(Edward Skloot ed., 1988) [hereinafter NONPROFIT ENTREPRENEUR].
55. Edward Skloot, Introduction-The Growth of, and Rationale for, Nonprofit
Enterprise, in NONPROFIT ENTREPRENEUR, supra note 54, at 1.
56. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 416 (9th ed. 1988).
57. Skloot, supra note 55, at 2.
1774 [Vol. 73
COMMERCIAL NONPROFITS
those who operate nonprofits that are both (1) primarily commercial
and (2) small.
With regard to the first criterion, sometimes the term "commer-
cial nonprofit" is broadly used by commentators" to describe any
nonprofit engaged in significant commercial activity, even when the
commercial activity is an ancillary endeavor used to subsidize non-
commercial activities that are the nonprofit's principal mission. A
commercial nonprofit might, for example, use the sale of logo prod-
ucts to help fund aid to the poor or cancer research. However, since
this Article focuses on the divorce law arena, it isolates for examina-
tion those entrepreneurs who operate nonprofit entities that most
resemble for-profit counterparts. Accordingly, it concentrates on the
narrower class of entrepreneurs of nonprofits engaged in commercial
activity that is also the principal nonprofit mission of the entity, such
as the publication and sale of educational software for children or the
provision of nursing or day care services. The activities of these
commercial nonprofits represent the purest form of sector-blurring.
These nonprofits are organized for the express purpose of producing
and selling particular goods and services; they are truly businesses.
Granted, society places a high value on the particular goods and
services provided by these entities, 9 and it consequently sanctions
their provision through the nonprofit form. Sometimes the products
or services are offered at reduced cost.' From the perspective of
the founders and chief operators of these commercial nonprofits,
however, their activities are undeniably entrepreneurial as well as
charitable.
With regard to the "small" size criterion, the nonprofit must have
a limited staff and the entrepreneur must be the sole or one of only
a few full-time managers of the nonprofit. The thesis of this Article
is that when commercial nonprofits are small, their operational
character is analogous to those for-profit organizations commonly
58. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
59. See discussion infra part II.C.1.
60. See Steinberg, supra note 47, at 284-86. Bargain pricing is one reason why the for-
profit sector argues that nonprofits unfairly compete. As one commentator puts it:
Although business knows that many nonprofits perform needed social services,
the complaint is with "commercial nonprofits"-those that focus on sales.
Among ones that have attracted attention [is] the state-sponsored Minnesota
Educational Computing Consortium, which sells software at bargain prices to
schools nationwide. The San Antonio-based Southwest Research Institute, going
beyond basic research, inspects nuclear plants. And Seattle's Northwest Hospital
Speech and Hearing Center has a brisk walk-in trade.
Skrzycki, supra note 40, at 65.
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referred to as "closely held corporations" or "close corporations."'"
The operators of small, primarily commercial nonprofits, often called
"closely held commercial nonprofits" in this Article, have control
powers equivalent in many respects to the key proprietary rights
enjoyed by close corporation shareholders. Thus, in the context of
divorce, the control powers held by the key managers of these
nonprofits should be accorded treatment similar to that of the
ownership rights of close corporation shareholders.
Small, commercial nonprofits are also analogous to closely held
corporations in importance. Closely held corporations comprise a
large subset of for-profit organizations,' and the subset of nonprofits
mirroring these entities is equally large in relative terms." Accor-
dingly, in appropriate contexts, the small, nonprofit entities focused
upon in this Article warrant separate evaluation-similar to that
accorded closely held corporations. The divorce law arena is one such
appropriate context.
3. The Implications of the Nondistribution Constraint
The reason nonprofits are not generally considered to have
"owners" is the nondistribution constraint. The nondistribution
constraint may not be reason enough to support such a broad
conclusion, however, because it does not remove all incidents of
ownership. Property law rules often focus on what property rights are
left, rather than what rights have been taken away.' Teachings from
the for-profit sector illuminate how ownership-like rights are often
exercised by managers/owners in ways that would not violate a
nondistribution constraint or implicate their shareholder-owner status.
Closely held corporations provide a particularly apt analogy.
While the nondistribution constraint may not be determinative of
the existence vel non of ownership, it is a significant impediment to
division of the actual business interests (i.e., an "in-kind" division).
61. See discussion infra part V.A (describing close corporations and their operational
character).
62. CHARLES R. O'KELLBY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOcIATIONs 56 (1992) ("[Ninety percent] of American corporations
have fewer than ten shareholders and half have less than $100,000 in assets.").
63. See infra notes 114, 312 and accompanying text.
64. For instance, in determining whether restrictive land use regulations constitute a
"taking" under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, courts generally examine
whether significant property value remains after application of the regulation. See, e.g.,
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978) (holding that a taking




However, in divorce situations in-kind division is not necessarily
required. In divorce law, the inability to partition a tangible or
intangible asset does not dictate the conclusion that its value should
be excluded from the allocation of property rights. Courts often allo-
cate the value of assets between spouses, rather than command their
shared ownership or actual division. This is a common approach
when division of asset control is infeasible or impermissible.65 Thus,
divorce law focuses on whether a divorcing spouse holds an interest
that can be fairly valued and treated as property for purposes of
property division at divorce. Divorce law precedents offer useful
guidance as to when property interests are sufficiently captured by an
individual to warrant an allocation of proprietary value.
Given this perspective, the question explored by this Article can
be refined: Should a nonprofit entity's value be included for purposes
of property-division allocations upon divorce when one or both of the
divorcing spouses has ownership-like control of the entity?
4. Practical Import and Related Perspectives
Do not assume the situation subsumed in the question bears
more resemblance to a fanciful law school hypothetical than to a real-
life issue. The impetus for this Article came from a pending divorce
situation involving this very issue (fortunately, it appears that these
particular parties will resolve their property division issues by
settlement rather than asset-by-asset litigation). Also, some non-
lawyer friends have shown unexpected interest in this Article, re-
porting anecdotal stories of past divorces involving nonprofit
entrepreneurs where the issue was never raised, leaving the non-
operator/spouses who had supported "the business" feeling unfairly
disadvantaged. It is not that the legal issue is nonexistent, but only
that the connections have not yet dawned on family law prac-
titioners.66 When a divorcing spouse reports to her divorce lawyer
65. See discussion infra part IV.B.4.
66. I have been able to locate only one reported divorce case in which the issue is
even raised, and in that case, the issue was raised inappropriately. See Allen v. Allen, 702
S.W.2d 819, 821 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986). In Allen, the court ruled against inclusion of a
marital interest in a nonprofit supper club controlled by one of the divorcing spouses. Id.
at 821. The court ruled correctly, but failed to articulate fully the proper reasons. The
supper club was a membership club, owned by its members. Id. Thus, the club is
distinguishable from the type of nonprofits upon which the present Article focuses. See
discussion infra parts ll.B.1 and II.B.2. See OLECK, supra note 17, at 1195 (detailing the
differences, at dissolution, between membership nonprofits and other types of
nonprofits).Nonetheless, the existence of the case illustrates the de facto ownership issued
raised by the control power of managers of small nonprofits, and legitimate feelings of
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that she or her spouse is employed as the president or chief executive
of a small nonprofit entity, the de facto ownership issues are masked
by the employment relationship. Few practitioners probe further into
the underlying facts.
Moreover, the issues presented in this Article offer a useful
perspective on a number of broader matters independently worthy of
analysis: the potential expansiveness of sector-blurring's impact as a
force of legal change; the differences in the operational realities of
small nonprofits as compared to larger nonprofits and the significance
of these differences for the design of nonprofit rules; the breadth of
the control power of managers of small nonprofits; the shifting
meaning of "property" in different legal contexts; and the relevance
of form versus substance, particularly in the divorce context. This
Article seeks not only to answer the specific divorce law question
posed, but also to fuel discussion of these other matters.67
The balance of this Article is divided into four Parts. Part II
provides an overview of the defining parameters of nonprofits and the
theories about why they are organized and operated. It emphasizes
those influences that dominate the motivations of nonprofit
entrepreneurs of closely held, commercial nonprofits. Part III
summarizes the evolutionary changes in nonprofit law precipitated by
the sector-blurring phenomenon and discusses the implications of
sector-blurring as an evolutionary force for change in other legal
arenas, particularly divorce law. Part IV, using a hypothetical, reviews
the divorce law treatment likely to be given the business interests held
by a for-profit entrepreneur/shareholder of a close corporation. This
Part identifies issues relevant to a comparative analysis of the
appropriate divorce law treatment for a nonprofit entrepreneur. Part
V uses the hypothetical to explore the essential proprietary rights
enjoyed by a close corporation shareholder and compares these rights
to the control powers held by a typical nonprofit entrepreneur. It
concludes that the business interests held by the nonprofit
unfairness experienced by nonoperator spouses.
67. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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entrepreneur, particularly the goodwill value of the nonprofit business,
deserve similar divorce law treatment.
II. OVERVIEW OF NONPROFITS
A. The Nondistribution Constraint
The terms "nonprofit" and "not-for-profit" generally are used
synonymously' to refer to entities possessing two negative charac-
teristics:69 First, they are not part of government,70 and thus are
called private; second, they are not profit-distributing, and thus are
differentiated from the other component of the private sector-private
businesses.7' In a well-known 1980 law review article,72 Professor
Henry Hansmann, a leading authority on nonprofits, coined the term
"nondistribution constraint" to refer to the prohibitions on profit
distribution that give rise to the second defining parameter.73
Generally, the constraint "bar[s the entity] from distributing profits,
or net earnings, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as its
directors, officers or members."'74
A chief advantage of nonprofit status is that an entity is eligible
for exemption from federal and state income taxes, and usually from
68. See OLECK, supra note 17, at 18 ("[T]here is no real difference between the two
terms."); see also Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 17, at 501 n.3 (explaining that
confusion has arisen from attempts to distinguish the two phrases). However, "[s]ome
persons see a subtle distinction between not-for-profit and nonprofit, in that the first term
is more accurate because nonprofits may seek profit as long as that profit is employed only
to fulfill the organization's major (nonprofit) purpose." OLECK, supra note 17, at 17.
69. O'NEILL, supra note 15, at 2.
70. Id. Lester Salamon notes:
Nonprofit organizations are neither part of the governmental apparatus nor
governed by boards dominated by government officials. This does not mean that
they may not receive significant government support. What is more, government
participation on nonprofit boards is not unheard of.... But the nonprofit
organizations are fundamentally private institutions in basic structure.
SALAMON, supra note 14, at 6.
71. 1l
72. Hansmann, The Role, supra note 17, at 838.
73. Since the nondistribution constraint is contained in the operative provisions of the
state laws under which a nonprofit entity chooses to be organized, the precise terminology
of the constraint varies from state to state and depends upon the type of entity. When the
nonprofit is a corporation, the constraint is imposed, explicitly or implicitly, by the state
nonprofit corporation statutes under which they are formed. See Hansmann, Reforming,
supra note 17, at 501-02. When the nonprofit is a charitable trust rather than a
corporation, state trust law is the source of the nondistribution constraint. Id. at 502. If
the entity is an unincorporated association, the source of the nondistribution constraint is
vague and its nonprofit status is sometimes questionable. Id.
74. Id. at 501.
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local income and property taxes,75 in whole or in part.76 Internal
Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) alludes to the nondistribution
constraint, requiring that an applicant for tax exemption 77 under this
section be organized and operated so that "no part of [its] net
earnings ... inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual. '78  Thus the nondistribution constraint is sometimes
referred to as the "private inurement doctrine., 79  In the words of
the Office of the IRS Chief Counsel: "The inurement prohibition
serves to prevent anyone in a position to do so from siphoning off any
... income or asset for personal use.... "80  Elsewhere, the chief
counsel elaborates, "Inurement is likely to arise where the financial
benefit represents a transfer of the organization's financial resources
to an individual solely by virtue of the individual's relationship with
the organization, and without regard to accomplishing exempt pur-
poses."8
1
Thus, the nondistribution constraint does not prohibit a
nonprofit's receipt of profits. Nonprofits are quite free to make and
even to accumulate profit, but profit may not be distributed to "insid-
ers,"' i.e., "individual[s] ... able to cause the application of the
75. See HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 6; SALAMON, supra note 14, at 5.
76. As Bruce Hopkins puts it:
The exemption ... does not extend to an organization's unrelated business
taxable income. Thus, the term "tax-exempt organization" is often not literally
accurate, inasmuch as this type of nonprofit organization may be subject to the
tax on unrelated income, as well as other taxes, such as those imposed on private
foundations, on organizations that engage in excessive lobbying, on organizations
that engage in certain political activities, or on the investment income of certain
nonprofit organizations.
HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 31. Elaboration on the intricacies of the tax system are beyond
the scope of this Article, since only the general parameters of the tax law are necessary
to the focus here. However, HOPKINS, supra note 14, is an excellent source for those
seeking more detailed treatment of this area.
77. Tax exemption is not automatic simply because an entity complies with the non-
distribution constraint and other exemption requirements. Exemption is granted only
upon application to the Internal Revenue Service and receipt of a favorable determination
from the Service that the entity satisfies all of the exemption requirements. HOPKINS,
supra note 14, at 29-31.
78. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988).
79. HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 266.
80. IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22,1991) (available in 1991 IRS GCM LEXIS
39); see also HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 264 n.4 (quoting the same language).
81. IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,459 (July 31,1980) (available in 1980 IRS GCM LEXIS
71); see also HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 264 (quoting the same language).
82. The term "insiders" is sometimes used to describe trustees, officers, members,
founders, contributors, or others who have sufficient interest or control power to cause the
prohibited action. See HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 266.
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organization's net earnings for private purposes as the result of [their]
exercise of control of or influence over the organization."' s In this
Article, the term "control power" is a shorthand reference to such
control and influence.84 Significantly, the nondistribution constraint
does not proscribe transactions with insiders, only distributions to
insiders. Transactions with insiders, sometimes called self-dealing
transactions, are generally permissible 5 as long as the payment for
goods or services provided by insiders is reasonable. 6 The non-
distribution constraint proscribes only "unreasonable compensation,
unreasonable rental charges, unreasonable borrowing arran-
gements,"'  or other actions that effect disguised distributions of
profits to persons with control power. Since profits are by definition
"net earnings," reasonable expenses incurred by the nonprofit, even
when paid to an insider, are not covered by the nondistribution
constraint. The constraint is satisfied when net income/profit is
applied to the purposes and missions of the nonprofit, including
reasonable expenditures incurred in its behalf.
B. Types of Nonprofits, with Focus on the Closely Held Commercial
Nonprofit
While the nondistribution constraint is the substantive dividing
line between the nonprofit and for-profit sectors,88 the nonprofit
sector itself includes many subsectors. The closely held commercial
nonprofits examined in this Article comprise one such subset group.
This Section provides a perspective on this group's placement relative
to the larger nonprofit sector. While "[t]here is no canonized method
83. Id. Governing laws of most states and the tax laws also require nonprofits to be
operated exclusively for charitable or tax-exempt purposes. This operational test gives rise
to an over-arching "private benefit doctrine," which proscribes untoward benefits to
anyone, including "outsiders." Generally, however, the nondistribution constraint focuses
on insiders since this is usually the group of persons to whom any private benefit would
accrue. See generally HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 297 (distinguishing the private benefit
doctrine from the narrower private inurement doctrine/nondistribution constraint).
84. See discussion infra part V.B.
85. There are rules that limit self-dealing transactions with interested parties,
particularly those which apply to a special category of nonprofits known as "private
foundations." But this is not the focus of the nondistribution constraint. Self-dealing
transactions are often the events that offer the opportunity for violation of the non-
distribution constraint, so there is some correlation and analogy. See HOPKINS, supra note
14, at 274. However, the distinction between self-dealing transactions and violations of the
nondistribution constraint must be kept clear.
86. See Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 17, at 501.
87. HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 267.
88. Id. at 266.
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of grouping private nonprofit organizations,"" sorting them by
purpose and mission is one useful means. Sorting by income sources
and governance structure is another.
1. Sorting by Purpose: Member-Serving Versus Public-Serving
Subsectors
In terms of purpose and mission, there are two basic, but very
different, categories of nonprofits: member-serving nonprofits and
public-serving nonprofitsY The commercial nonprofits concentrated
upon in this Article generally fit in the public-serving category. A
brief explanation of the member-serving category helps to distinguish
the focus category.
Member-serving nonprofits generally have some public purpose
but primarily exist to benefit members of the organization rather than
the public at large.9 They are sometimes referred to as "mutual
benefit" organizations. 2 The IRC lists 27 different types of member-
serving nonprofits, including credit unions, country clubs, service,
fraternal and professional organizations, trade associations, business
leagues, political parties, member cooperatives, and labor unions.93
Chambers of commerce, Rotary clubs, golf and tennis country clubs,
the American Automobile Association, the Consumers Union, and
the American Bar Association are just a few examples of primarily
member-serving organizations.
In contrast, public-serving organizations are most closely
associated with our traditional notions of charities and nonprofits.
These organizations primarily exist to serve the public at large rather
than members. 4 In fact, most do not even have dues-paying mem-
bers or a membership structure. Their operations are directed
towards serving a public purpose or furthering a specific cause rather
than towards providing benefits to a particular group of people. They
are often referred to as philanthropic or "public benefit" organizations
89. O'NEILL, supra note 15, at 4.
90. See generally O'NEILL, supra note 15, at 4 (referring to these categories);
SALAMON, supra note 14, at 13-16 (describing differences between the two categories).
91. SALAMON, supra note 14, at 14.
92. Some state nonprofit corporation laws, such as California's, use the term "mutual
benefit" corporation to identify a particular class of nonprofit which is subject to different
organizational rules than other categories of nonprofits. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§
7110-8910 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); see also O'NEILL, supra note 15, at 3, 156 (noting
use of this term).
93. I.R.C. § 501(c)(5)-(21) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
94. See O'NEILL, supra note 15, at 2; SALAMON, supra note 14, at 14.
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to distinguish them from mutual benefit nonprofits. 95 The target of
these organizations' aid may be a narrowly defined group, such as
homeless children or the elderly, but the activities of this sector as a
whole generally are aimed at alleviating overall societal failings,
inadequacies, or problems. The primarily public-serving subsector
accounts for approximately sixty-five percent of the nonprofit
organizations in this country96 and more than ninety percent of the
total employees and revenues of the nonprofit sector.
97
Service providers comprise the heart of the primarily public-
serving nonprofit subsector,98 delivering physical and psychological
health services, day care, adoption services, historical awareness,
education, counseling, community organization, protection of minority
group rights, environmental improvement, employment and training,
arts, culture, music, theater, and a vast array of "public goods."99
They include hospitals, nursing care facilities, libraries, universities,
museums, and recycling organizations. Because these private
organizations serve public purposes,"° they enjoy preferred status
among nonprofits under the tax law. Their tax exemption stems from
IRC Section 501(c)(3), which is reserved for those nonprofits operated
"exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes."' ' In addition to eligibility for tax exemption, Section
501(c)(3) organizations can receive grants and contributions from
other nonprofit institutions. These institutions, sometimes called
"funding intermediaries,"" ° predominately raise money and provide
funding for other nonprofits rather than engage directly in active
operations themselves. Moreover, Section 501(c)(3) nonprofits are
eligible to receive tax-deductible donations from individuals and for-
profit corporations. The justification for allowing individuals and for-
profit corporations to deduct gifts to Section 501(c)(3) organizations
95. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5110-6910 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); O'NEILL, supra
note 15, at 2, 156.
96. SALAMON, supra note 14, at 13-14 (based on 1989 data).
97. O'NEILL, supra note 15, at 3.
98. SALAMON, supra note 14, at 22.
99. See infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text for elaboration of the meaning of
"public goods."
100. O'NEILL, supra note 15, at 2.
101. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988).
102. This is the term used by Professor Lester Salamon to describe those public-serving
nonprofit "organizations whose sole, or principal, function is to channel financial ...
support to other nonprofit organizations.... Private foundations (e.g. The Ford Foun-
dation, The Rockefeller Foundation, The Carnegie Corporation) are among the most
visible." SALAMON, supra note 14, at 16.
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derives from nonprofits' performance of public services that the
government might otherwise have to support through tax
revenues." 3 Deductibility encourages voluntary contributions to
these entities.
2. Sorting by Income Sources and Governance Structure: Focus
on the Closely Held Commercial Nonprofit
As previously stated, the closely held commercial nonprofits
concentrated upon in this Article fit in the primarily public-serving
subsector of the nonprofit sector. This subsector is extremely diverse,
and its members can be further sorted by the nature of their activi-
ties"' or by a number of other criteria."5 Closely held commer-
cial nonprofits generally are not formally controlled by members or
patrons. Thus, they fall within a subset of the primarily public-serving
subsector that Professor Henry Hansmann calls the "commercial
entrepreneurial" category."'6
In his 1980 article and supplemental writings," Professor
Hansmann set forth a scheme for categorizing nonprofits based on the
sources of their income and according to the way they are governed.
Under the sources of income criterion, he classifies organizations as
donative if the bulk of their income comes from unrestricted
donations and contributions, and as commercial if the primary source
of income is payments received for goods and services."es Under the
governance criteria, he describes organizations as mutual if members
103. Id. at 14.
104. For example, Professor Lester Salamon breaks this subsector down into four
different types of activity groups-(1) funding intermediaries, (2) religious congregations,
(3) service-providing organizations, and (4) political action agencies-and then identifies
subgroupings within each of these categories. See SALAMON, supra note 14, 13-26.
105. Some of the sub-subsector groupings often overlap when categorical criteria for
groupings are exhibited by nonprofits in either subsector. See generally Billis, supra note
12, at 249 (discussing zones of overlap as a factor in sector-blurring); Hansmann,
Reforming, supra note 17, at 503 (noting that his categorization describes ideal types and
that many nonprofits cannot clearly be assigned to one type or another).
106. Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 17, at 503; Hansmann, The Role, supra note 17,
at 841. But see Ira M. Ellman, Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations, 80 MICH. L.
REv. 999, 1013-49 (1982) (criticizing various aspects of Hansmann's model in matters not
relevant to the focus of this Article).
107. Hansmann, The Role, supra note 17; Hansmann, Economic Theories, supra note
47; Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 17.




or patrons'09 have ultimate control to elect the board of directors
and as entrepreneurial if patrons do not have such control.10
Hansmann combined these two classifications to arrive at four
categories of nonprofits: donative mutual, donative entrepreneurial,
commercial mutual, and commercial entrepreneurial. He explained
that "[t]hese four categories ... merely describe polar or 'ideal'
types-extreme points on a continuum-rather than discrete forms of
organization.""' Many entities will likely have aspects that qualify
them for assignment to more than one of the four categories. 112 For
example, many organizations classified as "commercial" because of
the sale of products or services generally will also have a donative
funding base. Similarly, all organizations generally make it a practice
to have patrons on their board of directors, whether the board is
elected by members or patrons or both. A given entity's placement
on the Hansmann continuum depends on the degree to which the
various aspects are applicable.
Many nonprofits encompassed in Professor Hansmann's
commercial entrepreneurial category are small corporations in which
control power is often concentrated in one or only a few managers.
This generalization is based on several facts. First, almost all
nonprofits are organized as corporate entities under the applicable
nonprofit corporation laws of the states of their incorporation,
because incorporated entities receive the most favored tax and
funding treatment." Second, the overwhelming percentage of
nonprofits are small organizations." Large nonprofits (i.e., those
with sizeable assets and staff, such as hospitals, universities, and major
museums) attract the most attention from both scholars and the public
because of their relative size,"5 but small corporations predominate
109. The term "patrons" is used by Professor Hansmann to encompass all those persons
who are the ultimate source of income for a nonprofit, such as members, contributors, and
customers. Hansmann, The Role, supra note 17, at 841.
110. Hansmann, The Role, supra note 17, at 840-42; Hansmann, Reforming, supra note
17, at 502-03.
111. Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 17, at 503.
112. Id.
113. See HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 717-19; OLECK, supra note 17, § 9, at 19; PAUL E.
TREUSCH, TAX-EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 33-51 (3d ed. 1988); Hansmann,
The Role, supra note 17; at 838 (noting that "most nonprofits of any significance are
incorporated").
114. "The independent sector is dominated by a large number of small organizations
about which little is known." HODGKINSON, ALMANAC, supra note 25, at 11; see also infra
note 312 (setting forth statistical data on this point).
115. This may be partially attributable to a dearth of readily available data on small
nonprofits, because they have fewer reporting requirements. Nonprofits are not required
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in the nonprofit sector. Third, the initial boards of directors of these
small corporations are frequently selected by the corporation's
founders/managers and are usually self-perpetuating."
6
All these facts converge to create a sizeable number of closely
held, commercial nonprofit corporations that are analogues to the
closely held corporations in the for-profit sector.17 The commercial
activity in which these nonprofits engage is a part of their mission
(rather than a collateral source of funding), and they are operated and
controlled by a small staff with only one or a few managers. These
managers are the nonprofit entrepreneurs focused upon in this
Article.
3. The Implications of the Subset Size
Current laws still generally treat large and small nonprofits
identically and are premised on a simplistic model that assumes the
commercial activities of nonprofits are usually collateral rather than
primary operations. However, the size of the subset of nonprofits that
have small staffs, coupled with the increase in sector-blurring,
commercial activities by all nonprofits, calls into question the
appropriateness of this uniform treatment and the simplistic model.
The data and facts outlined in this Section strongly indicate that the
number of small, primarily commercial nonprofits is significant and
that the national pool of nonprofit entrepreneurs who operate these
entities is large."' Once one distinguishes between the nonprofit or
to report to the Internal Revenue Service unless their gross receipts exceed certain base
levels. See HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 778-79. Also, small nonprofits generally have fewer
funders or donors who require or request financial reporting and so do not prepare annual
statements or the like for broad distribution. In contrast, many large nonprofits release
annual statements comparable to public companies. Further, many large nonprofits are
in regulated industries, such as health care, where special reporting is required.
116. For authority for the position that these boards are usually self-perpetuating, see
Fama & Jensen, supra note 17, at 319; Fishman, supra note 17, at 677; Hansmann, The
Role, supra note 17, at 841.
117. See discussion infra part V.A; see also Fishman, supra note 17, at 666-68 (observing
that a statutory nonprofit equivalent to the statutory close corporation is needed).
118. Perusal of the yellow pages of a local telephone directory or a polling of anecdotal
experiences of random friends and colleagues generally will confirm this conclusion. The
national news media are also replete with accounts of closely held commercial nonprofits.
For example, NBC Nightly News recently reported about a new nonprofit called "Free
Byte Computers," a computer recycling company started by a high school student and his
friends in Atlanta, Georgia. The nonprofit company solicits donations of used, outdated
computers from for-profit companies, and then it repairs, upgrades, and resells them to
public schools and other nonprofits for a bargain price. When the teenager who started
the endeavor was able to convert monochrome monitors to color, he caught the attention
of the business industry and decided to form his own nonprofit company. NBC Nightly
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for-profit status of businesses, the predominance of sector-blurring,
nonprofit entrepreneurs becomes evident. The sheer number of
closely held commercial nonprofits and of entrepreneurs who operate
them heightens the need for separate legal evaluation of their
situations, including the issues addressed in this Article.
Recognition of the significance of the small, commercial nonprofit
subset is important for framing appropriate, contextual legal norms
for the nonprofit sector. It is now widely accepted that the corporate
law norms initially framed for the for-profit sector were deficient in
their predominant focus on the large publicly held corporation. Dif-
ferences in the operation of small, for-profit corporations dictated the
later adaptation of special "close corporation rules," which suffered
in development because of their breached birth."9 Fortunately, the
lessons of such prior oversights can aid in examination of the small,
corporate nonprofit. The heightened attention now given the
nonprofit sector offers opportunity for a systematic reassessment that
embraces the distinctiveness of all subsets of the sector, including the
closely held commercial nonprofit.
Indeed, lessons about the close corporation in the for-profit
sector provide insights as to how the closely held, nonprofit corporate
counterparts are operated and controlled. Specifically, lessons reveal
how entrepreneurs of closely held, commercial nonprofit corporations
often exercise significant control over the nonprofit's business
activities. This control power is sufficiently concentrated in these
entrepreneurs to merit inclusion of the value of "their" closely held
commercial nonprofits in property-division allocations upon the
divorce of these entrepreneurs."2  Of course, I speak of those
closely held commercial nonprofits that are relatively successful,
because divorce issues are moot unless the business has some net
positive value. Accordingly, before I elaborate further on the control
power, it is appropriate to analyze why an entrepreneur would elect
the nonprofit structure for a business that potentially could be
economically viable as a for-profit entity.
News (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 4, 1994). A California television news broadcast
recently reported on a new, small architectural firm in Southern California that has
incorporated as a nonprofit entity and will design and build ecologically safe homes for
those who have special environmental sensibilities. KRON Evening News (NBC affiliate
television broadcast, Aug. 4, 1994).
119. See discussion infra part V.A.1.
120. See discussion infra part V.B.
1995] 1787
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
C. Why Nonprofit Entrepreneurs Select the Nonprofit Rather than the
For-Profit Form
What forces operate to cause an entrepreneur to use a nonprofit
vehicle to create and control economic value? Economists advance
a number of demand-side and supply-side theories to explain the
seemingly anomalous development of nonprofits in the market
economy of the United States. Several of these theories are relevant
to the discussion of why closely held, commercial nonprofits exist.21
Accordingly, they merit summary and analysis in this Section to aid
in understanding the motivations of the nonprofit entrepreneur. This
adds contextual understanding to later discussion of the proprietary
nature of these nonprofits.
1. Demand-Side Theories
a. Contract-Failure Theory
A predominant demand-side theory that has broad applicability
and wide acceptance is the contract-failure theory. This theory,
articulated in significant detail by Professor Hansmann in 1980,
derives from problems of principal-agent monitoring."z According
to this theory, nonprofits typically arise in situations where the ability
of consumers to evaluate accurately the quantity or quality of a
service or product is inadequate."z' This inadequacy often exists
because the nature of the services or products or the circumstances
under which they are purchased or consumed involve hard-to-measure
attributes. The high cost of developing and enforcing a contract that
specifies these attributes results in contract failure."
121. Theories primarily only applicable to member-serving, mutual-benefit or-
ganizations, or specific industries, such as health care or the performing arts, are not
discussed in this Article because of their particularized focus. See generally NONPROFIT
HANDBOOK, supra note 17, chs. 12-17 (discussing certain specific industries).
122. Professor Henry Hansmann set forth this theory in his 1980 article titled The Role
of Nonprofit Enterprise and his 1981 companion article titled Reforming Nonprofit
Corporation Law. See Hansmann, The Role, supra note 17; Hansmann, Reforming, supra
note 17. These articles have been credited with having "a seminal influence on the
developing analyses of the law and economics of the nonprofit sector." Steinberg & Gray,
supra note 17, at 297.
123. Hansmann, The Role, supra note 17, at 839-44.
124. Clarke & Estes, supra note 17, at 946; see also ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE




Several categories of situations in which hard-to-measure
attributes arise can be identified. In the first, the persons who pay for
a good or service are not its recipients, so that monitoring quality or
quantity is difficult. This category includes the donation of money for
the benefit of the poor. In the second situation, the nature of the
product or service needed is complex and nonstandard, and the
consumer lacks the ability or expertise to comparison shop or to
assess quality. This category includes medical care and education.
Finally, the product or service may be what is often called a "public"
or "collective" good or service, meaning that the cost of providing the
good to many persons is not appreciably more than the cost of
providing it to one person; moreover, once provided, it is difficult to
prevent others from "free-riding'? on the payments of others. The
indivisible nature of public goods makes it difficult for a consumer to
determine whether her contribution has increased the level of service
or instead has simply disappeared into someone's pocket as increased
profit."2  Typical examples of public goods and services include
listener-supported radio, public monuments, pollution control, and
cancer research."2
In all of the foregoing situations the provider of the goods or
services (the agent) has an information advantage over the consumer
(the principal). As Professors Richard Steinberg and Bradford Gray
explain, "[F]or-profit firms have an incentive to take advantage of
consumers in [such] cases of asymmetrical information, whereas the
nondistribution constraint reduces this incentive in nonprofit organiza-
tions."' Elaborating, Professors Lee Clark and Carroll Estes state,
"Fearful of for-profit opportunism, clients search for a mechanism
that 'mitigates [these] incentives .... ' [R]ather than monitoring or-
ganizational output, clients rely on legal form as a signal that the urge
125. See Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 17, at 505-06, for further elaboration of
these matters.
126. Professor Hansmann's example of listener-supported radio stations provides a good
illustration of the operation of the contract-failure theory in the collective goods context.
Such stations are providing the listening audience a public good. It is no more
costly to make the radio signal available to all individuals living within a given
radius... than it is to provide the signal to one individual within that radius ....
This is, then, a situation in which enough people are willing to contribute
voluntarily so that provision of a public good is economically viable on a
nongovernmental basis .... A for-profit station would have every incentive to
solicit payments far in excess of the total needed to pay for its broadcasts, and
simply to distribute the difference to the owners as profits.
Hansmann, The Role, supra note 17, at 849-50.
127. Steinberg & Gray, supra note 17, at 297-98.
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to profit maximize has been muted and, hence, that nonprofits merit
institutional trust."'" In other words, the nondistribution constraint
signals a trustworthiness upon which consumers rely in lieu of costly
monitoring and contracting.
b. Market-Failure Theory
In the case of public goods and services, commentators emphasize
that market-failure, as well as contract-failure, is involved. The free-
rider problem, noted above, often produces too little of the collective
goods and services and thus leaves everyone worse off.'29 Even
when contract-failure is or can be mitigated in the provision of a given
public good or service, the market does not operate well in supplying
it. For-profit firms have fewer incentives to produce a public good or
service because the free-rider problem increases risks and reduces
returns. Nonprofits serve as a non-market mechanism for correcting
market failure. They allow groups of individuals who value the
increased production of some good or service enough to bear the
costs of its production to pool their resources through the medium of
a nonprofit entity.Y This explains the historic dominance of
nonprofits in industries providing public goods and services as well as
the basis for our traditional notions of nonprofits as "charities."
c. Government-Failure Theory
Since governments also are limited by a nondistribution
constraint, the contract-failure and market-failure theories do not
explain why private nonprofits, rather than governmental entities, are
the remedy for contract or market failure. In this regard, the govern-
ment-failure theory complements the contract-failure and market-
failure theories.'
Proponents of the government-failure theory32 agree that
128. Clarke & Estes, supra note 17, at 946.
129. See, eg., HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 21; SALAMON, supra note 14, at 7-8; Ben-Ner,
Who Benefits, supra note 17, at 749-53; Hansmann, Economic Theories, supra note 47, at
29 n.2.
130. See SALAMON, supra note 14, at 8; Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, Governance, supra
note 17, at 394.
131. The government-failure theory also applies as a supplement to the market-failure
theory when market-failure is the applicable theory in the case of collective goods. See
SALAMON, supra note 14, at 8-9.
132. See Clarke & Estes, supra note 17, at 947; Steinberg & Gray, supra note 17, at 299.
Professor Burton Weisbrod is generally credited for introducing this government-failure
theory. See Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in
a Three-Sector Economy, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 171
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nonprofit status symbolizes that quality will not be sacrificed for prof-
its. The proponents then observe that political and bureaucratic
factors limit governmental provision. 33 Chief among these factors
is a limitation on governmental production of public goods deter-
mined by what the "median voter" is willing to support.' 3  In other
words, governments tend to supply goods and services in accord with
the wishes of the average or median preference voter.'35 Thus,
"when demand is diverse ... whatever quantities and qualities of
services government provides will over-satisfy some people and under-
satisfy others.' ' 136 Individuals desiring different emphasis or focus
may band together to supplement government, thus avoiding contract
failure. 37 Also, even when majority support exists for government
financing of services or goods, other political and bureaucratic
impediments may dictate government's contracting out of their
provision. Government entities often choose nonprofit contractees to
avoid government victimization by contract failure.
38
When we focus on the economics of nonprofits as gap-fillers for
government failure, the immense non-economic value of these entities
is revealed. Nonprofits are much more than economic entities; they
are essential components of our democratic society.139  Nonprofits
give voice to the full populace rather than merely the majority voter.
As emphasized by Professors David Hammack and Dennis Young,
[Nonprofits] enable Americans to express their opinions and
to live by their religious beliefs and they help Americans to
manage their religious, cultural, and ethnic conflicts. Thus,
there are constitutional and civic as well as economic reasons
(Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975).
133. See SALAMON, supra note 14, at 8-9; see also Steinberg & Gray, supra note 17, at
299 (citing additional authorities on this point).
134. David C. Hammack & Dennis R. Young, Perspectives on Nonprofits in the
Marketplace, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 12, at
1, 6; see also Hansmann, Economic Theories, supra note 47, at 29 (describing the role of
the median voter in determining government production of public goods).
135. Steinberg & Gray, supra note 17, at 299.
136. BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 25 (1988); see also Clarke &
Estes, supra note 17, at 947 (discussing Weisbrod's views); Steinberg & Gray, supra note
17, at 299 (reiterating arguments that governments provide goods and services to meet
average wishes).
137. See Steinberg & Gray, supra note 17, at 299.
138. 11L; see SALAMON, supra note 14, at 8-9.
139. See generally SALAMON, supra note 14, at 3-4, 9-10 (describing the role of
nonprofits in American society).
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to be concerned about the economic behavior and economic
well-being of nonprofit organizations."4
d. Closely Held Commercial Nonprofits Only Partially
Explained
Contract-failure, market-failure, and government-failure theories
explain why certain industries, like social services, are dominated by
nonprofits rather than for-profits.' 4' These theories explain the
historical rise of nonprofits as potentially more trustworthy, higher-
value suppliers of certain goods and services. They reveal why
nonprofits have developed to meet the demands of consumers and
patrons and why nonprofit entrepreneurs can anticipate patronage of
their products and services. In other words, the contract-failure,
market-failure, and government-failure theories explain the demand
side of the demand-supply formula'42 and some of the supply-side
determinants. 43 However, these theories do not fully explain the
proliferation of nonprofits in recent years, particularly in industries
where nonprofits compete with for-profit firms-the primary
industries in which the closely held commercial nonprofits examined
in this Article are found.
140. Hammack & Young, supra note 134, at 14-15. Hammack and Young continue:
[N]onprofits made it possible to separate church and state.... Nonprofits
also make it possible for Americans to give concrete form to their rights of free
speech. Through a nonprofit, it is possible to teach a very wide variety of
political or scientific doctrines. It is possible to base a school, clinic, or
antipoverty initiative on an idiosyncratic point of view that commands insufficient
political support to influence a government-sponsored institution. And it is
possible to found a museum, an academy of arts and sciences, or a cultural center
whose purpose is to advance the values of a very specific national, ethnic,
religious, or social group.... The fragmentation of sovereignty makes it easier
to accommodate diverse views because it provides the constitutional basis for the
"marketplace of ideas."
Id. at 10-11.
141. See Hansmann, Economic Theories, supra note 47, at 37; Steinberg & Gray, supra
note 17, at 300. -Note, however, that a number of commentators have observed that the
changes in the health care industry have made it more attractive to for-profits and that
more and more for-profits are entering this field. They posit that the continued
predominance of nonprofit hospitals and the like in the health care field is now more
attributable to historical origins than to the demand-side theories articulated in this section.
See, e.g., Theodore R. Marmor et al., Nonprofit Organizations and Health Care, in
NONPROFIT HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 221, 224-29; David B. Starkweather, Profit-
Making by Nonprofit Hospitals, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET ECONOMY,
supra note 12, at 105, 106-07.
142. See Hansmann, Economic Theories, supra note 47, at 37.
143. See Hansmann, The Role, supra note 17, at 868-72.
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Revenue generation for cross-subsidization of principal nonprofit
missions explains increased commercial activity by many
nonprofits;' for instance, the sale of calendars by the Sierra Club
subsidizes the principal mission of environmental protection. But this
cross-subsidization motivation does not account for the increase in
nonprofits in which the commercial activity is also the principal
mission. In "mixed-market" industries-such as hospital care, nursing
care, day care, theater, vocational education, media and
publishing-in which both nonprofit and for-profit firms have substan-
tial market share, 4 the product or service sold is the prime activity
and not simply a revenue generator for other pursuits. This commer-
cial-activity-as-mission attribute is a key characteristic of the closely
held commercial nonprofits operated by the nonprofit entrepreneurs
examined in this Article.
In mixed-market industries the presence of for-profits is
indicative of market response rather than market failure and of
reduced or mitigated contract-failure problems. Why then do
nonprofits enter these fields? Why isn't the supply-side vehicle
chosen by entrepreneurs for servicing the demand in mixed-market
fields always a for-profit entity? Some observers note that the
trustworthiness engendered by the nondistribution constraint gives
nonprofits an edge in competing in mixed-market fields."4  This
edge is rarely significant enough to warrant an entrepreneur's
voluntary subjection to the strictures of the nondistribution constraint,
however, particularly in instances when the public is not even aware
that it is dealing with a nonprofit entity.
Thus, demand-side theories provide only a partial understanding
of an individual entrepreneur's motivations for choosing a closely held
commercial nonprofit as a vehicle for creating new economic value.
Accordingly, supply-side theories are needed to shed light on the
additional factors that likely motivate the nonprofit entrepreneurs
discussed in this Article.
2. Supply-Side Theories
Although demand-side theories receive the predominant attention
from scholars, 47 some supply-side theories and factors have been
144. See supra notes 31-36, 47 and accompanying text.
145. Hansmann, Market Share, supra note 17, at 71.
146. Steinberg & Gray, supra note 17, at 300.
147. Hansmann, Economic Theories, supra note 47, at 37.
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offered to explain the existence of nonprofits.'" Several of these
theories help explain the motivations for the establishment of closely
held commercial nonprofits.
a. Subsidy Theory
The subsidy theory149 focuses on "[t]ax exemption, low postal
rates, the ability by some nonprofits to issue tax-exempt bonds, and
favorable treatment under regulations governing ... aspects of
employment... [to] account for the presence of nonprofits in many
fields."'' 0 Some commentators argue that but for these explicit and
implicit subsidies, the presence of nonprofits in mixed-market indus-
tries would decline,' and some evidence supports this theory.'
For-profit firms espouse this theory in complaints that nonprofits have
an unfair competitive advantage by virtue of the subsidies.
This competitive advantage helps explain successful nonprofit
encroachment on market-share in mixed-market industries. Thus, the
subsidy theory serves as a demand-side theory as well as a supply-side
theory. Indeed, some scholars discuss the subsidy theory as part of
the former category," or discount the subsidy theory as a supply-
side explanation for why individuals are motivated to establish
nonprofits in the first instance. They reason that subsidies may not
be the principal motivating factor, because subsidies cannot legally
accrue to the founders and because nonprofit presence in many
industries pre-dates the laws establishing the subsidies.' This rea-
soning may be sound as a generalization about nonprofit founders as
a whole. However, relative to the narrower category of founders
examined in this Article-that is, entrepreneurs of closely held
commercial nonprofits in mixed-market industries-I posit that the
subsidy theory has significant credibility as a supply-side determinant
to explain the enlistment of this specific group of entrepreneurs into
148. See generally id. at 28-40 (describing a number of both demand-side and supply-
side theories); Steinberg & Gray, supra note 17, at 300-01 (noting the deficiencies of
demand-side theories and proffered supply-side theories).
149. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims,
26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 344 (1983); see also Hansmann, Economic Theories, supra note 47,
at 33 (citing authorities); Steinberg & Gray, supra note 17, at 300-01 (citing authorities).
150. Hammack & Young, supra note 134, at 7; see Fama & Jensen, supra note 149, at
344 (noting that tax concessions are important to some nonprofits).
151. See Hansmann, Market Share, supra note 17, at 71.
152. See id
153. See supra notes 37, 60 and accompanying text.
154. See Hansmann, Economic Theories, supra note 47, at 33, 37.
155. Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, Governance, supra note 17, at 401.
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the nonprofit ranks when two other sets of supply-side factors are
applicable, as elaborated below. The first set involves the overlap of
frustration and skill factors observed by scholars to be particularly evi-
dent in the nonprofit arena, which I group under one heading: the
patron self-help factors.156 The second set involves the convergence
of financial circumstances relative to both the chosen mixed-market
industry and the personal situation of the would-be entrepreneur,
which I group under another single heading: the financial tradeoff
factors.
b. Patron Self-Help Factors
Professors Avner Ben-Ner and Theresa Van Hoomissen, two
noted social scientists who study nonprofits, observe that the founding
entrepreneurs of commercial nonprofits are often frustrated
"stakeholders," that is, would-be patrons of a particular good or
service who are victimized by contract failure, market failure, or
government failure in the search for that good or service in adequate
quantity or quality to satisfy their needs.57 When would-be patrons
of a good or service also have the skills and expertise to facilitate its
production, they are motivated to effect the means to these ends for
themselves and others seeking the same product or service.
Anecdotal examples of patron self-help include childhood
educators who seek quality care for their own children organizing a
day care center; computer experts with disabled relatives designing
computers and software for use by the physically challenged; an
African-American author dismayed by the lack of children's books
featuring minority characters deciding to write and publish them
himself; and a commercial television producer interested in history
forming an independent film production company featuring historical
documentaries.
In the words of Professors Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, "Unlike
for-profit firms, nonprofit organizations come into existence only
when there is some overlap between those who demand nonprofit
156. This term is not used in the nonprofit literature but I use it to embrace various
points from a number of different theories. See, e.g., Steinberg & Gray, supra note 17, at
299-301 (summarizing various supply-side theories).
157. See Ben-Ner & Van Hoomisen, Governance, supra note 17, at 401-03; see also Ben-
Ner, Who Benefits, supra note 17, at 753-56 (referring to nonprofit controllers as
"nonprofit demanders"); Dennis R. Young, Entrepreneurship and the Behavior of
Nonprofit Organizations: Elements of a Theory, in NONPROFIT FIRMS IN A THREE
SECrOR ECONOMY, supra note 17, at 135, 14042 (discussing the different types of
entrepreneurial managers).
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provision and those who can engage in its supply." ''5 They also
note that the net benefits stemming from control of the entity are
powerful incentives for being a founder; control ensures that the
organization will provide what the stakeholder wants, removing
trustworthiness concerns.159
In short, a chief motivation of these demand-side stakeholders is
mission-maximization. This contrasts with the profit-maximization
generally seen as the optimizing behavioral model applicable to for-
profit entities."6 Nonetheless, a commitment to mission does not
mean that profit motives are absent, since nonprofit entrepreneurs
also have profit goals. The existence of the additional for-purpose
goal simply means that quantity and quality concerns might not be
sacrificed for maximum profit. All firms, whether nonprofit or for-
profit, must at least cover the costs of their undertaking, and this
includes salaries for the entrepreneur and any other necessary
personnel. Rarely would an entrepreneur have enough independent
financial resources to donate her services for free. 61 These financial
needs raise economic impediments for entrepreneurs desiring to enter
mixed-market industries as a means of patron self-help. They operate
as incentives to make a financial tradeoff that exchanges the benefits
of subsidy reliance for the limitations of the nondistribution
constraint.
c. Financial Tradeoff Factors
The same demand-side factors that motivate the desire for patron
self-help are strong predictors of business failure. Concededly, the
analysis here already has been narrowed to mixed-market industries
in which the potential viability of for-profit entities is evident. All
businesses, however, carry risks of failure, and these risks are
heightened in the situations examined here. The very fact that
nonprofits also participate in these mixed-market industries indicates
that the industries involve narrow patronage potential or complex
product or service delivery aspects 62 The only ostensible difference
158. Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, Governance, supra note 17, at 402.
159. Id. at 394, 402. See also infra note 168 and accompanying text.
160. See CLARK, supra note 124, ch. 16 (discussing behavioral models for corporate
action); Hansmann, Economic Theories, supra note 47, at 37-38 (discussing optimal models
of nonprofit behavior). See generally Young, supra note 157, at 135-36 (addressing profit
motivation).
161. Even doctors who start "free" clinics would need an income stream.




between the nonprofit and for-profit providers of a particular mixed-
market good or service is the possibility that nonprofits might offer
superior levels of quality and quantity because of reduced profit-
maximization needs. However, this is a difference of real significance
to many. The "it might not pay" aspects of the industries, coupled
with their high value to society, are precisely why donors and
governments are willing to subsidize, through grants and preferential
tax treatment, the efforts of entrepreneurs to produce a higher
quantity or quality of the applicable good or service."6
Given this high-risk context, the entrepreneur's personal financial
situation will often be a final determinant of whether he selects a for-
profit or nonprofit form as his mode of entry into a mixed-market
industry. This determinant is relative, of course, to the minimum
start-up capital requirements for the particular business. If the
entrepreneur is confident of her skill and has sufficient money capital
(or the ability to raise money capital on the strength of past
reputation or contacts), the for-profit form offers an opportunity to
achieve maximum profit as well as mission. These entrepreneurs are
willing to assume the risks of loss for the promise of both mission and
profit. However, for the skilled or knowledgeable patron who
believes strongly in her potential for success, but who lacks capital or
the ability to raise it, the for-profit form is unrealistic. The patron
self-help motivations of these limited-capital entrepreneurs might go
unrealized were it not for the nonprofit option. These are the situ-
ations which lend significant credibility to the subsidy theory as a
supply-side determinant for the formation of closely held commercial
nonprofits in mixed-market industries.
For limited-capital entrepreneurs of small, closely held
nonprofits in mixed-market industries, nonprofit subsidies are
essential to the actualization of their businesses; the subsidy factors
work in conjunction with the patron self-help motivations to facilitate
implementation of the mission. This is particularly true when
eligibility for grant monies is added to the list of relevant subsidies,
as is the case for IRC Section 501(c)(3) organizations.1" Tax
exemptions and other subsidies only reduce costs; they do not elim-
inate them. On the other hand, grants and donations provide a
source of capital for covering expenditures. Thus, the limited-capital
entrepreneur with a worthy mission and the ability to enlist the
163. See Steinberg, supra note 47, at 292-94 (arguing that "imperfect competition is a
necessary condition for the unique social benefits possible from nonprofit organizations").
164. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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support of donors may see the nonprofit entity as a viable
prospect.'
The increased competition among all nonprofits for funding
dollars requires greater efforts by these entrepreneurs. As previously
noted, this funding competition has increased commercial activity by
nonprofits that seek cross-subsidization revenues in industries
traditionally dominated by nonprofits.'6 It also has meant that
entrepreneurs of closely held nonprofits in mixed-market industries
have had to become more commercially aggressive. They have had
to rely more on independent revenue-generation from their primary
goods and services for continued business viability. In earlier times,
donors were more able and willing to finance a greater percentage of
overhead and to sustain break-even or loss operations for years.
Today, the successful nonprofit is the more attractive donee.' 67
Thus, even with grant funding, entrepreneurs of closely held
nonprofits in mixed-market industries face substantial economic risks.
An entrepreneur's decision to invest her human capital in a nonprofit
firm means that she will forego opportunities for investment of her
labor in less risky endeavors. Unless she can obtain grant funding in
sufficient amounts, resources will be inadequate to pay her a
reasonable salary and to generate internal revenues from the
165. As observed by one commentator in the context of an unrelated point, "[m]any
nonprofit organizations incorporate and seek tax exempt status solely to be eligible for
foundation grants." Fishman, supra note 17, at 665. Consider also the comments of Judge
Posner to the effect that "[t]he adoption of the nonprofit form does not change human
nature.... Nonprofit status affects the method of financing the enterprise (substituting
a combination of gift and debt financing for equity and debt financing) and the form in
which profits ... are distributed." Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381,1390 (7th
Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). See genreally Howard Tuckman, How and Why Nonprofit
Organizations Obtain Capital, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET ECONOMY,
supra note 12, at 203-32 (exploring why nonprofits want capital and the sources of sauch
capital). Professor Tuckman notes that "[floundation funding can be particularly
important for nonprofits that are new, small or in areas that do not draw donor interest."
Id., at 213.
166. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
167. For example, by law the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) may only
support organizations that are nonprofit and tax exempt. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR
THE ARTS, GUIDE TO THE NEA 1992-93, at 13 (1992). In addition, its funding policies
expressly state that "[p]rogram guidelines generally preclude funding for new organiza-
tions, thereby focusing Endowment support on activities that have demonstrated their
quality and value to their communities and ability to attract basic support from non-
Federal sources." Id.; see also Don Adams & Arlene Goldbard, The Bottom Line,
Funding for Media Arts Organizations, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug.-Sept. 1991, at 37, 39-40
(noting that it is becoming more difficult for additional groups to obtain funding support
and that new nonprofits are being persuaded to increase their earnings).
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production of goods or services. For this reason, control power is
important to these entrepreneurs." In addition to insuring
trustworthiness vis-a-vis the product or the service, control power
insures that livelihood concerns will not be sacrificed for mission or
be subject to the skills of others. If a would-be patron were solely
motivated by a mission, patron self-help could be achieved by seeking
employment at an established nonprofit, or even for-profit, entity that
provides the desired goods or services or that could provide the
quantity or quality of such goods or services with the aid and
expertise of the skilled patron. However, when the patron also has
profit motives, control power is needed to effect this goal. The
patron-turned-entrepreneur is a person who has dual for-purpose and
for-profit goals.
D. Summary
The material presented in the Introduction and in this part II
details and explains the traditional parameters of nonprofits, the
reasons for their formation, and their increasingly business-like nature,
with special emphasis on closely held commercial nonprofits in mixed-
market industries. The discussion reveals that the founder of a closely
held commercial nonprofit often is a patron-turned-entrepreneur who
has dual for-purpose and for-profit goals and also has limited capital
resources. These entrepreneurs select the nonprofit, rather than the
for-profit, closely held corporate form to create new economic value.
The purpose goals qualify for nonprofit status and the nonprofit form
provides a means of financing business operations when the
entrepreneur lacks the means to finance a for-profit entity. The
closely held nature of the entity allows the entrepreneur to have the
necessary control power to ensure that her for-profit goals also can be
effected as much as possible given the constraints of the nonprofit
form. The next part explains further how sector-blurring has changed
and is changing nonprofit law, and how this same phenomenon is so
168. As one commentator stated:
[C]ontrol of the nonprofit organization by these [organizing] demand-side
stakeholders provides the only assurance that the firm will operate according to
their economic demand .... [Nionprofit demanders... play the role of owners.
[They] become involved in the control of nonprofit organizations if their expected
benefits from operating a nonprofit organization, minus their expected costs,
exceed the benefits they would receive from relying on the services provided by
for-profit[s] ... or government ... or from entirely foregoing the service.
Ben-Ner, Who Benefits, supra note 17, at 753.
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pervasive that its evolutionary force commands change in other legal
arenas, particularly the divorce law arena.
III. RAMIFICATIONS OF SECrOR-BLURRING FOR THE LAW
A. Sector-Blurring's Impact on Nonprofit Law
1. Historical Background
In an informative 1988 article 69 summarizing the history of
nonprofit law, Professor Hansmann noted that for over 100
years-until around 1950-the character of the nonprofit sector was
quite different from what it is today:
[M]ost nonprofits were donatively supported organizations
providing services that had the character of a public good for
some substantial segment of the public-that is, they were
traditional charities. Therefore, they could be treated as a
unitary class. They also could be easily distinguished, both
in terms of their finances and the services they provided,
from the business firms for which most fiscal and regulatory
legislation was primarily designed. Moreover, the nonprofit
sector and most of the organizations within it were small.
Thus, there was little incentive to work out approaches for
extending fiscal and regulatory regimes to them .... "'
For a long time, nonprofits benefitted from preferential treatment
under fiscal and regulatory laws.' In addition to receiving tax
exemption and other privileged tax treatment, nonprofits were
exempted from a long list of federal laws'": Involuntary
bankruptcy,73  collective bargaining,74  securities registration,7"
169. Hansmann, Evolving Law, supra note 17.
170. Id. at 812.
171. Professor Hansmann categorizes laws as "fiscal" if they impose any form of general
taxation or special taxes and user fees. Id. at 807-08. "Regulatory" laws include
regulations bearing on the relationships between nonprofits and other private parties. Id.
at 808. Professor Hansmann's article also discusses changes in "organizational" laws, i.e.,
the basic scheme of state nonprofit incorporation laws. Id. at 809-10, 814-16. Discussion
of these organizational laws is beyond the scope of this Article.
172. Id. at 810-11.
173. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, 534-35 (exempting nonprofits from
voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy), amended by Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, § 4, 36
Stat. 838, 839 (removing exemption for voluntary bankruptcy).
174. The National Labor Relations Board created this exemption through its power to
define the scope of its own jurisdiction. See Fredrick E. Sherman & Dennis B. Black, The
Labor Board and the Private Non-Profit Employer: A Critical Examination of the Board's
Worthy Cause Exemption, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (1970).
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Social Security,7 6  unemployment insurance,"7  the minimum
wage, 78 and unfair trade practices 179 were removed from the con-
cerns of nonprofits. Moreover, nonprofits received favorable
treatment under copyright' m and antitrust laws.18" ' They even ob-
tained protected status from tort liability by virtue of the doctrine of
"charitable immunity."'" A prime justification offered for many of
these preferential laws was that they subsidized nonprofits in the
effort to facilitate charitable activities."Ss For non-subsidy type
preferences, the justification was the assumption that nonprofits, given
their "do-gooder" nature and activities, rarely, if ever, would engage
in the type of negative behavior addressed by these laws.'
84
2. Changes in Nonprofit Law Resulting from Sector-Blurring
Drastic changes in the nonprofit sector have occurred since the
basic framing of these preferential laws, principally due to the
commercialization of the sector. The entrenched nature of the legal
preferences toward nonprofits slowed the progress of corresponding
legal changes to reflect the altered character of the nonprofit
sector.185 But, with time, the law has changed significantly.
175. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 3(a)(4), 48 Stat. 74, 76 (current version codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(4) (1988)).
176. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 907(c)(7), 49 Stat. 620, 643, repealed by
Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 102, 97 Stat. 65, 70-71.
177. Federal Unemployment Tax Act of 1939, ch. 9, § 1607(c)(7), 53 Stat. 183, 187
(current version codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
178. 29 C.F.R. § 779.214 (1994); see also Hansmann, Evolving Law, supra note 17, at
811 n.11 (discussing past application of fair labor laws to nonprofits).
179. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 4, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
180. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 110, 111(a)(4), 112(b), 118(d)(3), 90
Stat. 2541,2549,2551,2559,2567 (current version codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 110, 111(a)(4),
112(b), 118(d)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see also Hansmann, Evolving Law, supra note
17, at 811 n.13 (discussing history of nonprofit treatment under copyright statutes).
181. See Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges &
Secondary Schs., Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654-55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
182. Hansmann, Evolving Law, supra note 17, at 809.
183. Id. at 825.
184. Id. at 824.
185. One commentator notes:
The rapid increase in the number and aggregate wealth of charitable or-
ganizations ... has taken the law by surprise. There has been no coherent
development of the law of nonprofit organizations. Courts and commentators are
still developing fundamental legal principles and attempting to achieve agreement
as to what nonprofit organizations are and how they should be categorized.
Fishman, supra note 17, at 618 (footnote omitted).
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A few of the changes include: judicial retrenchment from the
charitable immunity doctrine in tort;"8 the NLRB's gradual
repudiation of the "worthy cause" exemption that shielded nonprofits
from federal labor law; 7 the deletion of nonprofits' ability to opt
out of Social Security tax payments,"" making such taxes mandatory
for nonprofits on the same basis as for-profits; the elimination of the
nonprofit exemption from state unemployment insurance taxes;
89
more aggressive application of the antitrust laws to nonprofits,' in
reversal of the prior partial exemption carved out by the judiciary;
passage of the unrelated business income tax on nonprofits, which
rolled back the broad tax exemption on all nonprofit income to
subject to tax any portion of nonprofit income derived from "unrelat-
ed" commercial activities; 9' and the passage of tax laws distin-
guishing among classes of nonprofits." Moreover, the law of
nonprofits is still in a state of flux;"9 additional reforms are being
proposed and more changes can be predicted. 4
3. Evolutionary Nature of Changes
The legal changes set forth above are part of a natural,
evolutionary process. First, nonprofit law no longer treats nonprofits
monolithically and uniformly. Important legal distinctions exist
186. E.g., President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 827
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
187. St. Aloysius Home, 224 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1345 (1976); see Cornell Univ., 183
N.L.R.B. 329, 330-31 (1970).
188. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 102, 97 Stat. 65, 70-71
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 42 U.S.C.).
189. Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 104, 84 Stat.
695,697-99 (amending 26 U.S.C. §§ 3303(e), 3303(f), 3304(a)(6), 3309). See generally Amy
L. Henrich, Note, Preferential Treatment of Charities Under the Unemployment Insurance
Laws, 94 YALE LJ. 1472, 1477 (1985) (discussing application of unemployment taxes to
charities).
190. E.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98-101,
100 n.22 (1984).
191. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 301, 64 Stat. 906, 947-53 (current version codified
in scattered sections of 26 & 42 U.S.C.).
192. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1012, 100 Stat. 2085,2390 (codified
at I.R.C. § 501(m) (1988)) (excluding life and health insurance companies from exempted
corporations under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988)). See generally Hansmann, Evolving Law,
supra note 17, at 816-18 (referencing all the changes to nonprofit law noted above).
193. See Hansmann, Evolving Law, supra note 17, at 818 (noting, in particular, the
withdrawal of tax exemptions for life and health insurance companies under the Tax
Reform Act of 1986).
194. The reader can consult Professor Hansmann's 1989 article for elaboration of the
listed changes and other proposed legal reforms, see id.; further detailing here is beyond
the scope of this Article.
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between different types of nonprofits and also between types of activ-
ities within a nonprofit entity.195 Second, although many legal
changes required formal legislation and restructuring, a number
evolved from judicial recognition of the altered reality of nonprofit
operations.'96 The courts extended established commercial law rules
to commercial aspects of nonprofit operations. Operations cloaked
in the nonprofit legal form are no longer automatically shielded from
rules traditionally reserved for for-profit businesses."9 Third, even
the changes wrought by legislation reflect application of the principle
that similar situations should be treated the same under the law.98
Thus, as operational differences between nonprofits and for-profits
have declined, so have the justifications for differing treatment.
B. Sector-Blurring as the Impetus for Evolutionary Change in Divorce
Law
The evolutionary process affecting nonprofit law has been fueled
by sector-blurring. It would be erroneous to assume that sector-blur-
ring is a phenomenon that only affects nonprofit law; nonprofit law
has simply been the principal arena in which the impact of the
phenomenon already has been recognized. Sector-blurring is broad
and deep and has the potential to fuel evolutionary change in legal
arenas beyond nonprofit law. The established law of divorce is no
exception. When a divorcing spouse is an entrepreneur of a closely
held commercial nonprofit, her business interests in the nonprofit
should be examined to determine if there is allocable property value
attributable to these interests. The fact that the business interests are
cloaked in nonprofit form should not automatically end the analysis.
The realities of sector-blurring command a defrocking of form over
substance in divorce law, as well as in nonprofit law. The same forces
that require extension of traditional for-profit applications into the
nonprofit sector compel similar extensions of divorce law applications
into this sector.
Admittedly, nonprofits have no "owners" in the traditional
meaning of that term. Therefore, it seems logical to conclude that
195. See, e.g., supra note 192 regarding exclusion of life and health insurance companies
from I.R.C. 501(c)(3) status.
196. See, e.g., supra notes 186, 190 and accompanying text regarding judicial retreat
from tort immunity and increased judicial application of antitrust laws.
197. See, e.g., supra notes 186-94 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., supra note 191 and accompanying text regarding taxation of income from
unrelated commercial activities.
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entrepreneurs of commercial nonprofits can have no proprietary value
in something they do not own and that divorce law is thus inapplica-
ble. However, it must be acknowledged that traditionally nonprofits
generally had no quantifiable "business interests" that could have
been the object of ownership by individuals; they were formed and
operated for a purpose rather than for a profit. Thus, there is a
circularity to the conclusion. The impetus for many of the proprietary
property rules of our capitalistic society evolved from a reverse
circularity; they developed in response to something of value that
already was in existence. Property rules were designed to capture and
corral existing value into a proprietary form.1" Had the original
construct of nonprofits included the possible creation of new value,
the framing of the law of nonprofits might have contemplated the
implications of proprietary interests.
Reflection on the evolution of property law in general, and
nonprofit law in particular, helps to focus both the arbitrariness and
fallacy of assuming too quickly that divorce law is inapplicable to the
nonprofit situation. If some types of nonprofits now create new value,
then the evolutionary cycle of proprietary law dictates consideration
of expanding that law to embrace it.
A business is still a business, whether it is cloaked in a nonprofit
or for-profit robe. Recognition of this fact is the essential basis for
the evolutionary changes that already have occurred in the nonprofit
law arena. The legal form of a business may have particularized
constraints that prevent wholesale transference of applications from
one context to another. Fairness requires, however, that contextual
similarities be respected-unless dissimilarities warrant difference in
treatment. With respect to closely held commercial nonprofits, the
chief dissimilarity between these entities and their for-profit counter-
parts is the non-distribution constraint. However, before we analyze
199. Property rules have evolved as a necessary mechanism of capitalism. They create,
define, and protect entitlement to resources and value. The certainty of property
entitlements is essential to efficient operation of the private property/contractual exchange
regime. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 29-77 (3d ed.
1986) (applying economic analysis to the common law of property); Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (proposing a framework for integrating the legal
relationships between property and tort law that would hinge upon a concept of
"entitlements" protected by property, liability, or inalienability rules). For instance,
copyright laws give copyright holders exclusive property rights in work they create for a
certain period of time. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803, 1001-1010 (1988 and Supp. V 1993). This
is a property rule that fixes entitlement to something of value that, but for these laws,
would be owned by no one. The laws evolved to capture value.
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whether this dissimilarity warrants disparate treatment by divorce law
of nonprofit and for-profit entrepreneurs, the serious fairness issues
raised by the similarities between commercial nonprofits and for-
profits merit examination. As to this point, the flip-side view of
sector-blurring is very telling.
C. The Flip-Side View of Sector-Blurring: A Context for Assessing
Similarities and Comparative Fairness
1. For-Profit Interlopers
Sector-blurring has occurred primarily because of the immense
increase in commercial activity by nonprofits, including nonprofit
entry into fields traditionally dominated by for-profit firms. But
recent years also have witnessed an increase in the entry of for-profit
firms in fields traditionally dominated by nonprofits. Public ap-
preciation for quality child care, environmental concerns, cultural
preservation, and similar endeavors has expanded; with this expansion
has come increased demand for these value-based products and
services." In many instances, the nonprofit sector must be credited
with the increase in the high-value norms; nonprofits often have been
forerunners in risky but valuable activities that for-profit businesses
initially avoided due to predictions of low investment returns.'
Quality educational programming for children was risky business in
the days when Sesame Street first aired; today, a winner in this
arena is assured of profits.2' 3 Nonprofit recyclers started curb-side
200. See Hansmann, Market Share, supra note 17, at 78 (noting that there are industries
in which nonprofit firms tend to serve relatively elite and presumably well-educated
clientele and that the low-price, low-quality end of the market is served by government or
for-profit firms); Skloot, supra note 23, at 389 (stating that the private sector is increasingly
expanding into areas traditionally reserved for nonprofits).
201. See Hansmann, Market Share, supra note 17, at 77 (noting that "the proportion of
hospitals that are for-profit has grown during periods in which demand for hospital services
has expanded rapidly, and has then declined again when demand has leveled off").
202. Edwards, supra note 1, at A2 ("When 'Sesame Street' began in the late 1960s, the
producers knew they would have to look for additional revenues.... PBS did what
nobody else was going to do ....").
203. See generally Geoffrey Foisie, The Private Profit of Public Television, BROADCAS-
TING & CABLE, May 10, 1993, at 32 (reporting that Lancit Media Productions obtained a
stock market capitalization of more than $40 million, based primarily on investor optimism
about its production of a prospective new children's show for PBS, despite Lancit's less
than comforting earnings history at the time); Jensen, supra note 8, at F1 ("On the
strength of producing one acclaimed Public Broadcasting Service children's series,
'Reading Rainbow,' the husband-and-wife team [who founded the company] took their
company, Lancit Media Productions Ltd., public in 1991. Lancit [is] currently valued at
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collection services when few cared; now recycling is a service
municipalities want, and nonprofit recyclers must "find niches in a
newly competitive marketplace dominated by for-profit firms."" 4
Similarly, nonprofits once dominated home health care; today it is a
"multibillion dollar business, much of which is located in the for-profit
arena.
, 2 5
In other words, capitalists have followed the dollar-often into
markets created by the nonprofit sector. This contributes to sector-
blurring, but it receives limited attention because it does not represent
a fundamental change in the character of the for-profit sector. To the
contrary, it is quite consistent with the established character of for-
profits upon which legal norms are currently formulated. But these
for-profit interlopers offer an excellent comparative reference for
examining the unfairness of the current, disparate divorce law
treatment of nonprofit and for-profit entrepreneurs. In particular, it
is worthwhile to note a class of for-profit interlopers who engage in
what might be termed "sector straddling."
2. Sector Straddling and Reverse Cross-Subsidization
Sector straddling involves the indirect use of nonprofit subsidies
to generate for-profit revenues. Accordingly, it truly represents the
ffip-side of sector-blurring. Sector straddling is effected by the
increasing trend, particularly in certain industries,' to use various
forms of public/private partnerships or affiliations and other inter-
mediaries to channel "public" or nonprofit funds and deductible
donations to for-profits for the undertaking of worthy endeavors. The
underwriting arrangement between the Lyons Group-a closely held
for-profit entity founded by a husband and wife filmmaking
team-and PBS for the production of Barney & Friends is represen-
tative. Through such arrangements, grants and contributions are
made to a qualifying nonprofit entity for a specific project. The
nonprofit then contracts out the production of the goods and services
necessary for the project to a for-profit entity, which usually initiated
the idea for the "charitable" project. The nonprofit pays the contract
$80 million ....").
204. Michele Marie White, Nonprofit Recyclers Find Life After Curbside, BIOCYCLE,
Feb. 1992, at 66.
205. Clarke & Estes, supra note 17, at 947-48 (quoting Sherry L. Shamansky, Providing
Home Care Services in a For-Profit Environment, 23 NURSING CLINICS N. AM. 387, 387
(1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
206. See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
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fees to the for-profit, using the grant monies received from the project
funder or funders.28
When the subsidized, worthy endeavors of for-profits like the
Lyons Group help to generate a large independent market for the
products or services of the for-profit entities, it catches the attention
of the public. In these cases, the public/private partnership results in
a sort of "reverse" cross-subsidization that sometimes is more
troubling to the public than the typical form of cross-subsidization
that is received when nonprofits engage in revenue-generating
commercial activities. There is a sense that the for-profit entity
should share some of its profits with the nonprofit sector. For
example, political pressures about such reverse cross-subsidization
sparked PBS to seek return-on-investment (ROI) arrangements in
future negotiations with for-profit producers such as the LyonsGroup.'°
For-profit media and print companies are particularly well
situated to benefit from such reverse cross-subsidization; the high
visibility of their nonprofit endeavors, when successful, provides an
opportunity for ancillary for-profit sales of tie-in products. For
example, news reports have speculated about the profits made by Bill
Moyers's for-profit production company, Public Affairs Television,
Inc. (PAT),21 and Ken Burns's for-profit production company,
Florentine Films.2 ' Both regularly use independent contrac-
208. See Andrew Ferguson, The Power of Myth: Bill Moyers, Liberal Fraud, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 19 & 26, 1991, at 22, 25 (reporting that such independent contractor
arrangements are becoming increasingly common, particularly in the public television
industry). Ferguson describes the practice as a type of "money-laundering." Id. I do not
agree with the pejorative connotations that this term evokes because I am favorably
disposed to the results of the practice in this context. However, I do believe the term is
descriptively apt conceptually. See generally CLARK, supra note 124, at 696-701 (discussing
the proper role of for-profits and nonprofits in providing public-regarding activities);
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP: NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR MEETING SOCIAL NEEDS
(Harvey Brooks et al. eds., 1984) (presenting various viewpoints on forms of public and
private collaborative efforts).
209. See Harder Look, supra note 2; Mike Mills, Public TV Seeks Share of
Spinoffs-CPB Board to Cut Deals for Product Profits, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1995, at C1.
210. See Ferguson, supra note 208, at 24 (noting that since leaving CBS and forming
his own production company in 1986, Bill Moyers has produced 136 hours of television).
211. For a description of Burns's company, Florentine Films, see DAVID MARC &
ROBERT J. THOMPSON, PRIME TIME, PRIME MOVERS 301-08 (1992). Florentine Films was
started in 1975 by a group of Hampshire College classmates who wanted to make films of
their own choosing. Id. at 302. An interesting side note is that Amy Stechler, a classmate
of Bums, joined Florentine Films soon after, became one of Bums's chief collaborators,
and eventually married Bums. Id. She also is the current Vice President of Florentine
Films. Recently, it was reported that Ken Bums and his wife are separated. See Richard
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tor/nonprofit partnership arrangements. Because the commercial
success of their features and documentaries increases demand for their
services and imprimatur on products, the salaries paid by public
television to Moyers and Bums for their programs are more com-
petitive with those of top producers in commercial television than
with those in public television 12 In addition, sizeable earnings are
generated by the royalties from the sale of television tie-ins such as
books and tapes adapted from Moyers's program-The Power of
Myth-and Bums's successful documentaries-The Civil War, which
aired in 1990, and Baseball, which aired in 1994.213 It is often
difficult to determine the level of profit generated by such reverse
cross-subsidization if, like PAT and Florentine Films, the for-profit
Sandomir, Hits, Runs and Memories, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1994, at B1. How problematic
might their property division issues upon divorce be if Florentine Films were nonprofit
rather than for-profit?
Husband and wife teams in sector-straddling film-making companies do not appear
to be unusual. Lancit Media was founded by a husband and wife team who began in
public television and now have taken their for-profit company public. See supra note 203.
Bill Moyers's wife is a noted filmmaker who is actively involved in the various Moyers
productions and is President of PAT. See Ferguson, supra note 208, at 25. Consider also
the late Jim Henson and his wife, another husband and wife television production team.
Henson started as an employee of the nonprofit Children's Television Workshop (CTW).
He subsequently started his own for-profit company, Jim Henson Productions, Inc., with
his wife, from whom he later became legally separated. See Jane Sumner, The Master of
the Muppets, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 16, 1993, at 1C; Carl T. Hall, The Marketing
of Nonprofit "Sesame Street," Licensing Contracts Bring in Millions, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 30,
1991, at 1; see also Jeremy Gerard, 'Sesame Street' Talking About Race, From A to Z,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1990, at C9 (describing the genesis and current economic status of
Sesame Street).
212. See Ferguson, supra note 208, at 24-25. The budget for Moyers's project not only
provides a salary for Bill Moyers, but also includes salaries for his wife and son. Id.
213. According to one report:
The $50 "Civil War" companion [volume] has sold 750,000 copies, the most
successful gift book ever.... There's also an audio book, a soundtrack and a
video set. All of which provide royalties.... The speaking fees aren't bad
either.... [Ken Bums'] typical fees have tripled to $7,500, although he has
pulled in as much as $20,000 for a 40-minute appearance ....
Laura Blumenfeld, After "The Civil War," No Peace, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1991, at G1.
In September 1994 Knopf published Baseball, a companion to the latest Ken Bums
epic, to sell at a suggested list price of $60, up $10 from the price of the Civil War
Companion. Josh Getlin, Art and Science of Book Pricing, L.A. TIMES BOOK REV., Oct.
9, 1994, at 14. Even before broadcast of the Baseball television documentary, the retail
price for the nine-cassette video boxed set of the documentary was set for release at a
retail price of $179.98. Donald Liebenson, Generation Gap, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 1994, at
3.
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entities are not publicly held (and thus are not required to report
their earnings publicly) and the information is not volunteered.214
However, concerns about such reverse cross-subsidization are
balanced by the public service value of the endeavors undertaken by
these for-profit entities. Most of these endeavors, like the
predominant activities for which nonprofits are formed, are not
considered commercially viable in the primary capital markets.
215
This is why the public and nonprofit sectors subsidize these activities.
Were it not for the subsidy, the endeavors or projects would not be
undertaken at all or would be insufficient in their quantities or variet-
ies.216 For this reason, funders like PBS argue that concerns about
reverse cross-subsidization by for-profits are disproportionate to the
context in which it occurs. They maintain that in the rare instances
when a subsidized endeavor by a for-profit entity generates collateral
success for that entity, the public gets what it paid for and often
more.21  Further, the for-profit entity pays taxes on the unan-
ticipated profits. Accordingly, as long as there is "purpose accoun-
tability" to the donors, and profit-sharing arrangements that curb
excessive profits such as those earned by the Lyons Group,21 8 it is
questionable whether significant changes or adaptation of laws should
or will result in response to for-profit sector straddling.
3. A Comparative Reference for Analysis
Examination of the specific legal implications of sector straddling
and reverse cross-subsidization are beyond the scope of this Article.
214. See Edwards, supra note 1, at Al (reporting that The Lyons Group and other for-
profit companies such as the PBS producers of the popular Thomas the Tank Engine
would not reveal their licensing revenues); see also Ferguson, supra note 208, at 24-25
(indicating the same recalcitrance by Bill Moyers).
215. PBS representatives argue that "[w]ithout our funding, the television programs
wouldn't necessarily have been there.... PBS did what nobody else was going to do....
The entire commercial broadcasting world had turned their backs totally on the preschool
audience." Edwards, supra note 1, at A2.
216. See discussion supra part II.C.1. PBS executives have stated that "[flor every
'Barney' there are 20 to 30 other programs that are underfunded," and "because public
television won't provide total funding for shows, it has to offer incentives to attract
'entrepreneurial' producers. You can't have it both ways." Jensen, supra note 8, at F2.
217. For instance, PBS executives note that public television benefits indirectly from
programs produced by for-profits. To the extent shows like Barney or Bill Moyers' World
of Ideas have broad appeal, they increase subscriber dollars. More funds are available to
finance riskier programming by nonprofits. Cf Jensen, supra note 8, at F2 (quoting a
public broadcasting official who stated that public broadcasting "should get more [money]
back" from profitable programs "to use to generate new shows").
218. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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However, this flip-side view of sector-blurring underscores the
similarities between the operations of certain types of for-profit and
commercial nonprofit entities. For-profit sector straddlers offer an
excellent comparative reference for examining the question of
whether nonprofit business interests should be considered in divorce
situations. Although any closely held for-profit entity could be used,
a comparative reference to sector straddlers lends more force and
focus to the fairness issues because these entities can capture
nonprofit dollars without being subject to the nondistribution
constraint. Thus, the divorce law analysis in Parts III and IV
compares the divorce law treatment of the business interests of two
hypothetical entrepreneurs: one who owns a closely held, for-profit
entity that engages in sector straddling, and one who is the founder
and chief operating officer of a closely held, commercial, nonprofit
entity. Both hypothetical entrepreneurs are independent film
producers in the television broadcast industry. A number of
industries could have been selected for purposes of the
hypothetical,219 but the television broadcast industry is a useful
choice because its products-television programs-are generally famil-
iar.
IV. BASIC DIVORCE LAW PARAMETERS
A. Two Hypothetical Entrepreneurs
Please meet Joe Quality and Sue Capital. Joe and Sue are having
mixed feelings about their lives right now-their respective careers have
just begun to take off, but both are beginning the process of divorce
from their spouses. They reflect back over the last 10 years.
Joe and Sue both received their early training working in the news
departments of competing, local commercial television stations, and
both specialized in news features. Talented filmmakers, both soon
became frustrated with their lack of editorial control over the selection,
quality, and scope of projects on which they worked as staff employees.
They wanted to do more in-depth work on projects with greater
enduring significance, rather than continuing to hurriedly package the
popular feature of the week. Eventually, frustration led to bravery.





Joe Quality was the first to leave the security of his steady job. He
wanted to produce educational and cultural documentaries on his own.
Joe's wife had a reasonably well-paying job. They could meet their
household expenses if Joe brought in only one-half of the wages he
earned at the station. Joe reasoned that he could write the narrative
script for the first documentary and conduct and film most of the
interviews, using the small extra room in the house as an office. Still,
Joe needed money capital in order to provide a minimal salary for
himself, to rent equipment, and to pay for necessary supplies,
secretarial, editing, and other help on a contract-basis. However, the
Qualitys had little savings or money contacts, so Joe formed a
nonprofit company, "Quality Films, " complying with IRC Section
501(c) (3) in order to qualify for funding, by donors interested in
educational and cultural television programming. He enlisted three
respected educators/friends to serve on the company's board of
directors on a volunteer basis.
Joe immediately submitted grant proposals to foundations and
other funding sources in hopes of receiving adequate grant money to
cover the relatively small budget for the first documentary, including a
modest salary for himself Joe's luck held and his talent yielded results.
Quality Films received a small grant to cover the budget for the first
documentary. Joe then quit his job and began working as the president
of Quality Films and as executive producer of his dreamed-about
documentaries. He was Quality Films's only full-time employee. The
members of his board also served as treasurer, secretary, and assistant
secretary of the corporation.
Quality Films's first documentary received widespread approval,
and Joe's growing reputation as a successfulfilmmaker made it possible
for Quality Films to receive increasingly larger grant monies for new
film projects and a greater share of royalties and residuals on
completed films.
2. For-Profit Company
About the same time Joe started Quality Films, Sue and her
husband decided they had sufficient savings to allow Sue to see if she
could be successful in her own film production business. Sue quit her
job and formed a for-profit corporation called "Capital Films." She
invested a modest amount of money capital in the company to cover
basic equipment, supplies, marketing costs, and other start-up costs, and
became the company's sole shareholder and sole full-time employee.
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Sue's husband and brother agreed to serve with her as members of the
company's board of directors and to fill out the company's required
slate of officers, initially without compensation because their time
involvement would be limited. However, they agreed that if and when
the business became profitable, the corporation would compensate them
for their services.
Sue got an early lucky break. A high-level contact at the local
public television station was interested in one of her ideas for a small
documentary. The television station agreed to co-sponsor the documen-
tary with Capital Films by seeking funding for development of the
documentary from PBS and other funders of nonprofit sources. The
station contracted out the actual production of the documentary to
Capital Films on a fee-for-services basis, plus royalties and residuals for
repeat broadcasts. The joint venture was successful, and Sue used the
credibility gained from this first project to enter into other joint ven-
ture/co-sponsorship arrangements with the same and other public
stations. All her projects received nonprofit funding. The co-sponsor-
ship arrangements required Sue to give up a degree of the creative
control over projects that Joe retained, because of the involvement of
an intermediary overseer. But this was not unlike Joe's situation, since
even he had to deal with significant project oversight directly from his
company's funders.
3. Eventual Success
The initial years of the two businesses were quite lean for the two
entrepreneurs and their spouses. Both Joe and Sue often had to forego
drawing a salary from their respective companies between grant funding
of projects. Even when the companies received funding, their salaries
were below market for a number of years. During these early years,
they and their spouses frequently wondered if they should continue the
businesses given the financial insecurity. Eventually, though, success
begot success. With each completed documentary or feature grew the
credibility and reputation of the companies and their key managers as
talented producers of top-quality educational and cultural films. The
companies were able to receive funding for larger and larger projects.
Moreover, as the goodwill and credit history of the companies became
established, relations improved with the company's suppliers and
independent contractors, allowing greater credit flexibility. Also, the
goodwill generated by the companies' track records allowed Joe and
Sue to be even more selective about projects and to receive funding for
budgets with higher overhead costs for their salaries, even salaries that
were significantly above customary public television industry levels.
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Over time Joe and Sue were able to move their companies'
operations into rented office space; to purchase, rather than lease,
certain necessary equipment; and to hire secretarial help. Joe and Sue
continued to keep the overhead of the companies low by performing a
good deal of the work on the films themselves and hiring additional,
temporary help only as needed. Eventually, Quality Films and Capital
Films began to receive increasing revenues from royalties and residuals
on completed films from the licensing of repeat broadcast rights2
and the sale of videos to libraries and schools.
By the time Joe, Sue, and their respective spouses decided to
divorce, Joe and Sue were earning significantly higher salaries as the
chief operating officers of Quality Films and Capital Films, respectively,
than they would have earned as staff producers in public television.
Each was being touted in some circles as the Bill Moyers or Ken Burns
of the next generation.
B. Standard Measure Reference: Treatment of a Closely Held, For-
Profit Corporation Upon Divorce
Assume that Quality Films and Capital Films each has a total
appraised value of $100,000: $70,000 for the aggregate assembled
value of the tangible and intangible assets of the businesses and
$30,000 for goodwill." Assume further that Sue holds 100 shares
of stock in Capital Films as its sole shareholder of record.
In all United States jurisdictions, the 100 shares of Capital Films
clearly would be property subject to division between Sue and her
spouse upon -divorce.' To avoid dividing ownership of Capital
Films, however, a court would likely distribute all the stock to Sue
and distribute a greater share of other property 2 to Sue's husband
sufficient to compensate him for his foregone share of stock. In
making these calculations, the value of the Capital Films stock for
220. Generally producers own the broadcast rights. They license initial broadcast and
limited rebroadcast rights to the nonprofit intermediary and retain remaining rebroadcast
rights. See NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANmES, HUMANITIES PROJECTS IN
MEDIA: GUIDELINES AND APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS 9 (1992).
221. These values are not intended to be realistic relative to the hypothetical facts. The
actual values of companies meeting the same description might well be significantly higher.
The assumed values have been selected only for simplicity and ease of reference. The
values for assembled assets and goodwill are set out separately, for purposes of the
hypothetical, because of the different nature of these assets. See infra note 254 for an
explanation of this difference.
222. See discussion infra parts III.B.1. through III.B.2.
223. The "other" property distributed to Sue's spouse might be other property owned
by the spouses or a promissory note from Sue. See discussion infra part IV.B.4.
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divorce purposes would probably be set near the full $100,000 esti-
mate.224
These conclusions about the treatment of Sue's business interest
in Capital Films provide a standard measure reference for the general
treatment of closely held corporate interests upon divorce. Is there
sufficient justification to depart from this standard measure, in whole
or in part, when a closely held commercial corporation is operated by
a divorcing entrepreneur as a nonprofit rather than a for-profit? The
nondistribution constraint seems, at first glance, to justify different
treatment, but a critical analysis requires a more detailed justification.
One must first review the authorities supporting the above conclusions
about the treatment of Capital Films' in order to identify the oper-
224. See discussion infra part IV.B.3.
225. See, e.g., GRACE GANZ BLUMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA (2d
ed. 1993) [hereinafter BLUMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY]; 1-3 VALUATION AND
DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY (John P. McCahey ed., 1994) [hereinafter
VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION]; HARROLD E. VERRALL & GAIL BOREMAN BIRD, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY (5th ed. 1988); Lewis Becker,
Overview of Statutes Governing Property Distribution, in 1 VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION,
supra, ch. 3; Grace Ganz Blumberg, Intangible Assets Recognition and Valuation, in 2
VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION, supra, ch. 23 [hereinafter Blumberg, Intangible Assets];
Grace Ganz Blumberg, Professional and Business Goodwil in 2 VALUATION &
DISTRIBUTION, supra, ch. 25 [hereinafter Blumberg, Goodwill]; Grace G. Blumberg,
Marital Property Treatment of Pensions, Disability Pay, Workers' Compensation, and Other
Wage Substitutes: An Insurance, or Replacement, Analysis,33 UCLA L. REV. 1250 (1986)
[hereinafter Blumberg, Marital Property]; Carol S. Bruch, Of Work, Family Wealth, and
Equality, 17 FAM. L.Q. 99 (1983) [hereinafter Bruch, Of Work]; Carol S. Bruch, The
Definition and Division of Martial Property in California" Towards Parity and Simplicity,
33 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1982) [hereinafter Bruch, Definition and Division]; Thomas W.
Crockett & J. Randall Patterson, Dividing the Property in a Marital Dissolution, 62 MISS.
L.J. 57 (1992); Willard H. Da Silva, Property Subject to Equitable Distribution, in 1
VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION, supra, ch. 18; Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Walker,
Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 23 FAM. L.Q. 495 (1990); Harry J.
Haynsworth IV, Valuation of Business Interests, 33 MERCER L. REV. 457 (1982); Michael
G. Heyman, Goodwill and the Ideal of Equality: Marital Property at the Crossroads, 31 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1 (1992-93); Joseph W. McKnight, Defining Property Subject to
Division at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 193 (1989); J. Thomas Oldham, Putting Asunder in the
1990s, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1091 (1992) (reviewing DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990)); Gary N. Skoloff, Discovery of
Identity and Value of Marital Property and Use of Experts, in 2 VALUATION &
DISTRIBUTION, supra, ch. 21; Robin P. Rosen, Note, A Critical Analysis of Celebrity
Careers as Property Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522 (1993);
Diane Green Smith, Comment, 'Til Success Do Us Part: How Illinois Promotes Inequities
in Property Distribution Pursuant to Divorce by Excluding Professional Goodwil4 26 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 147 (1992); Wm. David Taylor III, Comment, The Minnesota Key
Person Discount Rule: A Useful Tool for Missouri Divorce Cases Involving Closely Held
Businesses, 55 Mo. L. REV. 219 (1990); Alan S. Zipp, Divorce Valuation of Business
Interests: A Capitalization of Earnings Approach, 23 FAM. L.Q. 89 (1989).
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ative divorce law guidelines at issue.
Of course, divorce laws vary from state to state and are quite
complex in their vagaries. Hence, no summary of divorce laws can be
precise, but enough areas of uniformity exist to discern generic
patterns of treatment. This summary review emphasizes these
patterns.2' This review outlines only existing, relevant divorce law;
in keeping with this Article's emphasis on sector-blurring's force as an
impetus for natural, evolutionary changes in the form of extended
applications of established law, reform proposals are not included.227
However, the summary does note relevant areas of existing controver-
sy that might result in differential treatment in given jurisdictions.
The relevant guidelines culled from the summary will then be applied
in Part V to the nonprofit setting. Accordingly, the following
discussion of the basic guidelines applicable in Sue's situation also
highlights issues for focus and examination in Part V's comparative
analysis of the appropriate treatment of Joe's situation.
226. Accordingly, as the authorities cited supra in note 225 reveal, this section of the
Article intentionally relies primarily on treatises, law review articles, casebooks, and other
secondary sources by leading divorce law commentators that summarize the law of the
various jurisdictions and patterns of uniformity. This reliance is intentional in order to
confirm the benchmark nature of the standards used for the comparative analysis
undertaken in this Article. Analysis of the efficacies of the current moorings of divorce
law is not a focus of this Article. Rather, in this Article these moorings are treated as
"givens" and are explored in terms of their applicability to a new context.
227. See discussion supra part III.A.3. This posture is not intended as a negative
comment on proposals for organic changes or "new" legal constructs. The realities of
sector-blurring may also command these types of changes in appropriate contexts. It is
simply that examination of possible divorce law reforms is beyond the scope of this Article.
Still, it is hoped that this Article's arguments for inclusion of nonprofit business interests
in divorce considerations will inform understanding of the implications of the current
moorings and offer a useful perspective for divorce law reformers on the current
definitions of "property" used in some jurisdictions.
For review of some of the current divorce reform proposals, see DIVORCE REFORM
AT THE CROSSROADS (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990) (containing a
collection of essays on divorce reform and reviewed in Oldham, supra note 225, at 1091);
Grace Ganz Blumberg, Reworking the Past, Imagining the Future. On Jacob's Silent
Revolution, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 115 (1991) (reviewing HERBERT JACOB, SILENT
REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
(1988)); June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology,
Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953 (1991); Herma Hill Kay,
Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1 (1987); Allen M. Parkman, Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the Marriage
Contract, 8 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 91 (1993); Allen M. Parkman, The Recognition of Human
Capital as Property in Divorce Settlements, 40 ARK. L. REV. 439 (1987); Bea Ann Smith,
The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689
(1990); Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383
(1993).
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The property division process upon divorce generally involves
four steps: (1) identification of the property of the spouses; (2)
classification or characterization of the identified property; (3)
valuation; and (4) distribution.
1. Identifying the Property
The threshold task in the property distribution process is to
identify relevant assets held by either or both spouses. Determining
what assets must be included is not always a simple process.', Real
property and tangible personal property generally present little
concern. However, states differ on whether certain valuable
intangibles may be included if the intangible right is so contingent that
it is more in the nature of an expectancy or opportunity than
"property" or if it is viewed as a "personal" right rather than as
"property." 9 Contingency concerns arise with intangibles such as
nonvested pension rights, other types of contingent employee fringe
benefits, and contingent trust interests 30 Whether something is a
personal rather than property right becomes an issue, for example,
when a party asserts claims to the increased future earning capacity
of a spouse who has acquired a professional education or license,
goodwill, or even celebrity status."' Some states focus on whether
228. Moreover, views are changing as to the range of proprietary interests that should
be embraced. See Bruch, Of Work, supra note 225, at 104; discussion infra part V.C.2.
229. See generally Blumberg, Intangible Assets, supra note 225, passim (discussing a
wide range of intangible assets and their cognizance as "property" for marital property
purposes); Blumberg, Goodwill, supra note 225, passim (focusing on the thorny legal
questions and issues presented by professional and business goodwill); McKnight, supra
note 225, at 199-203 (summarizing the various state provisions).
230. See, eg., Laing v. Laing, 741 P.2d 649,656-58 (Alaska 1987) (including a nonvested
pension); Busch v. Busch, 618 S.W.2d 244,245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (excluding nonvested
pension); In re Marriage of Bentson, 656 P.2d 395, 396 (Or. 1983) (including contingent
trust interest); Storm v. Storm, 470 P.2d 367,371 (Wyo. 1970) (excluding a contingent trust
interest).
231. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978) (evaluating the
value of an advanced degree); Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429, 434-35 (Mo. 1987)
(addressing professional goodwill); Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040, 1043 (N.J. 1988)
(holding celebrity goodwill a marital asset subject to division); In re Peerenboom, 433
N.W.2d 282, 284 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that goodwill is subject to division if it
exists, is marketable, and has value). When a spouse claims an interest in such human
capital items as these, the contingent nature of the value of such items may also be an
issue, in addition to the personal versus property right dispute. See, e.g., Nail v. Nail, 486
S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972). See generally Blumberg, Intangible Assets, supra note 225,
§§ 23.05-23.06 (discussing goodwill, and professional degrees and licenses); Blumberg,
Goodwil supra note 225, § 25.02 (focusing on the valuation problems with respect to
goodwill); Bruch, Definition and Division, supra note 225, at 813 n.170 (citing cases
involving educational degrees and licenses); Heyman, supra note 225, at 17-21 (discussing
1816 [Vol. 73
COMMERCIAL NONPROFITS
the interest or right is transferable or marketable-:-that is, whether it
can be pledged or sold-as a test of whether intangible rights or
interests are "property." 2  Many states take a broader approach
and emphasize whether the right or interest has economic value to the
holder, regardless of its transferability3 3
Despite differences in state approaches, intangible rights that are
defined and packaged in some tangible or recognized legal form, such
as a contract, are generally includable as "property."' For this rea-
son, business interests wrapped up in with the recognized legal fiction
of a for-profit corporation and evidenced by tangible stock certificates
are universally included." Thus, the stock of Capital Films easily
meets threshold "property" requirements under the most traditional
of approaches. However, the question of when a valuable interest is
"property" is an issue raised in Joe's situation because Joe does not
"own" stock in Quality Films.36
the minority position of some jurisdictions that income from professional goodwill is too
speculative); McKnight, supra note 225, at 201 (discussing contingent interests); Zipp, supra
note 225, at 104-05 (discussing goodwill cases).
232. See, e.g., Blumberg, Goodwil supra note 225, § 25.02[2][c] (noting that, although
the large majority of states recognize nonmarketable as well as marketable goodwill, a
minority of states only recognize goodwill that can be transferred in the market); Heyman,
supra note 225, at 26-27.
233. Often the issue of whether something is property and whether it can be valued are
intertwined. Describing the interrelation of these two definitions, Professor Grace
Blumberg wrote:
There is generally a tendency to ask whether a particular interest is
cognizable as property for marital property purposes and then, if so, to determine
how it is valued.
This approach tends, however, to obscure the reciprocity of the two inquiries.
Valuation is, in many instances, a vital aspect of the definition of an intangible
property interest.... [Cihoice of valuation technique represents an implicit or
explicit response to the distinguishing characteristics of intangible assets, such as
contingency, dependency on postcoverture spousal labor, nontransferability and
nonsurvivability.
Blumberg, Intangible Assets, supra note 225, § 23.01[2]; see also McKnight, supra note 225,
at 201 (noting that some states include intangibles in the consideration even though their
character as property may be questionable, but adjust for such imperfections in character
by discounting the value of the right).
234. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P2d 550,556 (Alaska 1990) (considering contingency
stock similar to a nonvested pension in that both are contractual rights and are more than
mere expectancies); In re Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (stating
copyright is personal property though intangible); see also Smith, supra note 227, at 692,
706-07 (emphasizing the deference accorded the familiar legal fiction of the corporate
entity as contrasted to the less familiar legal fiction of the marital partnership).
235. The "intangible" is made tangible and, incidentally, more freely transferable, by
the stock certificate form, thus eliminating characterization problems.
236. See discussion infra part V.C.2. Also, even when the is-it-property concern does
not arise in the property identification stage of the divorce proceedings, it may arise as
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2. Classification
Once spousal assets are identified, each asset must be classified
to determine if it is part of the estate subject to division. The method
of classification generally depends upon whether the jurisdiction uses
a common-law marital property system or is one of the limited
number of states"37 that use a community property system.238
All common-law states have adopted some form of equitable
distribution system for the purposes of property distribution upon di-
vorce.39  In some of these equitable distribution jurisdictions, all
property owned by either or both spouses, regardless of its source, is
subject to division in order to "do equity."' In other equitable
distribution jurisdictions, only marital property is subject to division
between the spouses upon marriage, in contrast to nonmarital
property, which is not subject to division.24' In the states adhering
to a community property system, the assets of divorcing spouses are
classified as either community property or as separate property. Com-
munity property is jointly owned by each spouse during marriage and
subject to division upon divorce. Separate property is not jointly
owned during marriage and is not subject to division upon divorce in
most community property states.242 A few of the community
property states have a general rule providing for a fifty-fifty
distribution of community property upon divorce; however, most
permit an equitable distribution of the community property and at
part of the valuation stage of the process. See supra note 233; discussion infra part IV.B.3.
237. "Community property law has traditionally been associated with eight contiguous
American states. Moving geographically from northwest to southeast, they are:
Washington, Idaho, Nevada, California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and Louisiana."
BLUMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY, supra note 225, at 6. In 1983 Wisconsin adopted the
Uniform Marital Property Act, establishing a community property system. Id. at 7.
238. See generally Becker, supra note 225, passim (reviewing the statutes in both
common law and community property jurisdictions).
239. BLUMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY, supra note 225, at 4; Becker, supra note 225,
§§ 3.02-3.03.
240. VERRALL & BIRD, supra note 225, at 3; Becker, supra note 225, § 3.03[1].
241. VERRALL &,BIRD, supra note 225, at 3; Becker, supra note 225, § 3.03[2] (noting
that marital property is generally defined to exclude gifts, inheritances, and premarital
acquisitions). See generally McKnight, supra note 225, at 194-97 (observing that some of
the jurisdictions that subject all property to division make no distinction between marital
and non-marital assets, while others distinguish between marital and non-marital property
but permit inclusion of some nonmarital assets in the divisible marital estate if equity
considerations warrant).




least one allows the divorce court to equitably distribute the parties'
separate property as well.243 For convenience herein, the terms
"divisible property or estate" or "divisible assets" will refer to both
community and marital property as well as any nonmarital or separate
property subject to division.
Although equitable distribution and community property jurisdic-
tions vary in their respective definitions of marital, community, or
divisible property, all treat value or "property"' acquired during
marriage that is paid for from earnings or attributable to labor efforts
during the marriage as community, marital, or divisible property.245
Since Capital Films stock falls within these core parameters, it would
be classified as divisible property regardless of jurisdiction.2' For
the same reasons, Joe's business interests in Quality Films would be
classified as a divisible asset if it satisfies the above-described
conditions regarding its classification as property and its owner-
ship.2 47
3. Valuation
After classification of the property held by divorcing spouses into
nondivisible or divisible categories, a divorce court must value the
divisible assets.2 With a large, publicly held company whose stock
is traded on the securities markets, the trading value of the stock
generally provides the operative value. However, with closely held
243. California, New Mexico, and Louisiana have 50-50 rules. See BLUMBERG, COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY, supra note 225, at 6; Bruch, Definition and Division, supra note 225,
at 777 n.38. Washington allows access to the separate property, and Arizona and Nevada
only allow access to a limited class of separate property. Becker, supra note 225, § 3.01[3].
244. See discussion supra part IV.B.1.
245. See generally Becker, supra note 225, passim (providing an overview of state
positions on property distributions).
246. If Sue had used an inheritance or funds saved before marriage to purchase the
stock, a portion of the business would be her separate or nonmarital property and the
community or marital property percentage would be reduced. In some jurisdictions, the
inception of title would control completely and there would be no marital property
component. See generally McKnight, supra note 225, at 201-10 (describing the components
of marital property). However, for the purposes of this Article it is not necessary to delve
into the complicated tracing or characterization issues attendant to the treatment or
division in the various states of property with mixed community or marital/separate
aspects. The issue explored in this Article still would be applicable to the community or
marital property component in most states. Accordingly, I have constructed the
hypothetical to avoid the distractions of the mixed-asset complications.
247. See supra notes 228-36 and accompanying text.
248. See generally Becker, supra note 225, §§ 3.07-3.08 (discussing valuation
requirements and determinations of "equitable" distributions).
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corporations, no similar market mechanism exists 49  Thus,
valuation can be quite a complex task, especially for divorce pur-
poses,' requiring the application of sophisticated accounting
methodologies. 5  If a recent offer to purchase the closely held
business has been received from a willing buyer in an arms-length
negotiation, the purchase offer might serve as an alternative value-
setting mechanism for the total value of the business. However, if no
such offer or data on sales of comparable businesses252 exists, as is
usually the case, accountants must consider a number of factors and
use various methodologies to value the closely held business.5 3 The
total of these separate values then provides a beginning reference for
valuation of the closely held stock.
Typically, the final valuation will be based on some combination
of the measure of value of all the tangible and intangible assets, plus
a goodwill factor representing the accumulated value of a business
beyond that of its assets, as reflected by earnings. Accountants gener-
ally apply the label "goodwill" to the difference between the price
249. Taylor, supra note 225, at 222. See generally SHANNON P. PRATT, VALUING
SMALL BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACrICES (1986) (describing the problems asso-
ciated with valuing closely held corporations); Haynsworth, supra note 225, at 459-60
(same); Skoloff, supra note 225, § 21.06 (same).
250. As an initial matter, recognizing that the purpose of the valuation is for divorce
allocations is extremely important. Different purposes will provide different values and
different valuation methods. See PRATt, supra note 249, at 19, 24 (emphasizing that the
valuation process and conclusion is influenced significantly by the purpose of the valuation
and that, in the case of divorce valuations, reference must be made to the specific divorce
law of the applicable jurisdiction). Unfortunately,
the legal context for valuations for divorces is more nebulous than the legal
context for almost any other valuation purpose. For one thing, unlike valuations
for taxes or dissenting stockholder actions, the various state statutes do not
specify any particular standard of value to be applicable, such as fair market
value, fair value, or intrinsic value.
Furthermore, the ... deficiencies in ... statutory law, in general, are not
clearly addressed in the states' case law. Virtually no states have resolved the
question of the standard of value.
Id. at 367.
251. See infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text.
252. See Haynsworth, supra note 225, at 468-70 (discussing sales of comparable
companies and of interests in the subject company), There may be shareholder
agreements or other documents outlining purchase options or withdrawal rights which also
present value-setting mechanisms that a divorce court might consider in the valuation
process. These arrangements, however, are not necessarily determinative. Id. at 501-506;
Blumberg, Intangible Assets, supra note 225, § 23.05[2][c].
253. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (setting forth guidelines for valuing closely
held businesses for tax purposes upon which many appraisers rely in divorce situations);




offered for a business and the net value of its -assembled assets.' In
the divorce setting, when there is no purchase offer or comparable
indicator of accumulated value, accountants must determine the value
of the assembled assets and the goodwill. Goodwill can be particular-
ly difficult to value. As explained by Professor Grace Blumberg:
Goodwill is widely understood today as a constellation of
inseparable intangible assets that inhere in a business ...
and enable it to realize supernormal earnings. The earnings
are supernormal in the sense that they exceed the sum of the
market value of the manager's labor and a reasonable return
on all tangible assets and individually quantifiable intangible
assets. The supernormal earnings are usually characterized
as excess earnings: their existence is both an indicator of
goodwill and an important factor in the measurement of its
value.255
A small minority of jurisdictions take a restrictive view and recognize
only forms of business goodwill that can be transferred in the market,
engendering considerable dispute over the inclusion of professional
goodwill in these jurisdictions. 6  Since Capital Films is a cor-
poration, rather than a professional practice, it is not the type of
entity that generally raises disputes about goodwill transferability in
the minority jurisdictions. Moreover, the large majority of states
254. BLUMmERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY, supra note 225, at 343; see also PRATr, supra
note 249, at 295 n.1 (noting that "going concern" value represented by assembled assets
is often lumped with goodwill value under one heading of "goodwill"). Discrete assets,
particularly tangible assets, have a separate intrinsic value and thus are distinguishable
from goodwill. Assets like desks, storage bins, typewriters and Xerox equipment can be
sold in the open market for a price relating to the value of used equipment. When these
same assets are assembled into a working enterprise, their collective value may be greater
than the sum of their individual values. There is a hidden cost of assembling the needed
assets in a going concern. Zipp, supra note 225, at 98. Accordingly, even "[a] brand new
business which has yet to make its first sale has a value greater than the sum total of the
values of its tangible assets. A buyer of a newly created business should be willing to pay
a price in excess of the cost of replacing all the assets since there is an intangible value,
measured in both time and money, which represents the the cost of assembling the assets
into an operational store, factory, or office." Id., at 99. This additional value is generally
referred to as "going concern value." See Fred M. Adams, Is Professional Goodwill
Divisible Community Property?, 6 CoMM. PROP. J. 61, 62-63 (1973) (contrasting goodwill
value with going concern value). In addition to going concern value, being in a good
location, having a fine reputation, credit history and satisfied customers also increases the
profitability of a business. The total increased profitability above the aggregate value of
the discrete assets as a whole represents goodwill value. See also infra note 254 and
accompanying text.
255. Blumberg, Goodwill, supra note 225, at § 25.01[1].
256. Id. § 25.02. Professional goodwill is the chief form of goodwill engendering
debates over market transferability. See id.
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include all forms of business goodwill in the divisible estate.257
Thus, it is highly likely that Capital Films' entire determined value, in-
cluding its goodwill value, will be included in the divisible estate.
Still, valuation generally will be subjective, relying on the
judgment of the appraiser 8 Although cbmmonly accepted factors
and valuation methods determine the outside parameters and narrow
the acceptable range of a given valuation,' 9 valuation methods are
not discrete,26° vary among the states, and generally rely on standard
assumptions. 26' Accordingly, sometimes overall values are dis-
counted to adjust for special circumstances involved in a case.262 On
the other hand, depending upon the chosen valuation method, some
special circumstances may already be accounted for in the basic
methodology used to determine the overall value or may even be
irrelevant given the selected methodology.26' If so, no separate
discount would be necessary. If not, then a discount may be appro-
priate.
The hypothetical sets the values of Capital Films and Quality
Films at $100,000 each, and the validity of the values assigned to the
various business assets of the companies is assumed. In reality, the
respective values of Capital Films and Quality Films might be found
257. Id. § 25.02; see also PRATt, supra note 249, at 294 (noting that professional
goodwill is sometimes called "personal goodwill" and that practice goodwill is sometimes
called "business goodwill").
258. "Estimating the value of a business or professional practice is much more than a
mechanical exercise-it requires large doses of informed judgment, distilled out of years
of experience and extensive continuing education .... " PRAT, supra note 249, at 223.
259. Skoloff, supra note 225, § 21.06, at 21-82.
260. Shannon Pratt urges caution when one hears references to a finite number of
valuation methods, emphasizing that the various methods "are not discrete, but rather
variations of each other, with considerable overlap." PRATT, supra note 249, at 223.
261. See generally Blumberg, Goodwil4 supra note 225, §§ 25.03-25.04 (discussing the
fair market valuation approach and the capitalization of excess earnings approach, as well
as modifications on each).
262. See Blumberg, Goodwil4 supra note 225, § 25.05 (discussing the argument that
covenants not to compete and promises to continue in the practice or business incident to
the sale of goodwill should cause a portion of goodwill value to be treated as separate and
indivisible); Haynsworth, supra note 225, at 488 (discussing possible discounts for lack of
marketability, minority interests, restrictions on resale, or the loss of a key person who is
the driving force behind a business); Taylor, supra note 225, at 227 (focusing on key
person discounts).
263. For example, if a capitalization approach is used, the appraiser might have used
a lower than usual capitalization rate to adjust for the special circumstances. See
Blumberg, Goodwill supra note 225, § 25.04[3] (noting that selection of the applicable rate
for a given situation is probably the most difficult problem in the entire process of business
valuation); see also Zipp, supra note 225, at 114-16 (discussing how to determine and apply
an appropriate capitalization rate).
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to be $100,000 in one jurisdiction and $120,000 in another. However,
by assuming the validity of a $100,000 valuation for both businesses,
this Article's comparative analysis of the divorce law treatment of the
two entities is tailored to allow for the vagaries of and thus is made
applicable to, any jurisdiction, based on a total valuation standard.
This is because the assumption obviates the necessity of examining the
various valuation methods and the disputes about the appropriate
method to be used in specific contexts;-, avoids examination of the
component assets of the businesses with respect to any property-
versus-personal-right distinction or other threshold test from the
applicable jurisdictions;2' 6 and allows the conclusion that final
valuation of Capital Films probably would be near the $100,000 total
value. However, in Joe's case there is a special circumstance-the
nondistribution constraint. This warrants consideration of a possible
discount of the overall value of Quality Films. Accordingly, this is
another issue highlighted for examination in the comparative analysis
of Joe's situation in Part V.
4. Distribution
Regardless of which spouse acquired the business interest, if that
interest is determined to be divisible property, its value is subject to
distribution upon divorce.' A court may divide the stock or assets
of the business between the spouses in proportion to the value of
their respective interests in the overall marital estate. In common-law
states the proportions are variable, but presumptive fifty-fifty norms
264. See generally Blumberg, Goodwil4 supra note 225, §§ 25.03-25.06 (analyzing the
implications of different valuation methods with respect to goodwill).
265. An asset-by-asset examination of the components of the valuation is eliminated
and differences among jurisdictions as to the includability of various component assets can
be disregarded. This is warranted because the characterization or recognition of a given
component asset by any jurisdiction should not change simply because the business is
operated as a nonprofit rather than a for-profit; if the nonprofit form would be an
impediment to recognition in any jurisdiction, it would be an impediment to recognition
of all of the value of the nonprofit, not simply some component portion of its value.
Accordingly, for example, it is assumed for purposes of the comparison undertaken in this
Article that the assigned goodwill value of $30,000 is business goodwill (which attaches to
the business) rather than reputational goodwill (which attaches to the individual) in
jurisdictions which make these distinctions in the recognition of goodwill in divorce
valuations. In other words, to the extent any value, for goodwill or otherwise, is assigned
to Capital Films, it is assumed to meet the applicable standards of a particular jurisdiction
for inclusion in the total valuation.
266. Smith, supra note 225, at 163.
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are becoming more frequent. 67  Although several community
property states provide for a fifty-fifty distribution, in most of these
states the portion also is variable and subject to a divorce court's
equitable distribution.2
Moreover, as previously noted, actual division of the asset is not
mandatory. Divorce law seeks finality in dissolving a marriage.
Continued co-ownership of property and business interests by
divorced spouses hampers this result. Accordingly, courts routinely
distribute business interests to the spouse most actively involved in
the business's operation and make an off-setting or equalizing
distribution to the other spouse from other property.69 This oper-
ates like a forced purchase/buy-out by the operator/spouse of the
interest of the other.'
Thus, a court presented with Sue's case probably would utilize
the allocation-of-value approach, rather than the in-kind-distribution
approach, with respect to Capital Films. In that likely event, a
distribution of all of the stock of Capital Films would be awarded to
Sue, with her husband receiving an off-setting distribution of other
marital or community assets, or an equalizing promissory note,
equivalent in value to his proportionate interest in the $100,000
business.
In Joe's case, the allocation-of-value approach offers a solution
to the nondistribution constraint impediment. Thus, the non-
distribution constraint's prohibition against an in-kind distribution is
267. BLUMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY, supra note 225, at 5; see also Becker, supra
note 225, § 3.08 (discussing a variety of cases and statutes that address the equitable
distribution of property); Bruch, Definition and Diversion, supra note 225, at 777 n.38
(surveying various property division statutes in several community property states).
268. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
269. See WILLIAM W. BASSETr, CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY HANDBOOK §
10.03[E][1] (3d ed. 1991); Becker, supra note 225, § 3.09.
270. One court commented:
[W]henever the court is called on to value a [closely held] business, neither any
corporate asset nor any fraction of the shares of the corporation will actually be
sold to an outsider. Generally ... the corporate shares are awarded to the
spouse more actively engaged in the business of the corporation, and the
management and operation of the business continue essentially unchanged. In
this context the establishment of a fair market value contemplates nothing more
than the assignment of a fair and reasonable value to the family business as a
whole to allow equitable apportionment of the marital property.
Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Minn. 1987); see also Smith, supra note 225, at
162 (arguing that an equitable distribution system seeks finality upon divorce, and "[e]ven
when both spouses are active in a business, the court may grant purchase options to each
of the spouses"); Taylor, supra note 225, at 223 (noting that a court's valuation for
equitable distribution purposes is tantamount to a forced sale).
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eliminated as a justification for not considering Quality Films in his
divorce proceeding. Divorce courts can and do distinguish between
the includability of an asset and its divisibility.
5. Summary of the Treatment
Clearly, Sue's case presents a fairly traditional and uncomplicated
scenario for divorce courts, even though Capital Films undertakes
nonprofit projects and engages in sector straddling. There are no
substantive matters implicating questionable issues or possible
differences in the way states would handle the matter, except for
differences in the selected methods used for valuation.
C. Fairness Issues
Sue's situation offers an easy-case, standard measure treatment
for assessing whether divorce laws should be applied to entrepreneurs
of closely held commercial nonprofits. The only difference between
Sue's case and Joe's is the applicability of the nondistribution
constraint. Although this constraint technically prevents Joe from
being a shareholder in Quality Films, in all other respects the rights
of Sue and Joe and the operations of the companies are identical. Joe
is operating a commercial enterprise, albeit a nonprofit one. His
motivations for organizing the company included profit goals similar
to Sue's. Were it not for the nondistribution constraint, a simple
mechanical extension of the divorce law guidelines would dictate that
Joe's spouse, like Sue's, should have an equitable claim to a portion
of the value of the enterprise. Is it fair for the two spouses to be
treated differently?
If divorce laws were not applied to nonprofit business interests,
Sue's spouse would likely receive $50,000P7 in a property distribu-
tion on account of Capital Films, while Joe's spouse would receive
nothing on account of Quality Films. Yet, both spouses have made
sacrifices for and have directly and indirectly supported the success of
both enterprises. Both Joe and Sue can continue to control the
respective enterprises and reap the benefits of this control. Clearly,
Joe's spouse could be allocated value without violating the non-
distribution constraint. If no value is allocated, Joe reaps a windfall
not available to Sue upon divorce because his business activities are
cloaked in the nonprofit form, even though his activities are just as
271. This assumes the proportionate share of Sue's spouse is 50% and that the final
valuation of Capital Films is set at the full $100,000 amount.
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commercial in nature as Sue's. Is such differential treatment justified
in light of the predominance of sector-blurring in our society today?
Since the nondistribution constraint is not an impediment to an
allocation of value to Joe's spouse, justification for such differential
treatment must turn on the nondistribution constraint's confining
impact on the scope of Joe's interest in Quality Films. The discussion
in this Part has highlighted the is-it-property issue, the ownership
issue, and the valuation discount issue as areas that warrant focus in
the comparative analysis of a case like Joe's. Essentially, each of
these issues represents a different angle on the same
problem-examination of the existence of proprietary value. Is Joe's
interest sufficiently proprietary to give rise to attributable value
subject to allocation? Or does the nondistribution constraint prevent
the attribution to individuals of all proprietary value in nonprofits?
I submit that nonprofit entrepreneurs like Joe do have sufficient
proprietary interests in commercial nonprofits to justify the attribution
and allocation of at least some of the enterprise's value upon divorce.
The reasons for this conclusion are discussed in Part V.
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: EXAMINING PROPRIETARY VALUE
AND DE FACTO OWNERSHIP
A. Proprietary Rights of Close Corporation Shareholders
For purposes of divorce allocations, the proprietary value
assigned to Sue's shares in Capital Films is based on the incidents of
ownership Sue enjoys as the sole shareholder of Capital Films.
Determining the appropriate divorce law treatment of Joe's situation
requires a comparison of Sue's underlying ownership rights in Capital
Films with Joe's status at Quality Films. Understanding Sue's owner-
ship rights is the first task of the comparative analysis. This requires,
as a preliminary matter, an understanding of the corporate model in
general and of the closely held corporation in particular.2'
272. See generally CLARK, supra note 124, §§ 1.3,18.1-18.4 (1986) (discussing the special
nature of close corporations and commenting specifically on the special line of cases and
charter provisions for close corporations that developed because the corporate law norms
designed to fit the public corporation model were "unsuitable" and "clumsy" for close
corporations); O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 62, ch. 5 (same). For a thorough
examination of close corporations, see F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON,
O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1992).
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1. Corporate Norms and the Distinctive Nature of Close
Corporations
Corporate law norms are based on a separation of ownership
rights that facilitates specialization of human and money capital
investment. The corporate form provides a mechanism for business
ownership by a large group of investors when it is impractical for all
of them to be actively involved in the operation of the business or
when they lack the skill or time to engage in active operation. As
one commentator explains:
Under the separation norm (1) shareholders are able to
provide money capital while investing human capital else-
where; (2) officers are able to specialize in day-to-day
management without making money capital investment in
the firm; and (3) the board of directors serves both as a
check on officers' diligence and loyalty and as a buffer
against inefficient shareholders' interference in
management.27 3
Shareholders remain the ultimate owners of the corporations;274
however, they ordinarily delegate their ownership rights to agents
charged with the task of maximizing the corporation's returns. Thus,
shareholders exercise their ownership rights indirectly.275
Corporate law norms were designed to accommodate the
operational needs of publicly held corporations276 or broadly held
corporations with a significant number of shareholders. However, it
is now widely recognized that closely held corporations are fundamen-
tally different.277 These are corporations with a small number of
individual shareholders whose shares are not traded on a recognized
securities exchange or on the over-the-counter market. 78 In closely
273. O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 62, at 359.
274. Id. at 150 (noting that the ownership interests of shareholders are represented by
shares, which are ownership units in the corporation that entitle shareholders to a
percentage of the firm's capital and dividends and to voting rights); see also CLARK, supra
note 124, at 13 (detailing the typical voting and other rights of holders of corporate stock).
275. See Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, Governance, supra note 17, at 396.
276. See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 62, at 359.
277. Id. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations
and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271,273-77 (1986) (delineating the economic structure
of closely held corporations); Gary C. Ivey, Note, Standards of Management Conduct in
Close Corporations: A Transactional Approach, 33 STAN. L. RFV. 1141, 1142-52 (1981)
(arguing that the traditional corporate and partnership approaches used by courts do not
adequately protect close corporation minority shareholders).
278. CLARK, supra note 124, § 1.3, at 24. State statutes that attempt to define closely
held corporations differ in the details of their definitions. Id. § 1.3, at 24 n.1; see also
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held corporations, the separation of identity between owners and
managers often is limited or virtually nonexistent, except as a matter
of corporate formality. Even though close corporations traditionally
have been chartered under the same business corporation statutes as
publicly held corporations,7 9 they operate more like incorporated
partnerships or sole proprietorships.' In the typical close cor-
poration, shareholders actively participate in all phases of the
management and operation of the business, as is the case with the
hypothetical Sue Capital. Also, significant illiquidity results from the
lack of .a national securities market for close corporation shares.
Accordingly, most close corporation shareholders eventually expect
either to pass their shares on to a son or daughter or to sell their
shares back to the corporation or a fellow shareholder."8  The
differences between the functioning of publicly held and closely held
corporations provide a perspective for analyzing the ownership rights
of shareholders, particularly those of close corporation shareholders
like Sue Capital.
2. Analysis of Shareholder Ownership Rights
A shareholder of a for-profit corporation enjoys the following
three ownership rights:'
a. the right to ultimate control over the legally permissible
activities of the business enterprise exercised through
control of the selection of the corporation's board of
directors, either exclusively-if she is the sole share-
holder-or collectively with other shareholders (the
control right);
O'KELLEY & THOMPSON supra note 62, §§ 1.02-1.04 (detailing the various distinctions
between "closely held," "close," "closed," and "statutory close" corporations). For
example, some set the number of shareholders at a maximum of 30 while others use a
different number. See CLARK, supra note 124, § 13, at 24.
279. Most jurisdictions now have special close corporation statutes that recognize the
differences in closely held corporations. Still, most close corporations continue to be
chartered under general corporations laws. See CLARK, supra note 124, at 24 n.1, 24-25;
see also O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 272, §§ 1.18-1.19 (comparing the close
corporation statutes of different states).
280. See CLARK, supra note 124, § 1.3, at 24-25.
281. See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 62, at 359.
282. See generally Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, Governance, supra note 17, at 395
(articulating a similar summary of ownership rights).
283. Sue's control of the Board of Directors of Capital Films is limited by legal
constraints against illegal actions and breaches of fiduciary duty. However, since all




b. the right, as residual claimant' of the entity, to re-
ceive the corporation's economic returns, either
exclusively-if she is the sole shareholder-or jointly if
there are other shareholders (the residual claimant
right); and
c. the right to transfer the previous two rights through
assignment of all or a portion of her ownership interests
(the transfer right).
For shareholders of publicly or broadly held corporations, each
of the three rights is significant and valuable, but the control right has
the least significance and value because it is diluted by the equal
control rights of a large number of other shareholders (unless, of
course, the shareholder holds a controlling block of shares). Accor-
dingly, for a divorcing shareholder of a publicly held corporation, the
proprietary value of her ownership interest is principally derived from
the residual claimant right and the transfer right, rather than from the
control right.
In contrast to publicly or broadly held corporations, in closely
held corporations, the control right is usually the key right of
ownership. Of course, if the corporation is to be sold or liquidated,
the residual claimant and transfer rights are more important because
the shareholder's control right is being terminated. But before such
termination, the residual claimant right and the transfer right have
value or significance to the close corporation shareholder only if the
corporation has profits. This requires residual returns above those
that the shareholder needs or chooses to use to finance future
operations of the business. By the most frequently used definition,
profits are the excess of income over reasonable expenses, including
salaries and employee benefits.' A close corporation may have
residual returns, which can either be taken as profit and paid as
dividends to shareholders pursuant to their residual claimant rights or
reinvested in the enterprise to finance future operations, including
increased salaries and employee benefits for the shareholder-
employees. The control right gives close corporation shareholders the
284. Shareholders are referred to as "residual claimants" because they have a right to
the residual assets of corporations remaining after creditors are paid. If such assets are
insufficient to pay the corporate debts and liabilities, they receive no return and may risk
losing their initial investment. If the business is profitable, however, they are entitled to
this return on investment, generally without cap. O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 62,
at 20-21, 150.
285. This is the standard definition of profit in the general accounting sense. See
HOPKINS, supra note 14, § 12.3, at 257.
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right to choose how to dispose of such returns. Many shareholders of
close corporations consider the business successful when returns are
sufficient to provide them a reasonable salary and to finance
continuation of the business. 6 For most close corporations, returns
rarely reach profitability levels that trigger the residual claimant
right.m
This low profitability in turn depresses market opportunities for
exercise of the transfer right and results in the widely acknowledged
illiquidity problems of shareholders of closely held corporations."8
When profits reach a level sufficient to attract outside investors,
closely held corporations usually become more broadly held and move
into another life cycle. As profitability rises, market values for the
transfer by a shareholder of a share of her residual claimant status
become more attractive, relative to the risks, than closely held control.
At this point, shareholders of closely held corporations are more
willing to trade some control and residual return rights for an assured
amount of money, not subject to business risks. Of course there are
exceptions and holdouts. At some point, however, the market forces
are so strong that, given business risks, continuation of closely held
control becomes economically imprudent.
Thus, if a corporation is very closely held, the control right is
probably the most valuable and important right. In fact, it often is
the only right that has any practical proprietary significance. As
286. As one commentator has noted:
Many businesses cannot even generate enough earnings to justify their purchase
at net tangible asset value. If the earning power justifies a price less than the
adjusted net tangible asset value but more than the liquidation value, it is rational
to expect the value determined by the earning power to predominate....
Some owners who wish to sell cannot accept the notion that the economic
value of the entity could be less than the replacement cost of its assets. The fact
is, however, that there are many such businesses that would never be worth
replacing if they did not already exist. They are worth only their economic value
based on what they can earn, not what it would cost to replace a business that
nobody would choose to replace in its existing form and location.
PRATr, supra note 249, at 227.
287. If returns consistently reach high profitability levels, the market forces compelling
the close corporation to become more broadly held begin to operate. Most close
corporations remain "closely held" precisely because profitability levels are relatively low,
although profitability may be adequate for the life cycle and basic income needs of the
owning stockholders.
288. See, eg., J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation:
A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L.
REV. 1, 40-44 (1977).
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observed by Professor Robert B. Thompson and the late Dean F.
Hodge O'Neal in their leading treatise on close corporations:. 9
Unlike the typical shareholder in a publicly held corporation,
who may be simply an investor or a speculator and does not
desire to assume the responsibilities of management, the
shareholder in a close corporation considers himself or
herself as a co-owner of the business and wants the
privileges and powers that go with ownership. Employment
by the corporation is often the shareholder's principal or
sole source of income. Providing for employment may have
been the principal reason why the shareholder participated
in organizing the corporation. Even if shareholders in a
close corporation anticipate an ultimate profit from the sale
of shares, they usually expect.., to receive an immediate
return in the form of salaries as officers or employees of the
corporation rather than in the form of dividends on their
stock. Earnings of a close corporation often are distributed
in major part in salaries, bonuses and retirement bene-
fits.21°
Thus, for most close corporation shareholders, the business
provides a means for self-generated livelihood.29' The control right,
rather than the residual claimant right or the transfer right, is the
essential incident of ownership for this purpose.29 When this reality
289. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 62.
290. Id. § 1.08, at 31-32.
291. See id. § 1.08, at 31; see also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505,
514 (Mass. 1975) (stating that a close corporation shareholder typically has a substantial
percentage of his personal assets invested in the corporation, anticipating that the
corporation will be his livelihood); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close Corporations Reconsidered,
63 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1176 (1989) (noting that shareholders of close corporations typically
draw cash from the corporation in a form other than dividends, such as in salaries and
perquisites, so that a true understanding of the profitability of the corporation may be
difficult to obtain); supra note 286 and accompanying text (noting that many shareholders
of close corporations consider their business successful when returns are sufficient to
provide them a reasonable salary and to finance continuation of the business).
292. For this reason, minority shareholders of closely held corporations are considered
to be particularly vulnerable. In fact, much of the literature on closely held corporations
focuses on the plight of the minority shareholder in a close corporation. When the control
power is diluted in closely held corporations, the limitations of the residual claimant and
transfer rights become even more evident. Illiquidity problems are significant and lead to
exploitation of minority shareholders. See generally CLARK, supra note 124, § 18.4
(summarizing illiquidity and exploitation problems and discussing solutions offered by
commentators and some courts); O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 62, § 8.07
(discussing the ways in which minority shareholders in close corporations can be
oppressed); Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 288, at 50-59 (proposing a statutory
reform granting an automatic buyout right to disgruntled close corporation shareholders).
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is appreciated, a comparison of Sue's proprietary rights in Capital
Films with Joe's powers of control over Quality Films reveals few
practical differences.
B. Comparative Analysis of Entrepreneurial Control Power in Closely
Held Nonprofits
In the hypothetical,2" Joe Quality is the founder, principal
operator, and sole permanent employee of Quality Films as well as
the creative force behind its operations. The control power of
nonprofit entrepreneurs like Joe over the nonprofit's operations is
equivalent, if not greater than, the ownership rights of shareholders
of for-profit entities except for two limitations: Ultimate legal control
of the nonprofit reposes in the nonprofit's board of directors, and the
entrepreneur's rights are subject to the nondistribution constraint. As
discussed below, the first legal difference is without practical
substance, and the second correlates more to the incidents of
ownership derived from a shareholder's residual claimant and transfer
rights than to his control right, thus having limited significance when
its implications are evaluated on a comparative basis with the rights
of close corporation shareholders. 94
1. Impact of Nonprofit Boards of Directors
It is true that shareholders of a for-profit corporation have
ultimate legal authority over its board of directors, because the
shareholders control the election of board members. In contrast, the
board of directors of a commercial nonprofit is usually self-per-
petuating295 and thus theoretically could usurp the control power of
the entrepreneur. This is unlikely, however. Typically, the
entrepreneur selects the initial members of the self-perpetuating
board, and because the entrepreneur generally appoints individuals
with strong allegiance to the entrepreneur and her goals, this
allegiance also tends to be self-perpetuating. Accordingly, the
entrepreneur's informal influence over nonprofit directors is often as
extensive as the voting rights of shareholders with respect to for-profit
directors.
The members of nonprofit boards are volunteers who usually
have no other affiliation with the nonprofit. They serve without com-
293. See discussion supra part IV.A.
294. See discussion supra part V.A.2. (discussing the limited import of the residual
claimant and transfer rights in the close corporation setting).
295. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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pensation because they, like the entrepreneur, are would-be patrons
of the product or service provided by the nonprofit. 96 Yet, unlike
the entrepreneur, they do not have the skills, time, or desire to resort
to patron self-help,297 so they support and applaud her efforts.
"[B]ecause [nonprofit] directors ... have no direct financial stake in
the organization, and because ... they can partake of the or-
ganization's benefits without participating in control,... [they] tend
to invest ... little time and effort as principals ... ,,29 Since they
cannot sell their interests in the nonprofit upon their departure, they
know "they cannot reap the benefits of [such] investment of time and
energy beyond their direct involvement with the organization."'2 9
Thus, nonprofit directors lack incentive to commit their resources to
controlling and second-guessing the decisions of entrepreneurs and
managers. "As a result,... the managers and other employees of the
organization ... often enjoy more freedom of action than do
managers and employees of for-profit firms.""
Nonprofit directors do have a responsibility to which they often
commit significant energies-that of insuring purpose accountability.
Aside from their common regard for the purposes for which the
nonprofit was formed, the directors are motivated to ensure purpose
accountability because of the funding problems and the personal legal
sanctions for breach of fiduciary duty that can result from non-
compliance.0' However, I believe the entrepreneur is similarly
motivated-even more so than the members of his board and
probably even more than managers of more broadly held nonprofits.
The entrepreneur's investment of human capital in the closely held
nonprofit is greater, and his identity is more intertwined with the
organization. Failures of purpose accountability will reflect more
negatively upon him and jeopardize his chosen means of livelihood to
a greater degree. Even if the state attorney general (the state officer
usually charged with monitoring nonprofit activity) conducts limited
296. See discussion supra part l.C.2.b.; see also Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen,
Governance, supra note 17, at 403-06 (discussing the residual governance problems of
nonprofit organizations).
297. See discussion supra part II.C2.b.
298. Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, Governance, supra note 17, at 405.
299. Id.
300. Id.; see also Ben-Ner, Who Benefits, supra note 17, at 754-55 (commenting that
"nonprofit... management and staff may enjoy considerably more latitude in the pursuit
of their own objectives").
301. See Oleck, supra note 17, at 746, 763-72 (generally discussing the fiduciary status
of directors of nonprofits, standards of diligence and care, and personal liability).
1995] 1833
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
oversight reviews,' °2 institutional funders and grantors of nonprofit
organizations are generally quite diligent in seeking regular accoun-
tings of the specific uses of their grants and contributions. 3
For all these reasons, directors of closely held nonprofits rarely
desire or need to usurp or even to check the control power or
operating preferences of the nonprofit's entrepreneur. Accordingly,
as a practical matter, entrepreneurs like Joe Quality enjoy power with
respect to "their" nonprofits at least comparable to the control right
of shareholders of for-profit corporations. Such entrepreneurs usually
have even the ability to cause the liquidation and cessation of the
nonprofit's business because they are so vital to its operation. 4
To appreciate this last point, remember that the focus here is on
a commercial nonprofit providing products or services competitive
with those offered by for-profits and operated principally by one or
only a few entrepreneurs. If such an entrepreneur chooses to depart,
the nonprofit's volunteer Board of Directors probably will not even
seek a replacement. But for the entrepreneur's initiative, the closely
held commercial nonprofit would likely not have existed. Its assets,
upon liquidation, may be valuable to others, or even to the departed
entrepreneur(s), for similar purposes in another form. But the
particular nonprofit came into being to serve specific motivations and
needs of the entrepreneur3 5 If the nonprofit becomes more
broadly held3 6 during the tenure of the entrepreneur(s), this
uniqueness is altered and the nonprofit entity may well continue
despite the departure. Otherwise, it likely will terminate with the
302. OLECK, supra note 17, at 158, 1217; Fishman, supra note 17, at 669.
303. Foundation funders generally impose stringent monitoring requirements in order
to ensure that they satisfy operation requirements imposed on nonprofits. See, e.g.,
Howard Tuckman, supra note 165, at 213 (observing that foundation funders of nonprofits
require that their grantees furnish a proposal of how funds will be used and an accounting
of how funds are spent).
304. Professor Ben-Ner's statements about the role of controllers in the formation of
nonprofits support the argument that these same controllers may also play a significant
role in a nonprofit's demise: "[L]n many nonprofit organizations only a few ... serve as
nonprofit controllers.... Low participation may prevent nonprofit formation in the first
place, or may allow management a large role in the determination of the organization's
objectives." Ben-Ner, Who Benefits, supra note 17, at 755; see also infra note 307 and
accompanying text.
305. See discussion supra parts I.B.3.b. and LB.4. (discussing the dual motivations of
nonprofit entrepreneurs); see also Ben-Ner, Who Benefits, supra note 17, at 753
(emphasizing that many nonprofit organizations "[are] controlled by... [stakeholder]
demanders, who play the role of owners").
306. This could occur due to expansion of management staff or increased participation
by nonprofit board members.
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entrepreneur's change in needs that precipitates his departure. The
power to cause termination of an entity is the ultimate indication of
control.3' This raises issues relevant to, and brings us to discussion
of, the implications of the second difference noted above-the non-
distribution constraint.
2. Impact of the Nondistribution Constraint
As previously posited, a realistic analysis of the motivations of
nonprofit entrepreneurs like Joe Quality demonstrates that they begin
and operate commercial nonprofit entities for both for-profit and for-
purpose goals.3° As long as the entrepreneur can achieve both her
for-profit and for-purpose goals through the nonprofit form, it is
sensible to do so. When the profit goal is principally that of providing
the entrepreneur with a livelihood by means of a reasonable salary,
no significant impediment arises to serving the dual goals. It is
important to emphasize that the nondistribution constraint does not
prohibit the making of profit.3 9 It restricts only the distribution of
profit to insiders.310  This means that an entrepreneur of a closely
held nonprofit cannot exercise power equivalent to the residual
claimant right or transfer right enjoyed by shareholders of for-profit
corporations. Any residual returns must be retained and re-employed
in the operations of the nonprofit corporation.
As we have seen, however, since shareholders of many closely
held for-profit corporations rarely have sufficient profits to implicate
their residual claimant and transfer rights, their control right is the
key incident of ownership. The corporations can be successful
without being "profitable" because shareholders can use their control
power to dispose of a certain amount of residual returns for future
operations, including increased compensation and perquisites to the
owner-shareholders within "reasonable" limits.3 ' Similarly, many,
307. See generally Billis, supra note 12, at 252-53 (offering the "closure test," which
determines who can close a nonprofit organization down or sell it, as a possibly revealing
and fruitful means of examining sector parentage).
308. See discussion supra part II.C.2.b (arguing that nonprofit entrepreneurs choose the
nonprofit, rather than the for-profit, medium because of the combined force of the need
for subsidy and the consistency and commonality of their profit and purpose goals).
309. See discussion supra part II.A.
310. See discussion supra part H.A.
311. Expenses for salary and the like are not deductible for tax purposes unless they
are reasonable in amount. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1988). Salaries to owner-shareholders in
excess of the'reasonable standard run the risk of being recharacterized as a dividend,
includable in the income of the recipient shareholder but not deductible by the
corporation. See Marvin A. Chirelstein, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 6.04, at 119-21
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if not most, closely held commercial nonprofits rarely have sufficient
profits to implicate the nondistribution constraint" When residual
returns reach a sufficiently high level, the entrepreneur no longer
needs the subsidy factor. He then is motivated to depart and
continue the same operations in a for-profit medium where he is not
subject to the nondistribution constraint?13 But until residual
returns reach such a level, the entrepreneur can use his control power
in exactly the same manner as the control right is exercised by close
corporation shareholders; that is, the entrepreneur can direct residual
returns towards future operations, including increased compensation
and employee benefits for the entrepreneur.
An entrepreneur can operate a commercial nonprofit, even a
successful one, for some time without the nondistribution constraint
becoming an issue. Most commercial nonprofits begin with modest
goals and financing, and their entrepreneurs, like the hypothetical Joe
Quality, start off undercompensated. If the nonprofit is unsuccessful
in generating some residual returns within a relatively short period of
time, the entrepreneur will likely end the operation because it is not
meeting his minimum profit goal of providing him with a livelihood.
However, if the operation successfully generates residual returns,
(6th ed. 1991) (discussing reasonable compensation as it relates to small, closely held
corporations); see also supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
312. In 1989, over 70% of nonprofits, excluding religious organizations and foundations,
had total revenue below $25,000 and, therefore, did not have to provide financial data to
the IRS. The majority of organizations reporting financial data (30% of all organizations)
had annual expenditures less than $100,000 and median assets of $158,000. HODGKINSON,
ALMANAC, supra note 25, at 11-12. This Article focuses on the nonprofits from this group
that are reasonably successful; otherwise, divorce valuation would be moot. However, the
above averages and medians indicate that the profitability of even successful small
nonprofits is not substantial in relative terms.
313. This phenomenon is most evident when large nonprofits convert to for-profit
status, because of the publicity received upon such conversions. See, e.g., Jayne Garrison,
The New Prince of Health Care, CAL, LAW., Dec. 1994, at 32 (detailing the history of
lucrative conversions of California health maintenance organizations and the efforts of
California's new Corporations Commissioner-who oversees HMOs-to require larger
charitable contributions on account of built-up nonprofit value when such HMO
conversions occur); Eric M. Katz, Note, Dissolution of Public Charity Corporations:
Preventing Improper Distribution of Assets, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1429, 1429-31 (1981) (noting
that although many nonprofits fade out of existence because they run out of funds, the
hospital industry is converting to for-profit status because of high profitability potential);
Donna Alvarado, Blue Cross May Owe State Billions For Tax Exemptions, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Sept. 12, 1994, at B5 (detailing the furor created by Blue Cross of California's
attempt to avoid the termination payment requirements of the nondistribution constraint
by "restructuring" the organization using a new for-profit affiliate rather than converting




future operations can expand because of the financing provided by re-
employed residual returns. In this event, unless the business's success
is meteoric-which is unlikely-it probably will enjoy a gradual
ascendance in residual returns. The nondistribution constraint will be
of concern only when residual returns reach a level beyond that which
can be captured by the entrepreneur in the form of "reasonable" com-
pensation and benefits. As future operations expand, however, so too
does the standard of "reasonableness" by which the salary and bene-
fits payable to the entrepreneur are measured. The reasonableness
of employee expenses is a relative concept based on the scope of the
operations and responsibilities undertaken by an employee 14 Thus,
the life span of a nonprofit can be quite long before the non-
distribution constraint is implicated.
Even when a closely held commercial nonprofit is terminated and
dissolved, the nondistribution constraint may have little substantive
impact. Under most state nonprofit laws, a nonprofit complies with
the nondistribution constraint by transferring its assets to another
nonprofit with similar purposes.315 If a small commercial nonprofit
is dissolved because it is unsuccessful, there probably will be few
significant assets to transfer after the satisfaction of the nonprofit's
liabilities. On the other hand, if the nonprofit is successful, dis-
solution probably is prompted by the fact that the nonprofit's residual
returns are reaching a level at which the nondistribution constraint
presents a dilemma for the nonprofit entrepreneur. In this case, the
entrepreneur can plan the dissolution to occur before returns reach
the critical level.
Moreover, the entrepreneur can use his control power to select
and direct the method of dissolution. Nonprofits, like for-profits, can
be dissolved either by sale of the ongoing business (including
314. See, e.g., JODY BLAZEK, TAX AND FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR TAx-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATnONS 313 (1990) (noting use of the same tests as applicable under I.R.C. § 162
to judge the reasonableness of business deductions); HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 278; see
also supra note 311 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. § 162).
315. See, eg., 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1) to (4) (1994) (mandating that nonprofit
organizing documents make this dissolution restriction clear); CAL. CORP. CODE § 6716
(West 1990) (setting forth this method of compliance); see also HOPKINS, supra note 14,
at 112-14 (discussing the federal tax law requirements to this effect which serve as the
impetus for the state nonprofit laws governing termination distributions); OLECK, supra
note 17, at 1191, 1195, and 1220 (generally discussing dissolution procedures of different
types of nonprofits under typical statutes, including the requirement that assets of
charitable nonprofits be transferred to other, similar charities).
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conversion in the case of nonprofits 16) or by sale of the assets of
the business in a liquidation. In either case, sale proceeds remaining
after satisfaction of liabilities can be transferred to a selected
successor nonprofit entity to satisfy the nondistribution constraint.
However, if a liquidation sale is chosen, an entrepreneur, who
arguably now has the ability to meet his dual for-purpose and for-
profit goals using a for-profit form, can purchase necessary assets from
the liquidating nonprofit for use in a new for-profit entity. Through
his control power over the nonprofit, he can obtain the used assets at
minimal relative cost,317 subject, of course, to good faith standards
316. A conversion of a nonprofit into a for-profit is analogized to a sale of an on-going
business because the entity issues stock to purchasers (generally "insiders") who invest in
the on-going business.
317. California's experience with HMO conversions is illustrative of the potential for
such bargain acquisitions in other nonprofit dissolution settings. See Garrison, supra note
313, at 32, 85. Until 1994, when the California Department of Corporations began to
increase the scrutiny it gave to HMO conversion plans, a number of IMOs converted
from nonprofit to for-profit status for what many saw as a bargain. As the Garrison article
reported:
[H]ealth plan conversions to for-profit status had become unbelievably lucrative.
Typically, the companies would donate to charity the value of their assets, which
was well below market because of their nonprofit status. After conversion, the
companies' book value would triple or quadruple, making instant millionaires of
their largest stockholders.... Insiders could buy their own companies for a
penny on the dollar....
Id. at 85.
HMO conversions such as those described in Garrison's article have received
significant publicity in California because of the significant dollars and public health care
issues involved. In particular, political outcry over a cleverly designed 1993 conversion
plan by Blue Cross of California has caused the California Department of Corporations
to pay greater attention to these conversions. The original Blue Cross plan allegedly
would have enabled Blue Cross to shift to for-profit status without contributing an
estimated $2.5 billion that consumer groups argued should have been donated for public
purposes under the nondistribution constraint requirements. Id. at 32. News reports
detailing the Blue Cross case generated significant political pressure, resulting in an
unprecedented reversal of the California Department of Corporations' initial approval of
Blue Cross's plan and renewed negotiations with Blue Cross over the amount owed to the
public trust. Although Blue Cross's plan had differed from the usual type of HMO
conversions in its use of what some termed a "legal loophole," the Blue Cross case brought
attention to other HMO conversions that had resulted in less egregious, but still sizeable,
bargain acquisitions. Accordingly, the California Department of Corporations is now
increasing its oversight efforts on HMO conversions to insure that the conversion prices
it approves more accurately reflect the true value of the HMO. Id. at 85-86. However,
HMOs, because they are health care providers, often are supervised by government
agencies different from those that oversee other types of nonprofits. Id. at 34 (describing
the California law enacted in 1975 to bring HMOs under the supervision of the California
Department of Corporations rather than the office of the attorney general, which oversees
other types of nonprofits).
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for such liquidating sales.318 He potentially could even continue
using the name of the dissolved nonprofit by adopting it for the new
for-profit operations, thus capturing much of the goodwill of the
nonprofit enterprise at no additional cost.31
3. De Facto Ownership Conclusion
Although Professor Hansmann made the following comments on
the economies of scale of nonprofits in the context of an unrelated
point, they echo the themes discussed in this section:
The distinction between the for-profit and nonprofit forms
becomes blurred when the organizations in question are
small in scale .... Consider, for example, a lawyer in solo
practice who bills his clients by the hour. Since he only gets
paid at what is presumably the going rate for his labor
services, his law office is, in a sense, conducted on a
nonprofit basis. Thus, his business might not operate much
differently if he were to establish it formally as a nonprofit
rather than as a [for-profit] sole proprietorship. Similarly, if
Accordingly, such intense scrutiny of dissolutions by other types of nonprofits is still
not typical. Even if attorneys general across the country were to give heightened scrutiny
to nonprofit dissolutions, it is doubtful that oversight energies would be focused on small
dissolving nonprofits because they have significantly lower values, relatively speaking, than
HMOs. Furthermore, the dissolution of any such nonprofit generally would not implicate
statewide public policy issues like those associated with health care providers. Also, when
the dissolution of a small nonprofit is achieved by means of a piecemeal liquidation, rather
than by conversion, the oversight authority to question valuation matters arguably is more
limited as long as the price paid for each asset is commercially reasonable. Thus, even if
scrutiny like that currently given to HMO conversions in California eventually trickles
down to the small nonprofit, it is likely that entrepreneurs of closely held commercial
nonprofits will still be able to effect bargain acquisitions of the assets of their dissolving
nonprofit.
318. See HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 288-91 (discussing IRS private letter rulings
containing good faith standards for sales of assets to insiders).
319. Much of an entity's built-up goodwill is embodied in its name. Generally, once
an entity is incorporated under a particular name, the office of the Secretary of State of
a particular jurisdiction thereafter reserves it for exclusive use by that entity to avoid the
confusion of the public that might be engendered by another corporation using this name.
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5122 (West 1990). Once a corporation, including a
nonprofit, dissolves and terminates, the applicable name generally again becomes available
for selection and use by any newly incorporating entity desiring the name, at no or
minimal cost. The nonprofit entrepreneur who is re-incorporating as a for-profit could
time the incorporation of his new for-profit entity to coincide with the termination of the
nonprofit, ensuring that he could select the name of the old nonprofit for his new for-profit
entity. If the entrepreneur is the principal purchaser of the assets of a nonprofit at a
piecemeal liquidating sale, he potentially can use his control power over the liquidation
process to capture even the goodwill value of the nonprofit in a new for-profit venture at
the same locale and under the same name.
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a person operates a small day care center out of his own
home, employing few or no persons other than himself the
flow of funds and even the bookkeeping might look much
the same whether the organization is formally created as a
nonprofit or a for-profit entity. The nondistribution
constraint that characterizes the nonprofit form has real
meaning only when an enterprise is of sufficient scale to
develop large earnings that cannot easily and plausibly be
paid out simply as reasonable salaries to the individuals in
control of the enterprise.3
The control power held by an entrepreneur like Joe Quality often
is essentially equivalent to the ownership rights actually available to
a close corporation shareholder like Sue Capital. The key incident of
ownership for Sue is her control right, with her residual claimant and
transfer rights only becoming of superior importance in limited
circumstances. 3 1 The control power available to Joe is comparable
to this control right. The nondistribution constraint prevents
entrepreneurs like Joe from having residual claimant and transfer
rights like those available to shareholders. However, as in the case
of the close corporation shareholder, the circumstances in which such
rights would have significance are limited and arise infrequently in the
small, commercial nonprofit context. When they do arise, the control
power offers the means for diminishing, and even deflecting, the
nondistribution constraint's impact.
There is little difference between Sue Capital and Joe Quality
with respect to their business operations. Entrepreneurs of commer-
cial nonprofits often are like Joe Quality. They have sufficient power
to make themselves de facto owners of the business interests they
control in the nonprofit form. This is not to suggest that there is
anything inappropriate or wrong about the control power held by
nonprofit entrepreneurs. As long as a nonprofit entrepreneur adheres
to the nonprofit purposes for which the entity was formed and does
not use the corporation or its assets fraudulently or otherwise engage
in impermissible dealings with the nonprofit or its assets, the control
power is not abused.3 However, the fact that the control power is
320. Hansmann, The Role, supra note 17, at 870-71 (footnote omitted).
321. See discussion supra part V.A.2.
322. Future reform measures may seek to curtail this control power, but currently it is
quite broad. See, eg., Ben-Ner, Who Benefits, supra note 17, at 756-61 (arguing that the
lack of broad-based participation by nonprofit demanders can lead to a decline in public
goodwill towards nonprofits, which, in turn, may result in nonprofits serving as a less
complete solution to the market failures to which they respond). On the other hand, it is
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legitimate has no relevance to its proprietary implications. In the
context of the closely held commercial nonprofits, upon which this
Article focuses, a nonprofit entrepreneur's control power makes him
a de facto owner of the nonprofit. Moreover, for the reasons set forth
in the next section, when nonprofit entrepreneurs divorce, it is not
only fair, but also appropriate, to include their business "holdings" in
the divorce deliberations.
C. Implications of the Control Power in the Divorce Law Context
1. Importance of Context to Proprietary Determinations
As previously acknowledged, nonprofit entrepreneurs do not
"own" the assets of the nonprofits they control, at least as the term
is commonly understood. This fundamental fact engenders intuitive
concern about including the value of business interests held in non-
profit form in divorce allocations. But one must consider what gives
rise to ownership: a stock certificate with an individual's name on it
or the powers of ownership? A stock certificate is merely an
indication of a particular set of ownership rights-those of a
shareholder of a for-profit corporation. Even the standard set of
ownership rights typically flowing to shareholders may be altered by
preferences and limitations set forth in incorporation documents,
bylaws, or shareholder agreements. A shareholder is still considered
to have ownership or proprietary rights even if her voting,
distribution, or other usual rights are significantly circumscribed by
such documents.
The bundle of possible property rights recognized in this country
is multi-dimensional. Incidents of ownership flow from even the most
tenuous hold on any right in the bundle if appropriate to the legal
context in which "ownership" is examined.3  The purposes of
particular laws are equally broad; some emphasize the protection of
private personal rights and the fostering of societal welfare, while
others facilitate the efficient functioning of capitalism by emphasizing
private property and freedom of contract rights. Thus, "ownership"
often the very availability of broad control power which serves as one of the final
determinants in an entrepreneur's decision to form a nonprofit. See supra note 168 and
accompanying text. Accordingly, the availability of control power can have a positive
effect in adding to the pool of nonprofits formed to correct contract, market, and
government failure.
323. For examples of interests that are designated property for some purposes but not
for others, see infra notes 324-30 and accompanying text. See also Oldham, supra note
225, at 1120 (making a general observation about the different meanings of property).
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is a term that has no single meaning; its breadth, limitations, and
implications are defined by the operative legal context of its
reference. Proprietary rights are constrained in some contexts and
expanded in others, depending on the economic and societal purposes
to be served.
An adverse possessor does not own the property she possesses
but is given superior rights of ownership in the property relative to all
but the true owner.24 A news service does not own the news it
packages in news reports but is protected from its usurpation by
competitors?' The holder of a contingent future interest in proper-
ty has sufficient present ownership rights to prevent waste by the
present possessory holder.3" A provider of gametes, such as frozen
sperm or embryos, cannot claim a broad property interest founded in
general property law in such neither-property-nor-person material, but
is said to have interests "in the nature of ownership," representing an
"interim category" of property in divorce and probate situations.327
A child has a mere expectancy in the property of a parent, but is
given standing to bring a will contest if the expectancy is dashed by
a will that disinherits the child.3' An enterprise may have only a
potential business opportunity in a particular project, but may have
sufficient expectancy to thwart the efforts of another to compete un-
fairly for the opportunity.32 9 Corporate assets are technically owned
by corporations, yet shareholders are said to own corporations
because, acting collectively and through the intermediary of a board
of directors, they have proprietary rights over the corporate as-
sets.33
0
The foregoing examples illustrate how the proprietary force of
rights, claims, or interests existing in one context vary when such
rights are viewed in another context. Proprietary rights are extended
324. See RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 56-57 (4th ed. 1991).
325. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918)
(holding that news gatherer had a "quasi-property" interest in its gathered news, entitling
it to stop competitors from using the information until its commercial value as news had
passed away).
326. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 231-33 (3d ed. 1993).
327. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281 (Cal. App. 1993) (holding
that a decedent had an interest in his frozen sperm that fell within the broad definition of
property for purposes of probate of his will); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn.
1992) (concerning the disposition of frozen pre-embryos in a divorce case), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
328. See WILLIAM McGOvERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 582 (1988).
329. See CLARK, supra note 124, §§ 7.1-7.9 at 223-62.
330. See authorities cited supra parts IV.A.1.-IV.A.2.
1842 [Vol. 73
COMMERCIAL NONPROFITS
when, and to the extent, necessary or appropriate for the underlying
purposes of the legal rules at issue. Stated differently, the purposive
legal context in which rights or interests are examined generally
determines the proprietary implications of the rights or interests.
Some rights or interests might not be sufficiently proprietary for
certain purposes, but may be more than adequate for others. With
regard to the divorce context examined in this Article, the adequacy
standard for proprietary attribution does not require the existence of
all the traditional incidents of property ownership.
331
2. Specific Divorce Law Context: Broad Standards for
Proprietary Attribution
Divorce laws increasingly view marriage as a partnership? 32
The purpose of property-division allocation laws is to divide the ac-
cumulated acquisitions of the marital partnership fairly between the
spouses upon its termination 33 However, unlike typical commercial
partnerships, the marital partnership concept assumes the mutual
support of the labor and efforts of each spouse in both commercial
and non-commercial endeavors. 34  The partnership contemplates
long-term investment in the economic and non-economic well-being
of the individual marriage partners rather than in any specific asset or
endeavor.33 The partnership is premised on the notion that marital
efforts that improve the well-being of one partner will be shared by,
and inure to the benefit of the other?36  Given this distinction,
divorce courts routinely must consider expanding the scope of
economic interests divisible upon divorce beyond the borders of rights
traditionally viewed as fully proprietary in order to effect fair
allocation of assets.337
331. See generally Da Silva, supra note 225, § 18.02 (discussing the broad concept of
"property" in divorce law).
332. See, e.g., Bruch, Of Work, supra note 225, at 101; Oldham, supra note 225, at 1084;
Smith, supra note 227, at 696, 730-38 (arguing that the partnership theory may be a
realistic approach to marriage but is flawed as an approach to divorce).
333. See Oldham, supra note 225, at 1084; Smith, supra note 227, at 732.
334. See Smith, supra note 227, at 732-34.
335. Id.; see also Bruch, Of Work, supra note 225, at 101.
336. See Blumberg, Marital Property, supra note 225, at 1251-52; Da Silva, supra note
225, § 18.02; see also Heyman, supra note 225, at 4 n.13 ("[T]he very existence of marital
property schemes eventually forced courts to rethink what is meant by property rights.").
337. In commercial partnerships, the parties identify the scope of shared assets and
rights. Investors in the venture risk that it will not mature. Hence, the scope of includable
assets is defined by the focus and narrow purposes of the venture. The marital partnership
is not so defined by purpose or duration. For divorce law purposes, "[g]enerally speaking,
the mere fact that an item is difficult to identify with specificity does not preclude its
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In fact, what constitutes "ownership" of assets rarely is discussed
directly as a problematic or ambiguous issue in connection with the
divorce allocation process.3 s  For the most part, the question of
whether one or both spouses "owns" an asset appears to be treated
as a non-issue in divorce cases, except when there are competing
ownership claims by third parties339 or between the spouses.3
Courts seem to pay more attention to the issue of the nature of the
asset or right rather than to the technicalities of its ownership
anchorings.141  It appears that spousal representations about the
ownership of assets generally are accepted and supported by pos-
session, clear title documents, or contractual, trust, or employment
arrangements giving a spouse beneficial rights. Even when an asset,
such as an nonvested pension right, is not owned in the full legal
sense of the term, differing inclusion rules center on the nature of the
right as property rather than on its ownership.342 The fact that
financial benefits flow in the direction of one or both spouses appears
potential in being classified as 'property.' " Da Silva, supra note 225, § 18.02[2].
"[D]ictionary definitions of 'property' provide little value in the overall concepts of equita-
ble distribution of marital property." Id. § 18.02[1]. "While state courts have been
confounded by many... intangible interests, the trend is to accord them 'property' status
for marital property purposes." Blumberg, Intangible Assets, supra note 225, § 23.01[1].
338. Accordingly, no relevant cases or legal commentary generally discuss "ownership"
as a prerequisite to the inclusion of an asset in divorce allocations. It appears that the
discussion of includability is simply not addressed in these terms.
339. One case in which ownership is addressed directly is Allen v. Allen, 702 S.W.2d
819, 821 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986); cf. supra note 66. Allen is the only case that deals with the
question of whether a nonprofit's value should be included in divorce allocations. In
Allen, the court resolved the issue in the negative because the nonprofit involved in the
case was a membership club, owned by its members rather than by the divorcing
entrepreneur who controlled it. Allen, 702 S.W.2d at 821-22. This membership-type
nonprofit stands in contrast to the type of nonprofits upon which this Article focuses.
Thus, even Allen dealt with a competing claim of ownership by third parties, which was
determinative.
340. In some cases, a spouse may claim that he has acquired an interest in the property
of the other spouse by virtue of a spousal agreement, contributions to improvement of the
asset, or other facts. See generally Da Silva, supra note 225, § 18.07, at 18-85 to 18-99
(discussing statutes and case law concerning transmutation of property caused by spousal
agreements, commingling, gifts, and other actions).
341. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978) (analyzing how
an educational degree lacks the attributes of property); In re Marriage of Washburn, 677
P.2d 152, 162 (Wash. 1984) (Rosellini, J., dissenting) (arguing that the crucial inquiry in
a marital property question is whether a property interest is found in an intangible); see
also Heyman, supra note 225, at 4 (noting that "marital property exists without reference
to title").
342. See, e.g., Ball v. Ball, 445 S.E.2d 449,450 (S.C. 1994) (concluding that participation
right in pension plan is "property" whether vested or nonvested); see also infra notes 350-
51 and accompanying text.
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to be sufficient to corral the source of that wealth into their divorce
deliberations.
Thus, ownership questions have not spawned the same
interpretative disputes and differences in approach as the question of
whether certain intangibles are property. Accordingly, it appears that
divorce courts Would likely frame the issue of inclusion of nonprofit
business interests as an "is-it-property" issue rather than as an "is-it-
owned" issue. This distinction may seem to be only a slight sub-
stantive shift in perspective. However, such framing significantly
facilitates the required analysis, because it focuses the relevant divorce
law guidelines.
Divorce courts have had to grapple with the appropriateness of
inclusion of a wide variety of intangible and inchoate rights in divorce
allocation. Exclusion is particularly troublesome when intangible or
inchoate rights have significant value or may be the most valuable
asset of the marital partnership. When the labor and efforts of one
or both spouses result in acquisitions of tangible business property or
defined shareholder or partnership holdings in a business corporation
or partnership, the proprietary nature of the assets is clear.4a
However, marital efforts often produce valuable economic prospects
or opportunities that have not yet matured into fixed proprietary
rights in particular property or have not yet been captured in
recognizable proprietary form, such as a contract right or an active
business operation. Such opportunities and prospects span a broad
spectrum of possible rights, claims, and interests based on a spouse's
status, skills, talents, labor, and experience developed, risked, or
expended during the marriage. For example, economic prospects
based on an idea for an invention, a professional education, legal
causes of action, established reputation or goodwill, an executory
contract, or accrued salary all would be included in the opportunity
spectrum.3" At one end of the opportunity spectrum lie sheer hope
and expectancy in yet undefined and amorphous property?4 These
343. The valuation of such assets may be problematic, but they are clearly includable
in the divisible estate. See Da Silva, supra note 225, § 18.02[3].
344. Each of these examples represents the prospect or opportunity of earning or
otherwise acquiring future wealth. However, the likelihood that such wealth will be
realized depends on speculation about future events, gratuities, or the enforceability of
rights.
345. See, eg., In re Brown, 544 P.2d 561, 565 (Cal. 1976) (distinguishing a mere
expectancy from a nonvested pension right). The court stated:
The term expectancy describes the interest of a person who merely foresees that
he might receive a future beneficence, such as the interest of an heir apparent of
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prospects warrant no proprietary attribution to the marital partnership
or either spouse. At the other end of the spectrum lie fully matured
or developed interests, which reasonably insure the eventual
realization of possessory rights by the marital partnership to distinct
assets that meet all traditional definitions of property?46 These
prospects warrant unquestionable proprietary attribution.
Between the two ends of the opportunity spectrum lies a legal
"gray" area. Divorce courts often must determine whether, on the
one hand, the proprietary value of an economic prospect is at-
tributable to the marital partnership or, on the other hand, it is so
personally intertwined with the identity or indivisible rights of one
spouse, so dependent on post-marital efforts of that spouse, or so
contingent on future events, that no attribution to the other spouse is
appropriate 4 7 Generally, a case-by-case determination is required.
States disagree about controlling determinants or the characterization
of certain facts.' Despite such disagreements, however, the
dividing line for inclusion of economic prospects in divorce allocations
lies somewhere within, rather than outside or at the far edges of, the
economic opportunity spectrum 49
For example, most divorce courts now include the value of
nonvested pensions as allocable property upon divorce.350 For
a beneficiary designated by a living insured who has a right to change the
beneficiary. As these examples demonstrate, the defining characteristic of an
expectancy is that its holder has no enforceable right to his beneficence.
IdL
346. Accrued salary and vested pension rights would lie at this end of the opportunity
spectrum because they are fully earned and are based on clear contractual rights. They
are fixed receivables and their collection generally only is subject to the ability of the
employer to make payment when due.
347. See, eg., Blumberg, Maritalproperty, supra note 229, at 1255 (stating the view that
"the entirety of marital property law ... represent[s] an accommodation between the
competing claims of marital partnership and personal autonomy").
348. See, e.g., Blumberg, Goodwill, supra note 225, §§ 25.02-25.03,25.06 (summarizing
state differences in analyzing goodwill); Da Silva, supra note 225, § 18.03[3], at 18-20
(emphasizing that the definitions of intangibles are in a constant state of flux from juris-
diction to jurisdiction and even within given jurisdictions); McKnight, supra note 225, at
199-201 (noting that there is no standard definition of property and describing specific
inconsistencies between states on this issue).
349. Even though the law of intangible inclusion is fraught with ambiguity, "certain
types of intangible property are considered to such a frequent extent by courts ... that
certain accepted guidelines have been established." Da Silva, supra note 225, § 18.03[3],
at 18-20.
350. Blumberg, Intangible Assets, supra note 225, § 23.02[1] (noting that a majority of
states recognize any type of pension right as marital property and providing an overview
of the various state positions on pensions); see also, eg., Ohm v. Ohm, 431 A.2d 1371,1375
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (holding pension rights includable, whether vested or not);
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years, however, a number of these same jurisdictions characterized
nonvested pensions as mere expectancies.35' Courts previously
characterized pensions in this way because pensions may be lost if an
employee-spouse leaves employment or is fired before vesting.
Similarly, commercial goodwill of a business has been viewed as an
includable asset for a considerable number of years despite its distinct
intangible nature? 2 A majority of jurisdictions also includes
professional goodwill in divorce allocations, 53 although a few main-
tain that in personal service businesses the goodwill is inseparable
from the person of the spouse or nontransferable."s A few jurisdic-
tions even go so far as to include the value of "star" or celebrity
status as allocable celebrity goodwill?55  In these jurisdictions, the
incremental value of celebrity status is recognized, even though it is
not captured in an established proprietary form, separate from the
celebrity, by being either part of the goodwill of an independent
enterprise or commodified in a long-term service contract. 6
In summary, divorce courts often attribute proprietary value to
intangible and inchoate economic rights or interests that lack formal
incidents of ownership or lack independent form as distinct property.
Imperfections in, or restrictions on, ownership rights and amorphous-
ness of form can be accounted for by discounts in the valuation
process rather than by wholesale exclusion from the divisible
estate.37 Accordingly, it is not necessary that assets or interests in
assets be fully "owned" in the traditional sense or be captured in a
recognized proprietary form in order for divorce laws to find sufficient
Damiano v. Damiano, 463 N.Y.S.2d'477,480-81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (holding nonvested
pension includable despite valuation difficulties); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343,
348-49 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (same); see generally Blumberg, Marital Property, supra note
225, at 1256-66 (discussing the various state rationales for treating pensions as marital
property).
351. See, eg., BASSETr, supra note 270, § 3.04[B] (citing 13 California decisions
overturned by the California Supreme Court when it ruled in In Re Marriage of Brown,
544 P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. 1976), that non-vested pension rights are divisible contingent
property interests rather than "mere expectancies").
352. Da Silva, supra note 225, § 18.03[3][c], at 18-31.
353. Blumberg, Goodwill, supra note 225, § 25.02, at 25-15 to 25-16.
354. See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
355. See Blumberg, Goodwill supra note 225, § 25.06[6] (discussing cases finding for
inclusion of celebrity goodwill).
356. ]l; see Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190,1191-92 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988),
affid, 557 A.2d 1040 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 564 A.2d 875 (N.J. 1989);
Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), appeal dismissed, 588 N.E.2d
99 (N.Y. 1992).
357. See supra notes 233, 259-63 and accompanying text.
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proprietary value to warrant attribution and allocation. This is the
operative context for analyzing the question of whether a nonprofit
entrepreneur's business interests are subject to value allocation. A
nonprofit entrepreneur's control power in an on-going nonprofit is an
existing present-day interest. Compare this interest to the myriad
types of significantly contingent, future interests that divorce courts
have classified as includable 8  The nonprofit entrepreneur's
control right clearly meets the proprietary standards of existing
divorce laws. If nonprofit business holdings of a divorcing entre-
preneur would otherwise qualify as divisible assets were they held in
the for-profit form, the nature of the corporate form should not result
in different treatment. The value of the business holdings should be
included in divorce allocations, even though the nondistribution
constraint prevents the in-kind division of the holdings. Given this
conclusion, the first issue for a divorce court presented with a case
involving a manager of a closely held, commercial nonprofit should be
proof of control.
D. Proof ofRequisite Control: Replacing Assumption with Rebuttable
Presumption
Not every manager/operator of a closely held commercial
nonprofit will have sufficient control to qualify as a de facto owner.
Given the predominance of sector-blurring, however, such managers
should not automatically be assumed to have mere employee status
simply because their operations are carried on through a nonprofit.
At a minimum, the predominance of sector-blurring necessitates
changing this assumption to at least a rebuttable presumption against
de facto ownership. A case-by-case analysis is required to discern the
true status of these "employees."
Judicial guidelines for such a determination can be fashioned by
adapting already familiar standards. For example, institutional
lenders commonly require that closely held businesses purchase key-
person insurance coverage359 on employees considered essential to
the continued success of the business of operations. Similarly, key-
358. See supra notes 350-57 and accompanying text.
359. The term "key-person" is the gender neutral version of "key-man," which is still
sometimes used. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 608 N.E.2d 967, 970 (I11. App. Ct.
1993) (noting valuation of husband's closely held corporation based on evidence of key
person insurance policy taken out on the husband in the amount of $200,000, which named
the corporation as beneficiary). See generally Taylor, supra note 225 (discussing the use
of the concept to justify a valuation discount in divorce cases that involve issues different
from those upon which this Article focuses).
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person discounts are employed regularly by accountants to determine
the going-concern sale value of a for-profit business in which an
essential employee will be departing.3 Courts are accustomed to
applying such key-person discounts in divorce valuations of closely
held for-profits. 361 The standards for determining key-person status
in these for-profit contexts could easily be modified and adapted for
a de facto ownership determination in the nonprofit context. If a
nonprofit employee is so essential to the operation of the nonprofit
that extensive key-person insurance would be required by a lender of
the nonprofit, de facto ownership status seems appropriate. Similarly,
the current judicial standards used for determining satisfaction of the
alter ego requirements in corporate-veil-piercing cases, modified to
eliminate inapplicable elements. 3 also hold promise as a beginning
basis for fashioning de facto ownership testing criteria.3  Alter-
natively, courts might choose to frame completely new criteria.
Regardless of the criteria used, if the testing for de facto ownership
is positive, valuation of the interests will be the next significant task.
E. Valuation in Light of the Nondistribution Constraint, with
Emphasis on Goodwill
The value assigned to a nonprofit entrepreneur's interest in a
closely held commercial nonprofit arguably should be less than that
assignable to a comparable interest in a for-profit. This is because the
nondistribution constraint deprives a nonprofit entrepreneur of
residual claimant and transfer rights. If the selected valuation method
and assumptions used for a comparable for-profit rely in any way on
the existence of these rights, and the same basic method is used to
value the nonprofit, then the nonprofit's valuation should incorporate
360. See PRATr, supra note 249, at 35-36, 101-02; Haynsworth, supra note 225, at 496-
97.
361. See authorities cited supra note 262.
362. A nonprofit entrepreneur need not act inappropriately to be considered as having
de facto ownership of the nonprofit for divorce law purposes. Accordingly, the veil-
piercing standards would need to be modified to do away with the notion of wrong or
fault, since the purpose of de facto ownership standards would be to determine value
attribution, while veil-piercing standards are applied to determine liability. For discussions
of veil piercing, see David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETrE L.
REv. 371 (1981); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89 (1985); Robert Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veik
An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991).
363. At least one court has already suggested that nonprofit insiders who became
owners of an HMO upon its conversion were the "alter egos" of the nonprofit. See Maillie
v. Greater Delavare Valley Health Care, Inc., 628 A.2d 528, 531 (Pa. 1993).
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a discount to account for the nondistribution constraint ("NDC dis-
count").364  Accountants and appraisers are familiar with valuing
stock subject to shareholder-imposed restrictions, which have impact
similar to that of the nondistribution constraint. 65 They can draw
upon the techniques and factors used in these for-profit settings to
design an NDC discount methodology. One approach in particular
might be useful: to view the control power of the divorcing
entrepreneur as comparable to a leasehold right in the assets of the
nonprofit business? 66 This leasehold approach, which is explained
below, is offered as a theoretical basis for understanding how
valuation of a nonprofit entity might differ from that of a comparable
for-profit entity. It is offered as a concept rather than as an actual
methodology to assist those who, like myself, are untrained in
valuation practice in comprehending how the applicable determinants
might be translated. I hope not to offend those trained in valuation
practice by the use of terminology or assumptions that may seem
awkward or inappropriate to them given their experience. In any
case, possible disagreements with my conceptual approach or
conclusions regarding valuation should not obscure this Article's
fundamental conclusion about de facto ownership of closely held
commercial nonprofits.
1. Suggested Leasehold Analogy Discount
Control power essentially provides the entrepreneur the ability
to use and enjoy the assets of a business as long as she chooses to be
in control and as long as she is not ousted by the board of directors.
The traditional real property analogue to such use and enjoyment
rights is the leasehold estate-specifically the periodic tenancy.3 67
364. This depends on the valuation method and assumptions that might be selected for
use in a comparable for-profit in the divorce context. As previously stated, valuation
methods vary and so do assumptions used within methods. See supra notes 259-63 and
accompanying text. If residual claimant and transfer rights are not considered in the
selected methodology, no discount seems necessary. However, the discussion in this
section assumes use of a basic valuation method that incorporates these rights. Since the
arguments in this Article have been presented from a comparative perspective, this
assumption is appropriate to complete the comparative analysis.
365. See PRATt, supra note 249, at 381-83 (discussing various types of shareholder
agreements that restrict marketability); Haynsworth, supra note 225, at 488-92, 501-06
(explaining valuation factors used by appraisers to take account of lack of marketability,
restricted securities, and buy/sell arrangements).
366. See PRA7r, supra note 249, at 50.
367. Under a periodic tenancy the leasehold estate is automatically renewed for
successive periods unless either party gives timely notice of an intent to terminate it. See,
e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 326, at 426.
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Accordingly, the entrepreneur's control over the assets of the
nonprofit may be equivalent to having a lease of the underlying assets
of the nonprofit. The value of the leasehold right in each asset could
then be determined by using a reasonable lease term comparable to
the capitalization period that might be employed to value a for-profit
business.s This technique could be utilized easily for tangible
assets, including equipment and office space, because market rental
values for such assets are likely to be readily available. Moreover, as
with many for-profits, the nonprofit actually may lease, rather than
own, some of the assets used in the business. In this case, the
valuation is no different than it would be if the leased assets were
being used by a for-profit. The intangible leasehold value of the
underlying tangible assets would be the operative value.369
Admittedly, other types of non-leasehold intangibles, such as
service, supply, or consulting contract rights, will present greater
valuation difficulties. However, using the leasehold approach also
offers a useful conceptual37 perspective for valuing these assets in
a manner that recognizes a discount for the limitations attending the
nondistribution constraint. These intangibles could be valued in the
same manner as they would be valued in a for-profit context.
Appraisers could then overlay and apply familiar leasehold valuation
methodologies as a single additional step in the valuation of the
intangible.
Thus, the closely held nonprofit could first be valued in the same
manner as would a for-profit close corporation in the applicable
jurisdiction.37' This establishes a benchmark reference value for
determining the value of the business interests "held" by the nonprofit
368. Alternatively, as suggested by one reader of a draft of this Article, the
entrepreneur's interest might be more like a revocable license than a leasehold interest
because the entrepreneur's access to the assets is not supported by the legal protection
afforded to lease rights. In this instance it is doubtful such an alternative characterization
would result in a significant difference in valuation, because the matters that would cause
revocation of the nonprofit "license" are almost totally within the control of the
entrepreneur. See also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 326, at 437-38 (presenting the
difficulties of distinguishing leases from licenses in certain situations).
369. Conceptually, the control power can be viewed as giving the entrepreneur a
sublease in the same tangible assets on the same terms and conditions as the nonprofit
entity's leases.
370. Even if the conceptual difficulties are overcome, evidentiary problems may remain.
However, evidentiary problems exist in varying degrees in all valuations, appraisers are
accustomed to addressing them, and divorce courts are accustomed to assessing the
testimony.
371. See supra text accompanying note 253 and the comments supra note 265 regarding
the jurisdictional differences in the treatment of various component assets.
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entrepreneur that should be includable in the allocations on divorce
(the "includable nonprofit value"). The benchmark value would be
the maximum value potentially assignable to the includable nonprofit
value. The minimum value potentially assignable would be deter-
mined by applying a full NDC discount, of either the leasehold-type
suggested or another appropriate discounting method, to the entirety
of the benchmark value. In fact, if certain adjustments, discussed
below, were not necessary, this minimum value theoretically would be
the appropriate amount of the includable nonprofit value using a
basic conceptual formula that equates the includable nonprofit value
to the benchmark value minus the NDC discount. However, the
actual includable nonprofit value would likely be an amount falling
within these maximum and minimum conceptual parameters when
adjustments are made.
2. Adjustments to the Conceptual Formula
First, the full NDC discount must be adjusted downward to the
extent it is based on factors common to, and overlapping with, factors
already considered in determination of the benchmark value.372 For
example, it is highly likely that the benchmark value already reflects
a discount factor for lack of marketability, because the benchmark is
theoretically determined by treating the nonprofit as a closely held,
for-profit corporation. Interests in closely held corporations usually
have reduced marketability; this reduced marketability is normally
considered as a factor in the basic valuation of closely held corpora-
tions.373 If so, application to the benchmark value of a full NDC
discount, to account for the nondistribution constraint's restrictions on
transfer rights, might overcompensate for these transfer restrictions.
Appraisers should make adjustments to the NDC discount to avoid
this overcompensation.
Second, an adjustment must be made when the total benchmark
value includes the value of an asset of the nonprofit not significantly
affected by the nondistribution constraint. Unlike the first ad-
justment, this adjustment to the basic conceptual formula is not
dependent on the specifics of a particular appraiser's methodology,
but rather should always be applied when implicated by a given
component asset. In particular, persuasive arguments exist to treat
goodwill value as such an asset. These arguments, articulated below,
372. See supra notes 357-58 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 249-53, 262, and accompanying text.
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support a conclusion that whenever goodwill value is a part of the
benchmark value it should be exempted from the NDC discount. In
other words, instead of using the minimum value determined under
the basic conceptual formula, only the benchmark value exclusive of
goodwill should be discounted. This should result in a more accurate
valuation.
3. Case for Exempting Goodwill Value from Discount
Why exempt the goodwill value of the business from the NDC
discount? There are two reasons. One is based on jurisdictional
practice. The other, more important reason is based on the essential
nature of goodwill.
a. Jurisdictional Practice
As previously stated, the large majority of jurisdictions includes
the goodwill value of business interests in divorce valuations re-
gardless of whether the goodwill is marketable or transferable.374
If the standards established in any of these jurisdictions for valuing
unmarketable goodwill in these for-profit settings do not differ from
those established for valuing marketable goodwill, then no NDC
discount of goodwill value in the nonprofit setting seems warranted.
IfX however, the standards do differ, then the same standards used in
these jurisdictions for valuing unmarketable goodwill in the for-profit
setting should be applied in these jurisdictions rather than the NDC
discount. But the primary reason for exempting goodwill from an
NDC discount urges caution in the wholesale application of such
differing standards in these jurisdictions and similar caution in
jurisdictions that do not recognize unmarketable goodwill.
b. Nature of Goodwill
The primary reason to exempt goodwill from the NDC discount
is that the nondistribution constraint has no-or only
minimal-application to the goodwill value. Thus, discounting this
asset is unwarranted.
Goodwill is the intangible aspect of a business relating to
reputation and patronage. "Goodwill... really means those factors
that tend to bring customers back to the business."375 Elements of
goodwill include business name, proprietary product, and the proba-
374. See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
375. PRATr, supra note 249, at 188.
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bility that the old customers will resort to the old place of busi-
ness.3 76 The nondistribution constraint prohibits the distribution of
profits or assets owned by the nonprofit to insiders 77 But goodwill
is the capacity for profit, rather than profit itself and, further, is not
a distinct and independent type of asset within the traditional meaning
of the term.
As to this latter point, while goodwill is generally referred to as
an "asset," it is an intangible different from other types of assets. In
fact, goodwill is usually defined as that portion of a business's value
exceeding the value of its assets 78 This definition is intended to
contrast goodwill with discretely identifiable assets that have a value
separate from the business activities of an enterprise. Valuation
methodologies analyze the sources of value in a business. "The
business as an operating activity has a value based on its income
profitability. The profitability of the business includes income created
from two distinct sources.... assets and goodwill. 3 79  In this
context, the term "assets" is used to refer to assets, both tangible and
intangible, other than goodwill, that is, "discrete" assets.310
Since goodwill is a conglomerate of factors creating additional
value, as opposed to a discrete asset, it is not capable of being
distributed or assigned by itself as an isolated, separate asset. This
means goodwill value can only be accessed through use of an owner's
control rights, because goodwill has no independent value separate
from business activities. It has value only insofar as it attaches to a
376. Smith, supra note 225, at 164.
377. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
378. Zipp, supra note 225, at 101. Professor Blumberg notes:
Since goodwill is a residuum of assets we are otherwise unable to quantify
individually, any listing of goodwill constituents is necessarily illustrative rather
than exhaustive. In addition to reputation and repeat patronage, goodwill may
include, inter alia, strategic location, effective advertising, the value of a skilled,
trained, efficient work force, assemblage of property, plant and equipment in a
productive unit, and systems, controls and methods developed as part of the
operation.
Blumberg, Goodwill, supra note 225, at 25-26 (internal citations omitted).
379. Zipp, supra note 225, at 100.
380. Note, however, that a business appraiser might use what is termed the "big pot"
approach. Under this approach, he would not attempt to identify the specific values
attributable to individual intangible assets, but would lump all value over and above net
tangible asset value into one big pot and loosely refer to it collectively as goodwill. If the
amount of the intangible assets is relatively small, the big pot approach results in
reasonable accuracy in valuing true goodwill. However, if intangible asset value in the
business is substantial, the intangibles should be identified and appraised individually. See
PRATr, supra note 249, at 188; Zipp, supra note 225, at 99.
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continuing business.38' As already revealed by the comparative
analysis in Sections A and B of this Part, the control right is the
principal ownership right in close corporations and the control rights
of nonprofit entrepreneurs of closely held commercial nonprofits are
essentially equivalent to those of shareholders of close corporations.
Accordingly, since goodwill is an asset that has value only as part of
control rights, a nonprofit entrepreneur generally has the same ability
to access goodwill value as does a close corporation shareholder. As
controller of a closely held commercial nonprofit, he has full use and
enjoyment of the entity's goodwill. In translating a closely held
entity's value from a for-profit setting to a nonprofit setting, it would
be inappropriate to adjust for the absence of rights that have little
relevance to the benchmark value assigned in the for-profit context.
The rationale for the NDC discount is to adjust for the lack of
the residual claimant and transfer rights resulting from the non-
distribution constraint. However, the absence of residual claimant
and transfer rights detracts little from the ability to access goodwill
value. In comparison to shareholder rights in a for-profit business,
the residual claimant and transfer rights with respect to this "asset"
only have value isolated from the control right in two situations of
limited applicability: when profitability attributable to goodwill is
relatively high, implicating the residual claimant right; or when the on-
going business is sold, implicating both the residual claimant and
transfer rights. However, for reasons already discussed in this Article
and briefly reviewed at this juncture, an NDC discount is not
necessarily warranted in order to account for the possibility of these
two situations.
As previously noted, closely held corporations rarely achieve the
sorts of high profits that make the residual claimant right attrac-
tive." When high profits are achieved, closely held corporations
usually become more broadly held?3 Until profitability reaches
381. See supra text accompanying note 265. One commentator argues:
If goodwill exists, its exists only as a value which attaches to the business as a
whole. Consequently, the value of the goodwill can only be measured indirectly
by first determining the value of the business as a whole and then comparing this
value to the net values of the various separate assets and property rights of the
business. If an excess value of the business as a whole exists, then this difference
must represent the intangible known as goodwill.
Zipp, supra note 225, at 96-97; see also Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429,433 (Mo. 1987)
(holding that saleable goodwill is property that attaches to a business entity, not an
individual, and that goodwill is valuable only as an incident of a continuing business).
382. See supra notes 285-89 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 285-89 and accompanying text.
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such levels, a close corporation shareholder generally relies on her
control power to access profits by increasing her salary and employee
benefits. Similarly, a nonprofit entrepreneur can use his control
power to access goodwill value. As long as he controls the nonprofit
entity, the goodwill value inures to his personal benefit to the extent
that it results in increased residual returns that he uses to finance
additional salary and employee benefits for himself. The only
limitation on this indirect ability to capture the entity's profits
attributable to goodwill in the high profitability situation is that
compensation and perquisites must be "reasonable" relative to the
expanding operations of the entity?" Accordingly, unless the
goodwill valuation in a divorce setting'is based on projected
profitability attributable to accumulated marital goodwill that would
violate the reasonableness standard, a valuation discount because of
this limitation is unwarranted.
On the other hand, if the divorce valuation is based on projected
profitability attributable to goodwill that cannot reasonably be
calculated in the described manner, then it is likely, as previously
noted, that the nonprofit entrepreneur will be motivated to abandon
the nonprofit form and continue the business in a for-profit form. If
this is the case, then observations made in this Article about the
entrepreneur's ability to use his control power to dictate the method
of dissolution of the nonprofit entity" still mitigate against applying
an automatic NDC discount to goodwill value. Moreover, these same
observations also mitigate against applying an NDC discount to
account for the second situation referenced above as implicating
residual claimant and transfer rights, that is, a sale of the on-going
business.
With respect to this situation, the relevance of the nondistribution
constraint's negation of residual claimant and transfer rights may not
be eliminated but is significantly diminished. This situation exists
because the termination options for nonprofits operate to give the
nonprofit entrepreneur rights that are almost comparable to that of
the residual claimant and transfer rights held by close corporation
shareholders upon sale of a for-profit entity.
When a for-profit business is sold as an on-going concern, the
control right terminates, as does the continuing benefit of the goodwill
of the business. It is true that a shareholder's residual claimant and
384. See supra notes 85-87, 312-14, and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 315-19 and accompanying text.
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transfer fights then become relevant, because shareholders are able
to capture the built-up goodwill value existing as of the date of sale
in the form of any premium paid8 6 by the purchaser for good-
will. s  It is also true that the nondistribution constraint deprives
nonprofit entrepreneurs of a similar ability to capture goodwill value
via sale of the nonprofit entity because, as previously noted,ss the
proceeds of any such sale must be distributed to another nonprofit.
However, as previously discussed, 3 9 a nonprofit entrepreneur desir-
ing to re-incorporate in a for-profit form also has the potential to
capture most, if not all, of the goodwill of the nonprofit.
In order to comply with the nondistribution constraint, a
terminating nonprofit usually must donate and transfer to another
nonprofit either its assets or the proceeds of a liquidation sale of the
business.39° Typically, a terminating nonprofit will liquidate its
operations by selling its assets to one or several for-profit or nonprofit
entities and then distribute the sales proceeds to another nonprofit in
order to comply with the nondistribution constraint. These li-
quidation sales would not, and could not, include a sale of something
called the nonprofit's goodwill as a discrete asset since goodwill
cannot be sold as a separate asset.3 9'
If the entrepreneur uses his control power to select piecemeal
liquidation, rather than sale of the on-going business, as the method
of dissolution, and he is the principal purchaser of the assets at the
liquidation sale, he can continue the business in a new for-profit
386. PRATr, supra note 249, at 188-89.
387. However, absent a sale of an on-going business (as contrasted to a piecemeal
liquidation of the assets of a terminating for-profit), the residual claimant and transfer
rights have no relevance to goodwill value because goodwill, unlike discrete assets, cannot
be sold separately. See supra notes 254-55, 381 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 315-19 and accompanying text.
390. See supra text accompanying note 315.
391. Similarly, if termination is effected by donation and direct transfer of specific
assets to a successor nonprofit, the list of assets transferred would not and need not
include goodwill in order for the terminating nonprofit to comply with the nondistribution
constraint. Such direct asset transfers are essentially the same as a piecemeal liquidation
of the assets of the nonprofit, even when all the assets are transferred directly to one
entity. In such a situation, involving the transfer of all the assets to one successor entity,
much of the goodwill value of the terminating nonprofit could well be captured by the
successor, since it is receiving all the discrete assets at the same time. But this would be
a by-product rather than a required component of the transfer. When all the assets of a
business are sold or transferred to one entity, there can be the appearance of a transfer
of an on-going business even if there is no actual cessation of operations. This is
particularly true if the successor entity adopts the name of the terminated entity.
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venture at the same locale and potentially under the same name.39z
Few suppliers and independent contractors who do business with a
commercial nonprofit are likely to even be aware of its nonprofit
status. This is also true of many customers. Hence, if the principal
representative/operator of a terminated nonprofit entity with whom
such suppliers, contractors, and customers dealt continues doing the
same business, in the same locale, and under the same name, but in
a for-profit rather than a nonprofit form, he can capture the
nonprofit's goodwill in a for-profit form at minimal cost.3"
4. Valuation Analysis Summary
The includable nonprofit value can be based on a conceptual
formula that first uses a benchmark value equal to the value that
would be given a comparable for-profit entity. An NDC discount,
based on a leasehold analogy or comparable methodology, could then
be applied to the benchmark value to determine a minimum value for
the includable nonprofit interest. This value is suggested as only a
minimum value, however, because adjustments to the formula are
likely to be warranted in order to prevent double discounting and to
adjust for the special dignity of any component asset value upon
which the benchmark value might be based.
In particular, it is argued that the full goodwill value of the
nonprofit should be included without discount, because goodwill is not
a discrete "asset" to which anyone can hold legal title. Unlike
discrete assets, it cannot be "owned." Rather, it "inures in benefit"
to whoever controls the business to which it attaches. Goodwill
reflects real economic value. When that economic value has been
built up during the course of a marriage and is solely in the control
of a divorcing entrepreneur, it is marital property that should be
divided. There is no competing ownership claim for the goodwill
value. Its benefit flows totally in the direction of the controller of a
business. Accordingly, in the case of an entrepreneur of a closely
held commercial nonprofit, the goodwill of the business is essentially
392. See supra notes 315-19 and accompanying text.
393. In contrast, a shareholder of a for-profit business has no reason to capture
goodwill value for use in another for-profit form continuing the same business unless she
shares this value with other shareholders and wants to eliminate the interest of a co-owner.
In the latter situation, she likely will pay a significant goodwill-value premium to the co-
owner being bought out via a sale of the on-going business or a sale of the co-owner's
stock. Unlike the nonprofit entrepreneur, the ability of the purchasing shareholder to
manipulate a piecemeal sale of assets that preserves the full goodwill value is limited by
both the shared contiol power of the co-owner and fiduciary obligations.
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hers. Moreover, a nonprofit entrepreneur of a closely held commer-
cial nonprofit has virtually the same privileges of access to the
goodwill of the enterprise as close corporation shareholders have to
access the goodwill of a for-profit enterprise?94 For all of the above
reasons, the full value of the nonprofit's goodwill should be included
without an NDC discount, because the rationale for the discount is
inapplicable to the goodwill value.
F Summary of all Comparative Findings
Let us return to the comparative analysis of the hypothetical. Joe
Quality's control power over Quality Films makes him a de facto
owner of the nonprofit, subject only to the implications of the
nondistribution constraint. Accordingly, the value of the assets of
Quality Films should be considered for purposes of property-division
allocations upon Joe's divorce. In light of the nondistribution
constraint, the $70,000 value of the specific assets discussed in the
hypothetical-for example, equipment, furnishings, contract rights,
and accounts receivable-should be reduced by an NDC discount.
This may result in a significant reduction in value depending upon the
chosen discount methodology. On the other hand, the full $30,000
value of the goodwill should be included without an NDC discount
because goodwill is an asset that is insignificantly impacted by the
nondistribution constraint. The benefit of the goodwill's present value
inures almost entirely to Joe, as controller of Quality Films.
However, even if valuation experts disagree with the valuation
specifics offered in this Article, any such disagreement should not
detract from the fundamental conclusion that the interests held by
controllers of closely held commercial nonprofits should be considered
in divorce deliberations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The realities of sector-blurring dictate inclusion of the value of
closely held commercial nonprofits in value allocations upon divorce
394. Since an entrepreneur does not "own" the commercial nonprofit in the traditional
sense, a claim to any goodwill value might be countered by a mechanical argument that
there is no business owned by the entrepreneur to which the goodwill attaches. But in the
case of the goodwill value assigned to an entrepreneur of a nonprofit, commercial
enterprise, the goodwill is attached to a business. It is simply that the entirety of the
proprietary value of the business cannot be attributed to the nonprofit entrepreneur
because of the nondistribution constraint. Neither can it be argued that the nonprofit is
not a business. The information regarding sector-blurring and the increase in the number
of commercial nonprofits set forth at the beginning of this Article destroys this myth.
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of nonprofit entrepreneurs as a matter of fairness. The typical control
powers held by the nonprofit entrepreneurs of these entities are
essentially equivalent to the key incidents of ownership enjoyed by
close corporation shareholders. Similar circumstances warrant similar
legal treatment. Moreover, the parameters of existing divorce laws
for the attribution of proprietary value are sufficiently broad to
embrace the inclusion. Substance should predominate over form in
this situation.
Proof that a given nonprofit entrepreneur has the requisite
control power to be considered a de facto owner of the nonprofit
entity will be necessary. This Article has suggested standards for such
proof in this regard. If de facto ownership is established, then, at a
minimum, the full, undiscounted value of, the nonprofit's goodwill
should be included in the divorce allocations. In addition, the value
of the other assets of the nonprofit, discounted for the implications of
the nondistribution constraint, also should be included.
This Article has examined the narrow issue of the appropriate
treatment of divorcing nonprofit entrepreneurs of closely held com-
mercial nonprofits. Although this is a limited focus, the realities of
sector-blurring indicate that the subset of nonprofits and nonprofit
entrepreneurs to which this Article potentially may apply is sig-
nificant. Further, this Article's limited focus has served as a mag-
nifying glass for examining a number of matters of even broader
applicability, such as form versus substance, the control power in
closely held corporations (both for-profit and nonprofit), the
relevance of context to the meaning of property, and the need to
consider the different sizes of nonprofits and the varying focus of their
commercial activities as principal or ancillary activities in designing
nonprofit laws and norms.
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